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Doctors’	  orders	  and	  morally	  distressed	  nurses:	  an	  objection	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  a	  resolution.	  	  	  There	  are	  differing	  views	  on	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  moral	  distress	  in	  nursing,	  but	  essentially,	  most	  empirical	  work	  indicates	  that	  it	  is	  the	  nurse’s	  inability	  to	  do	  the	  right	  thing	  because	  she	  feels	  impeded	  from	  doing	  so,	  due	  to	  constraints	  such	  as	  organisational	  structures	  or	  lack	  of	  authority	  in	  medical	  decision	  making.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  moral	  distress.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  a	  poorly	  defined	  concept	  but	  that	  even	  so,	  the	  emotional	  and	  rational	  challenges	  that	  it	  brings	  to	  the	  nurse,	  are	  valid	  and	  worthy	  of	  more	  exploration.	  	  	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  moral	  distress	  is	  more	  or	  less	  synonymous	  with	  ‘troubled	  conscience’.	  Thereafter	  Catlin	  et	  al’s	  (2008)	  claim	  that	  the	  nursing	  profession	  ought	  to	  sanction	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  doctors’	  orders	  when	  nurses	  are	  morally	  distressed	  by	  perceived	  futile	  care	  will	  be	  examined.	  	  I	  will	  oppose	  this	  position,	  and	  argue	  that	  instead,	  nurses	  can	  limit	  their	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  actions	  performed	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  doctors.	  To	  defend	  my	  position	  will	  require	  the	  construction	  of	  arguments	  based	  on	  current	  legal	  and	  professional	  practice	  and	  philosophical	  concepts	  such	  as	  erroneous	  conscience,	  moral	  luck	  and	  the	  ethics	  of	  care.	  	  In	  seeking	  to	  defend	  my	  alternate	  view	  of	  how	  the	  nursing	  profession	  ought	  to	  behave	  under	  such	  circumstances,	  I	  will	  propose	  a	  new	  resolution	  to	  moral	  distress.	  This	  will	  involve	  ethical	  reasoning	  that	  includes	  consequetialist	  justifications	  within	  the	  paradigm	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  care.	  It	  will	  also	  involve	  addressing	  the	  emotional	  and	  spiritual	  challenges	  of	  nursing	  care,	  which	  I	  will	  argue	  have	  so	  far	  not	  been	  recognised	  as	  significant	  components	  of	  moral	  distress.	  	  	  Catlin	  A,	  Volat	  D,	  Hadley	  M.,	  Bassir	  R.,	  Armigo	  C.,	  Valle	  E.,	  Gong	  W.	  and	  Anderson	  K.	  (2008)	  Conscientious	  Objection:	  A	  Potential	  Neonatal	  Nursing	  Response	  to	  Care	  Orders	  That	  Cause	  Suffering	  at	  the	  End	  of	  Life?	  Study	  of	  a	  Concept.	  Research	  
in	  Nursing	  27	  (2)	  p.	  101	  –	  108.	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Notes	  on	  text	  	  Throughout	  this	  work,	  to	  prevent	  confusion,	  ‘he’	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  doctor	  and	  ‘she’	  to	  the	  nurse.	  	  ‘Futile’	   care	   will	   be	   referred	   to	   where	   the	   nurse	   (or	   other)	   perceives	   medical	  treatment	  to	  be	  overly	  aggressive.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  futile	  care,	  where	  medical	  treatment	   is	   agreed	   by	   consensus	   or	   medical	   opinion	   to	   be	   against	   the	   best	  interests	  of	  the	  patient	  because	  it	  is	  known	  that	  no	  improvement	  will	  be	  made.	  It	  should	   be	   noted	   that	   ‘care’	   refers	   to	   medical	   intervention,	   not	   nursing	   care,	  which	  is	  rarely	  if	  ever	  futile.	  	  In	  chapters	  one	  and	  two	  ‘moral	  distress’	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  term	  as	  it	  is	  commonly	  understood.	  	  In	  chapters	  three	  –	  seven,	  ‘moral	  distress’	  will	  mostly	  used	  to	  define	  the	  form	  of	  moral	   distress	   that	   this	   thesis	   takes	   as	   its	   subject;	   that	   is	   moral	   distress	   that	  arises	  from	  being	  asked	  to	  perform	  ‘futile’	  orders.	  	  For	   ease	   of	   reference,	   ethically	   challenging	   situations	   will	   be	   referred	   to	   as	  ‘ethical	  dilemmas’	  even	  though	  most	  are	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  ethical	  dilemmas.	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Prologue	  	  The	  subject	  chosen	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  grounded	  in	  clinical	  experience	  and	  has	  been	  written	  about	  by	  philosophical	  and	  empirical	  researchers	  since	  the	  early	  1980s.	  It	  will	  address	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress.	  As	  Wilkinson	  (1987)	  points	  out,	  nurses	   who	   experience	   moral	   distress	   are	   sincere,	   thoughtful	   and	   credible	  practitioners	  who	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  moral	  issues	  of	  their	  practice.	  	  There	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  moral	  distress	  that	  Nathaniel	  (2006)	  points	  out;	  that	  is	  that	  the	  objective	  bystander	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  see	  any	  ethical	  issue	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	   Indeed	  when	   the	  narrative	   that	   the	   reader	  will	   soon	   come	   to,	  was	  submitted	  to	  a	  peer-­‐reviewed	   journal,	   the	  reviewers	   initially	  could	  not	  see	  beyond	  an	  emotionally	  distressing	  incident.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	   ethical	   questions	   that	   need	   to	   be	   answered	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   normative	  conclusions	   about	   how	   nurses	   ought	   to	   respond	   to	   moral	   distress,	   and	  specifically	  for	  this	  thesis,	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  respond	  to	  medical	  orders	  that	  they	  identify	  as	  harmful	  to	  their	  patients.	  	  This	  work	  will	   be	   grounded	   in	  my	  own	  experience	  of	   nursing	   and	  will	   involve	  some	   reflexive	   analysis	   of	   the	   personal	   experience	   of	   moral	   distress	   in	   the	  narrative	   that	   is	   to	   follow.	   Chambon	   &	   Irving	   (2003)	   argue	   that	   once	   ethics	  enters	   into	   the	  world	  of	  experience	  and	  especially	  suffering,	   that	   reason	  seems	  fragile	  in	  its	  persistence	  to	  render	  everything	  under	  coherent	  argument.	  To	  some	  extent	  this	  will	  be	  true	  for	  this	  work.	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As	   an	   alternative	   choice,	   I	   could	   have	   looked	   into	   whether	   or	   not	   medically	  aggressive	  care	  is	  justifiable	  or	  not,	  when	  it	  is	  known	  that	  some	  will	  suffer	  in	  the	  meeting	   of	   this	   end.	   Such	   a	   stance	  would	   have	   led	   to	  more	   easily	   defined	   and	  articulated	  arguments	  than	  the	  subject	  I	  have	  chosen.	  	  	  The	  subject	  of	   this	   thesis	  does	   include	  consideration	  of	   the	  ethics	  of	  aggressive	  medical	  treatment.	  However,	  the	  prime	  focus	  will	  be	  the	  moral	  distress	  that	  the	  nurse	   experiences	   under	   these	   treatment	   orders.	   This	   is	   a	   nebulous	   cloud	   of	  emotional	  and	  articulated	  responses	  within	  which	  wrong-­‐doing	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  found	  to	  be	  present.	  	  	  This	   prologue	  will	   begin	  with	   the	   autobiographical	   narrative	   ‘Grim	   orders	   and	  fragile	   birds’	  which	   sets	   the	   scene	   for	  what	  will	   follow.	   Indeed	   it	   could	   almost	  stand	   by	   itself.	   However,	   before	   entering	   into	   the	   chapters	   that	   follow,	   a	   brief	  summary	  will	  be	  given	  about	  how	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  structured.	  	  	  Grim	  orders	  and	  fragile	  birds.1	  It	   is	   the	  year	  2000	  and	   I	  want	  you	   to	   imagine	  a	  ward	  of	  patients.	  You	  are	   in	   a	  nurse’s	  uniform.	  You	  are	  young	  and	  junior.	  Your	  name	  badge	  announces	  you	  as	  ‘Staff	  Nurse’.	   	   There	   are	   bays	   along	   the	   length	   of	   the	  ward,	   each	  housing	   eight	  patients,	   most	   with	   small	   machines	   by	   their	   beds	   that	   will	   spew	   clouds	   of	  medicine	   via	   facemasks.	   Just	   now	   the	   machines	   are	   quiet.	   But	   wait	   until	   the	  drugs	   round,	   and	   one	   by	   one	   they’ll	   waken,	   the	   sound	   of	   clapped	   out	   motors	  reaching	  a	   crescendo,	  until	   one	  by	  one	   the	  patients	   turn	   them	  off.	  The	  ward	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  1	  This	  narrative	  has	  been	  published.	  (Walsh,	  2010)	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full.	  Patients	  sit.	  Some	  wander.	  Others	  lie	  in	  side	  rooms	  with	  half	  closed	  doors.	  In	  one	  of	   the	  bays,	   sitting	   in	   the	   corner	   is	   an	  old	   lady.	  Her	  hair	   is	   curly	  grey.	  The	  nightdress	  she	  wears	  gapes	  about	  her	  chest.	   Its	   shoulders	  appear	   to	  hang	  off	  a	  coat	  hanger.	  The	  sleeves	  are	  billowy;	  almost	  sail	  like,	  with	  skinny	  arms	  flapping	  between.	  The	  fabric	  that	  used	  to	  fit	  now	  serves	  as	  a	  frame	  that	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  skeletal	  body	  that	  the	  woman	  has	  come	  to	  inhabit.	  The	  flesh	  on	  her	  face	  has	  collapsed	   into	   the	   shape	   of	   a	   skull.	   Her	   dentures	   rattle	   and	   dance	   when	   she	  speaks.	  Her	  eyes	  are	  bright	  blue.	  They	  shine	  and	  dart	  from	  side	  to	  side	  until	  you	  approach,	   sit,	   and	   touch	   her	   to	   gain	   her	   attention.	   There’s	   something	   bird	   like	  about	  her.	  Let’s	  call	  her	  Mrs	  Bird.	  	  Her	  eyes	  settle	  and	  rest	  into	  yours.	  The	  tubing	  snaking	  from	  the	  wall,	  across	  her	  bare	   ribs,	   around	  her	   ears	   and	  nose	   delivers	   oxygen.	   Carbon	  dioxide	   drenches	  her	  blood	  and	  so	  not	  too	  much	  oxygen,	  or	  she	  will	  stop	  breathing.	  No,	  breathing	  isn’t	  quite	  the	  right	  word.	  Panting.	  She	  pants,	  and	  has	  done	  for	  years.	  	  	  You	  touch	  her	  hand.	  Her	  fingers	  are	  cold,	  her	  nails	  are	  a	  wave	  of	  blue	  that	  curve	  over	  her	  finger	  tips.	  Her	  lips	  have	  a	  blue	  hue.	  The	  oxygen	  helps	  to	  keep	  her	  alive.	  Alive	   enough	   to	   eat	   tiny	   portions	   of	   food.	   Alive	   enough	   to	   have	   an	   echo	   of	  recognition	  when	  she	  sees	  her	  son	  visit.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  that	  there	  are	  things	  to	  do.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  feel	  the	  oxygen	  tubing	  pulling	  at	  her	  face	  when	  she	  gets	  up	  to	  see	  to	  her	  jobs.	  Alive	  enough	  in	  her	  low	  oxygen	  state,	  to	  have	  the	  sense	   -­‐	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   her	   confusion	   -­‐	   to	   take	   the	   tubing	   off	   and	   wander	   in	  pursuit	  of	  what	  exists	  in	  her	  thoughts.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  feel	  your	  hand	  and	  to	  be	  comforted	  by	  it.	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  The	   doctors	   do	   their	   round	   and	   take	   note	   that	   you	   have	   seen	   her	   condition	  deteriorate.	  This	   is	  her	   third	  admission	   in	   two	  months.	  Her	   stiffened	   lungs	  are	  not	  responding	  to	  the	  antibiotics	  and	  steroids	  that	  will	  clear	  infection	  and	  reduce	  inflammation.	  	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  round	  the	  charge	  nurse	  approaches.	  He	  tells	  you	  that	  Mrs	  Bird	  is	  to	  have	  a	  doxapram	  infusion.	  Doxapram.	  You	  feel	  your	  chest	  tighten.	  It’s	  a	  drug	  that	  makes	  patients	  breathe	  harder.	  It	  makes	  their	  muscles	  tremble.	  They	  don’t	  sleep.	   They	   are	   agitated.	   The	   last	   gravely	   ill	   person	   you	  managed	   on	   this	   drug	  was	   like	   a	   hunted	   fox.	  What	   about	  her	   steroids?	  Are	   they	   increasing	   the	  dose?	  Are	  they	  going	  to	  change	  her	  antibiotics?	  No,	  just	  doxapram.	  	  You	  begin	   to	  argue.	  What	   is	   the	  point	  of	  giving	  doxapram	  without	   treating	  any	  underlying	   condition?	   She	   wouldn’t	   be	   ventilated,	   so	   why	   make	   her	   self	  ventilate?	   With	   no	   hope	   of	   alleviating	   underlying	   conditions	   she	   will	   self	  ventilate	  and	  most	  likely	  die	  on	  the	  drug.	  	  Your	   primary	   nurse	   arrives.	   The	   sentence	   ‘we	   don’t	   commit	   euthanasia’	   is	  spoken.	  Next	  comes	  the	  junior	  doctor.	  You	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong.	  He	  takes	  you	  to	  the	  desk	   and	  draws	   a	  picture	   to	   show	  you	  how	  doxapram	  works	  on	  breathing	  rate	   and	   depth.	   You	   have	   a	   sudden	   flash	   of	   anger	   and	   feel	   like	   slapping	   him.	  You’ve	   worked	   in	   intensive	   care	   and	   so	   you	   slap	   him	   with	   this	   information	  instead.	  He	  apologises.	  Still	  no	  one	  ‘gets’	  it	  until	  the	  registrar	  arrives.	  You	  speak	  to	  him.	  He	  listens.	  He	  says	  he	  thinks	  you	  are	  right.	  There	  is	  a	  moment	  of	  relief;	  at	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least	  you	  have	  been	  heard.	  But	  he	  continues,	  that	  the	  consultant	  is	  now	  gone	  and	  the	  team	  will	  follow	  his	  plan.	  Then	  comes	  desperation;	  nothing	  will	  change.	  You	  are	   not	   the	   person	   who	   can	   alter	   the	   course	   of	   medical	   treatment.	   You	   have	  argued	   your	   case.	   You	   have	   taken	   it	   to	   the	   highest	   level.	   You	   have	   been	  understood.	  But	  the	  senior	  doctor	  makes	  the	  decision.	  	  So	  stop.	  Take	  in	  what	  has	  happened	  so	  far.	  Touch	  the	  smooth	  steel	  of	  the	  artery	  forceps	   in	   your	  breast	  pocket.	   You	  have	   spent	   the	  morning	  helping	  patients	   to	  wash	   and	   to	   clamber	   onto	   the	   commode.	   The	   Irish	   patient	   has	   joked	  with	   his	  fellow	  inmates	  that	  you	  are	  ‘the	  flasher’,	  you	  having	  woken	  him	  a	  few	  nights	  ago	  with	  your	  torch	  shining	  in	  his	  face	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  he	  wasn’t	  dead.	  He	  wasn’t	  dead,	  but	  the	  shock	  of	  waking	  to	  the	  bright	  light	  and	  you	  looming	  anxiously	  over	  him	  almost	   killed	  him.	   You	  have	   travelled	   to	   and	   from	   the	   sluice	   to	   dispose	   of	  urine	  and	   faeces	  and	   then	  pushed	   the	  drugs	   trolley	   from	  bed	   to	  bed.	  You	  have	  informed	   relatives	   of	   a	   patient’s	   death	   and	   laid	   out	   the	   body	   ready	   for	   their	  arrival.	   Next	   door	   another	   patient	   is	   dying.	   You	   have	   cleaned	   his	   mouth	   and	  turned	  him.	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  every	  early	  shift,	  you	  sweat.	  	  Mrs	  Bird	  is	  looking	  out	  of	   the	  window,	   the	   fan	   that	  helps	  her	   feel	  more	  able	   to	  breathe,	   blowing	  a	  breeze	  into	  her	  face.	  	  The	   charge	   nurse	   sees	   that	   you	   are	   visibly	   distressed.	   Academics	   would	   state	  ‘morally	  distressed.’	  It’s	  the	  distress	  you	  feel	  because	  you	  believe	  you	  know	  the	  right	  action	  to	  take,	  but	  are	  not	  able	  to	  carry	  it	  out.	  	  He	  touches	  your	  arm	  –	  you	  will	  not	  forget	  his	  compassion.	  He	  tells	  you	  he	  can	  see	  how	  upset	  you	  are,	  that	  it	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is	   ok	   and	   he	   offers	   to	   put	   up	   the	   infusion	   for	   you.	   You	   have	   been	   offered	   the	  opportunity	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  carrying	  out	  a	  medical	  treatment.	  	  Let	  the	  ward	  lights	  dim.	  Let	  the	  scene	  fade	  to	  darkness.	  Let	  yourself	  take	  centre	  stage.	  Let	  the	  spotlight	  shine	  on	  you.	  It	  is	  time	  to	  examine	  your	  conscience.	  You	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  perform	  an	  action.	  You	  believe	  that	  the	  action	  is	  wrong.	  Most	  likely	  it	  is	  wrong.	  You	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  remove	  yourself	  from	  that	  action.	  Your	  charge	  nurse	  will	  assemble	  the	  equipment,	  prepare	  the	  infusion	  and	  attach	  it	  to	  Mrs	  Bird.	  He	  will	  set	  the	  rate	  and	  press	  the	  start	  button.	  Your	  ‘hands’	  will	  be	  clean.	   Such	   a	   simple	   answer	   to	   the	   situation.	   Your	   distress	   will	   ease.	   Your	  autonomy	  and	  integrity	  will	  be	  protected.	  But	  is	  this	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do?	  Ought	  you	  to	  be	  the	  focus?	  	  What	  about	  Mrs	  Bird?	  What	  about	  the	  other	  patients?	  	  	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  their	  nurse	  and	  where	  does	  your	  responsibility	  lie?	  Most	  importantly	  where	  does	  your	  responsibility	  end?	  And	  when	  you	  define	  its	  limits	  –	  if	  you	  exchange	  some	  autonomy	  for	  some	  humility	  -­‐	  does	  it	  free	  you	  of	  a	  burden	  in	  order	  to	  do	  something	  else?	  	  	  The	  dying	  patient	  in	  the	  side	  room	  needs	  to	  be	  turned	  again.	  His	  mouth	  is	  dry.	  It	  is	   time	   to	   soak	   a	   sponge	   in	   water	   and	   then	   rest	   it	   in	   his	   mouth.	   He	   appears	  unconscious	  but	  will	   furiously	   suck	  when	   the	   sponge	   touches	  his	   tongue.	   Such	  matters	   are	   the	   responsibility	   of	   nurses.	   Tedious,	   repetitive	   and	   physically	  demanding	  labour	  that	  eases	  suffering	  and	  that	  literally	  protects	  patients’	  bodies	  from	  decay.	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Your	  code	  of	  conduct	  does	  not	  allow	  you	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  carrying	  out	  medical	   treatment,	   or	   dare	   I	   go	   as	   far	   as	   to	   say	   ‘carry	   out	   a	   doctor’s	   orders’?	  Academics	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  your	  distress	  and	  your	  powerlessness.	  They	  wish	  to	  promote	   your	   professional	   autonomy.	   The	   solution	   is	   to	   alleviate	   it	   with	  empathic	  workshops,	  ethics	  rounds	  and	  egalitarian	  collaboration	  between	  health	  care	  teams.	  	  They	  concentrate	  their	  research	  in	  hospices	  and	  intensive	  care	  units	  where	   funding	   and	   staff	   can	   accommodate	   grand	   ideology	   and	   where	   ‘ethical	  dilemmas	  are	  a	  theatre	  advertised	  in	  neon	  lights.	  But	  this	  is	  a	  busy	  medical	  ward.	  Mrs	  Bird	   is	  getting	  up.	  She	  pulls	  at	  her	  nightdress.	  You	  need	   to	  make	  sure	   that	  she	  does	  not	  wet	  herself.	  That	  she	  sits	  down	  before	  she	  falls.	  	  There	   is	  an	  error	  made	   in	  medical	  ethics	  when	  your	  moral	  distress	  and	   lack	  of	  autonomy	   becomes	   the	   focus	   of	   research	   and	   attention.	   There	   is	  more	   to	   this	  scene	  than	  meets	  the	  eye	  of	  many	  ethicists.	  You	  are	  a	  nurse.	  You	  can	  engage	  in	  what	   is	  seen	  to	  be	   lofty	  debate	  about	  the	  rightness	  of	  medical	   intervention	  and	  indeed	   I	   do	   not	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   you	   ought	   not	   to	   have	   argued	   the	   case	  	  against	  doxapram.	  An	  opiate	  would	  have	  eased	  her.	  However,	  don’t	   forget	   that	  the	   important	  person	   is	  Mrs	  Bird.	   It	   is	  not	  you.	  Whilst	  you	  discuss	  and	  distress	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  she	  should	  have	  the	  drug,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  put	  up	  the	  infusion	  or	  who	  else	  can	  do	  it	   if	  you	  don’t,	  Mrs	  Bird	  is	  thirsty.	  She	  has	  been	  sat	  too	   long	  on	  the	  chair	  and	  the	  skin	  on	  her	  buttocks	  will	  start	   to	  peel.	  She	  hasn’t	  passed	  faeces	  for	  three	  days	  and	  is	  feeling	  bloated.	  Is	  thirst	  or	  constipation	  any	  less	  of	  a	  distressing	  symptom	  than	  side	  effects	  of	  a	  drug?	  Is	   it	   less	  deserving	  of	  attention?	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Take	  yourself	   to	  the	  medicine	  room.	  Prepare	  the	   infusion.	  Accept	  that	  you	  now	  perform	  an	  action	  for	  which	  you	  can	  limit	  what	  you	  are	  responsible	  for.	  It	  is	  the	  doctor	  who	  has	  prescribed	   the	  medication.	   It	   is	   the	  doctor	  who	  has	   refused	   to	  alter	   the	   course	  of	   treatment	  despite	  his	   agreement	  with	   you	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	  best	  treatment	  to	  proceed	  with.	  This	  is	  not	  murder,	  it	   is	  at	  worst	  a	  bad	  medical	  decision,	  but	  who	  knows	  what	  might	  happen	  next?	  The	  odds	  are	   that	  Mrs	  Bird	  will	  die,	  but	  remember	  you	  deal	  in	  odds	  and	  they	  are	  not	  a	  certainty.	  Accept	  that	  at	  worst	  Mrs	  Bird	  will	  most	   likely	   suffer	   side	   effects	   that	  will	   distress	   her	   and	  that	   in	   a	   better	   world	   she	   would	   not	   be	   receiving	   this	   drug.	   Accept	   that	   in	   a	  better	  world	  she	  would	  not	  suffer	  respiratory	   failure.	  Accept	   that	   in	   this	  world	  you	   can	   only	   do	   your	   best	   under	   the	   circumstances.	   Limit	   what	   you	   are	  responsible	  for	  -­‐	  you	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  making	  sure	  that	  the	  drug	  is	  at	  the	  correct	  dosage,	  that	  it	  will	  infuse	  correctly	  and	  safely	  and	  that	  you	  will	  watch	  her	  closely	  for	  the	  coming	  hours.	  	  	  Know	  that	  you	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  free	  yourself	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  responsibility	   that	   it	   is	   you	   who	   will	   cause	   her	   to	   suffer	   when	   you	   start	   the	  infusion.	  Know	   that	   in	   freeing	  yourself	   from	   this	  burden	  you	  will	  be	   free	   to	  do	  something	  else	  for	  your	  patient.	  You	  will	  be	  free	  to	  feel	  compassion.	  You	  will	  be	  free	  to	  consider	  her	  needs	  rather	  than	  your	  own.	  You	  will	  be	  free	  to	  nurse	  her	  –	  to	  remain	  close	  rather	   than	  avoid	  her,	   to	  walk	  with	  her	  whatever	  path	  unfolds.	  This	   is	  the	  essence	  of	  nursing	  –	  to	  remain	  with	  the	  patient	  and	  walk	  with	  them	  every	   step	   of	   the	   way;	   to	   remain	   with	   the	   patient	   when	   all	   the	   other	  professionals	  walk	  out	  of	  the	  door.	  	  	  
	   15	  
It	   is	   time	   to	  bring	   the	  medication	   to	  Mrs.	  Bird’s	  bedside.	  You	  push	   the	   infusion	  pump	  to	  her	  bedside.	  You	  sit.	  You	  touch	  her	  hand.	  You	  explain	  that	  the	  doctors	  have	  decided	   to	  give	  her	   some	  medicine.	  You	   tell	  her	   that	   it	  will	  help	  with	  her	  breathing.	  You	  tell	  her	  that	  you	  will	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  her.	  She	  looks	  into	  your	  eyes	  and	  for	  a	  little	  while	  looks	  peaceful.	  It	  is	  not	  long	  before	  you	  see	  the	  tremors	  start	  in	  her	  hands.	  	  The	   act	   is	   done.	   You	   have	   made	   the	   decision	   to	   set	   up	   the	   infusion	   for	   your	  patient	   despite	   the	   charge	   nurse	   offering	   to	   do	   it	   for	   you.	   At	   the	   time	   you	  believed	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  follow	  your	  code	  of	  conduct,	  and	  carry	  out	  your	  duty	  to	  follow	  prescribed	  medical	  treatment.	  	  	  You	  went	  home	   that	   evening	   feeling	  defeated	  and	  with	   the	   emotional	   strain	  of	  having	  felt	  that	  you	  had	  done	  something	  in	  a	  caring	  manner	  that	  was	  wrong.	  You	  felt	  duplicitous.	  I	  wish,	  watching	  you	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  event,	  that	  your	  ethical	  reasoning	  had	  extended	  beyond	  your	  code	  of	  conduct	  duties	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  loss	  of	  integrity	  that	  resulted.	  If	  only	  you	  had	  had	  the	  humility	  to	  limit	  your	  sense	  of	  responsibility	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   that	   you	   had	   freed	   yourself	   to	   concentrate	   on	  nursing	  care.	  If	  only	  you	  hadn’t	  have	  felt	  inclined	  to	  take	  flight	  from	  Mrs	  Bird,	  as	  the	  researchers	  have	   found	  happens,	  because	  all	  you	  could	  see	  was	  the	  wrong-­‐doing	  of	  the	  medical	  intervention	  and	  your	  own	  complicity	  in	  causing	  that	  harm.	  	  	  If	  only	  you	  had	  also	  realised	  something	  else.	  That	  we	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  point	  of	  history	  with	  in	  which	  the	  stories	  of	  our	  lives	  are	  told.	  Today	  palliative	  care	  teams	  are	  involved	  with	  patients	  such	  as	  Mrs	  Bird.	  	  The	  limitations	  in	  her	  care	  were	  as	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much	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   times	   in	   which	   she	   was	   sick,	   as	   a	   reflection	   on	   the	  characters	  who	   crossed	  her	   path	  during	  her	   hospital	   stay.	   I	  wish	   that	   you	  had	  realised	   that	   your	   experience	   with	   Mrs	   Bird	   would	   extend	   throughout	   your	  career	  in	  positive	  ways.	  The	  event	  that	  made	  you	  consider	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  labour	  of	  nursing	  and	  the	  importance	  that	  this	  labour	  be	  recognised	  as	  worthy	  of	  academic	  discourse	   in	   circles	  more	   inclined	   to	   concentrate	  on	   the	  dilemmas	  of	  medicine	  and	  science.	  	  	  But	  the	  present	  tense	  does	  not	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight.	  It	  is	  time	  to	  return	  to	  the	  year	  2000.	  You	  are	  in	  nurse’s	  uniform.	  Your	  name	  badge	  announces	  you	  as	  ‘staff	  nurse’.	  You	  arrive	  in	  the	  ward	  the	  next	  morning.	  At	  handover	  you	  ask	  how	  Mrs	  Bird	  has	  fared	  overnight.	  You	  are	  told	  that	  she	  died	  in	  the	  early	  hours	  with	  the	  doxapram	  infusion	  running.	  You	  know	  she	  had	  struggled	  for	  the	  last	  hours	  of	  her	  life.	  There	  had	  been	  no	  palliation	  of	  her	  symptoms.	  Although	  her	  death	  was	  more	  difficult	   than	   it	  need	  to	  have	  been,	  she	  had	  been	  warm,	  she	  had	  not	  been	  thirsty	   and	   she	   had	   been	   cared	   for.	   As	   the	   dawn	   begins	   to	   break	   the	   junior	  doctor,	   who	   was	   on	   call	   all	   night,	   discusses	   the	   coming	   ward	   round	   with	   the	  charge	  nurse.	  The	  registrar	  is	  at	  home	  rising	  from	  his	  bed.	  The	  patients	  begin	  to	  switch	  on	  the	  machines	  by	  their	  beds,	  the	  sound	  of	  clapped	  out	  motors	  rising	  and	  filling	  the	  air.	  It	  is	  time	  to	  go	  and	  lay	  out	  Mrs	  Bird’s	  body	  in	  readiness	  to	  greet	  her	  son.	  He	  will	  be	  coming	  to	  pay	  his	  last	  respects	  soon.	  	  	  	   	   _______________________________________________________	  The	   thesis	  will	  be	  structured	  as	   follows.	   In	  chapters	  one	  and	   two	   the	  nature	  of	  moral	   distress	  will	   be	   examined	   and	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   or	   not	   it	   can	   be	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considered	  a	  valid	  source	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  wrong-­‐doing	  will	  be	  identified.	  In	   chapter	   three,	   the	   relationship	   between	   moral	   distress,	   conscience	   and	  conscientious	  objection	  will	  be	  demonstrated.	  Conscientious	  objection	  to	  overly	  aggressive	  medical	  orders	  will	  be	  examined	  as	  a	  response	  to	  moral	  distress	  and	  an	  initial	  analysis	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  position	  is	  supportable	  for	  nurses,	  will	  be	   made.	   In	   chapters	   four,	   five	   and	   six	   it	   will	   be	   argued	   that	   conscientious	  objection	   by	   nurses	   in	   response	   to	   overly	   aggressive	   medical	   orders	   is	   not	  supportable	   when	   philosophy,	   law	   and	   professional	   codes	   of	   conduct	   are	  examined	  respectively.	  Finally	  in	  chapter	  seven	  the	  most	  serious	  objection	  to	  the	  arguments	   presented	   in	   chapters	   four	   to	   six	   will	   be	   described	   and	   refuted.	  Finally,	   alternative	   resolutions	   to	   moral	   distress	   will	   be	   suggested.	   In	   the	  epilogue	  the	  original	  narrative	  will	  be	  returned	  to,	  in	  a	  final	  analysis	  to	  identify	  if	  the	  arguments	  that	  were	  initially	  made	  have	  withstood	  more	  intensive	  research.	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Chapter	  One:	  Moral	  distress	  
Introduction	  
This	   chapter	  will	   review	  and	  analyse	   the	  empirical	  work	   that	  has	  been	   carried	  out	   on	  moral	   distress.	   The	  way	   in	  which	  moral	   distress	   is	   understood	  will	   be	  presented,	  followed	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  why	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  issue	  for	  nursing	  practice.	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  harm	  that	  moral	  distress	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  is	  caused	  by	  three	  potential	  sources	  of	  wrong-­‐doing.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  primary	  harm	   is	  done	   to	   the	  patient.	   Secondly,	   there	   is	  a	   secondary	  harm.	  This	  harm	  is	  a	  harm	  experienced	  directly	  by	  nurses	  or	  that	  indirectly	  effects	  the	  patient	  through	  harm	  that	  the	  nurse	  experiences.	  	  
It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  researchers	  tend	  to	  identify	  a	  primary	  harm,	  but	  then	  tend	  to	   address	   the	   secondary	   harm	   and	   not	   the	   primary	   harm	  when	   they	   suggest	  resolutions	  to	  ease	  moral	  distress.	  In	  other	  words,	  although	  researchers	  identify	  primary	  harm	  to	  the	  patient,	   in	  the	   introduction	  to	  their	  work,	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  harm	  alters	  as	  normative	  conclusions	  are	  presented.	  	  
Moral	  Distress:	  Definitions	  
There	   are	   two	   definitions	   of	   moral	   distress	   that	   are	   most	   commonly	   cited	   by	  empirical	   researchers	   and	   these	   have	   been	   provided	   by	   Jameton	   (1984)	   and	  Nathaniel	  (2003).	  Jameton	  (1984)	  was	  the	  first	  person	  to	  define	  the	  experience	  as	   a	   specific	   concept.	   He	   defined	   it	   as	   the	   feelings	   and	   experiences	   that	   result	  from	  a	  moral	  conflict	  where	  one	  knows	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‘the	   right	   thing	   to	   do,	   but	   institutional	   constraints	   make	   it	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  pursue	  the	  right	  course	  of	  action’	  (p.	  6).	  
Wilkinson	  (1987,	  p16)	  at	  around	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  taking	  up	  Jameton’s	  ideas,	  defined	  it	  as:	  
	  ‘the	   psychological	   disequilibrium	   and	   negative	   feeling	   state	  experienced	  when	  a	  person	  makes	  a	  moral	  decision	  but	  does	  not	   follow	   through	   by	   performing	   the	   moral	   behavior	  indicated	  by	  that	  decision’.	  (p.16)	  	  
A	   later	   refinement	  of	   this	  definition	  has	  been	  offered	  by	  Nathaniel	   (2003)	  who	  described	  it	  as:	  
	  ‘the	  pain	  or	  anguish	  effecting	  the	  mind,	  body	  or	  relationships	  in	  response	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   a	   person	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   moral	  problem,	   acknowledges	   personal	   responsibility	   and	   makes	   a	  moral	  judgment	  about	  the	  correct	  action,	  yet	  as	  a	  result	  of	  real	  or	  perceived	   constraints	   participates	   in	   perceived	   moral	   wrong-­‐doing.’	  (p22)	  
Moral	  distress	  has	  been	  accepted	  as	  a	  valid	  term	  by	  the	  American	  Association	  of	  Critical	  Care	  Nursing	  (AACN,	  2010)	  and	  it	  has	  a	  validated	  tool	  for	  measurement	  (Corley	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Studies	  indicate	  that	  between	  around	  thirty	  (Redmond	  and	  Fry	   2000)	   and	   fifty	   (Rushton	   and	   Scanlon,	   1995)	   percent	   of	   nurses	   have	  experienced	  it.	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Further	  to	  these	  definitions	  it	  can	  be	  subdivided	  into	  two	  forms.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  ‘moral	   distress’	   that	   occurs	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   incident.	   Depending	   on	   how	   the	  incident	   is	   resolved,	  moral	   distress	  might	   be	   resolved	   or	   eased,	   or	   else	   it	  may	  become	   ‘reactive	   moral	   distress’,	   where	   the	   situation	   is	   not	   resolved,	   and	   a	  residue	  of	  the	  emotions	  continue,	  despite	  passage	  of	  time	  (Wilkinson,	  1987).	  
The	  common	  ground	  that	  Jameton	  and	  Nathaniel	  share,	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  the	  term	  ‘moral	  distress’	  can	  with	  certainty,	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  emotional	  response	  to	  a	  morally	   charged	   situation.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   a	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   is	  specified	   in	   the	   second,	   and	   can	   be	   inferred	   from	   the	   first,	   given	   that	   Jameton	  refers	   to	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   need	   to	   act:	   when	   one	   decides	   upon	   an	   action,	  responsibility	   for	   that	   action	   necessarily	   lies	   with	   the	   person	   who	   decides	   to	  cause	   an	   act	   to	   occur.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	   point	   of	   difference	   between	   both	  definitions.	  Nathaniel	  departs	   from	  Jameton	  when	  he	  uses	  the	  word	   ‘perceived’	  in	   reference	   to	   the	   constraints	   and	   wrong-­‐doing2	   that	   the	   nurse	   feels	   she	  participates	  in.	  Unlike	  Jameton,	  Nathaniel	  includes	  the	  insinuation,	  that	  the	  nurse	  is	  not	  always	  correct	  in	  her	  identification	  of	  constraints,	  nor	  in	  her	  identification	  of	   wrong-­‐doing.	   This	   nuance	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   to	   elucidate,	   that	   is,	   does	  moral	  distress	  identify	  harm	  to	  patients	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  harm	  and	  what	  can	  nurses	  do	  about	  it?	  The	  second	  question	  that	  requires	  attention	  is	  that	  should	  it	  be	  found	  that	  it	  does	  not	  identify	  moral	  harm	  to	  patients,	  then	  what	  else	  does	  it	  indicate,	  and	  in	  that	  case	  what	  ought	  to	  done?	  	  
Most	   authors,	   whichever	   definition	   they	   initially	   refer	   to,	   either	   explicitly	   or	  implicitly	  include	  an	  assumption	  that	  moral	  distress	  arises	  from	  an	  initial	  act	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  2	  Wrong-­‐doing	  is	  synonymous	  with	  an	  act	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  patient	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harm	  to	  patients3.	  For	  example,	  Austin	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  state	  that	  nurses	  experience	  moral	  distress	  when	  	  
‘the	  choice	   for	   the	  good	   is	  quite	  clear,	  but	   the	   implementation	  of	  the	  morally	  acceptable	  action	  is	  thwarted.’(p34)	  
	  Epstein	   and	   Delgado	   (2010)	   and	   Payne	   (2011)	   refer	   to	   moral	   distress,	   as	  knowing	   the	   right	   thing	   to	   do,	   and	   Payne	   goes	   so	   far	   as	   to	   state	   that	   the	  constraints	  to	  action	  are	  what	  are	  perceived,	  or	  psychologically	  constructed	  and	  not	  the	  harm	  that	  was	  initially	  identified.	  	  
This	  initial	  act	  of	  wrong-­‐doing	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  directly	  involving	  the	  patient,	  such	  as	   aggressive	  medical	   treatment	   (Elpern	  et	   al.,	   2005;	  Rice	   et	   al.,	   2008)	  or	  relate	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  lack	  of	  proper	  resources	  (Harrowing	  &	  Mill,	  2010).	  This	  is	  the	  ‘primary	  harm’	  or	  ‘primary	  wrong-­‐doing’	  that	  moral	  distress	  describes.	  	  
Authors	  who	  empirically	  research	  and	  describe	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress	  identify	   primary	   harm	   but	   then	   tend	   to	   ‘leap’	   from	   the	   description	   of	   moral	  distress	   to	   normative	   statements	   about	   other	   forms	   of	   harm,	   that	   is	   the	  secondary	  harms	  done	  to	  the	  nurse	  and	  indirectly	  the	  patient,	  and	  then	  discuss	  how	   it	   ought	   to	   be	   resolved.	   Most	   commonly,	   the	   resolution	   addresses	   the	  secondary	  harm,	  although	  as	   shall	  be	   seen,	  Catlin	  et	   al.	   (2008)	   in	  her	   study	  on	  conscientious	   objection,	   concedes	   to	   and	   addresses	   the	   primary	   harm	   that	   is	  perceived	   to	  be	  done	   to	   the	  patient.	  This	   finding	   that	  an	  ethical	  analysis	  of	   the	  nature	  of	  harm	  and	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  done	  about	  it	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  empirical	  literature	  is	  supported	  by	  Repenshek	  (2009)	  who	  argues	  that	  moral	  distress	  is	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  3	  Or	  patient.	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case	   of	  mistaken	   identity,	  where	   the	   nurse	  misidentifies	  moral	   uncertainty	   for	  certainty.	   Nathaniel	   (2003)	   also	   supports	   the	   position	   that	   the	   differences	   in	  opinion	  that	  arise	  in	  moral	  distress	  do	  not	  arise	  from	  actual	  harm.	  
Particular	  and	  contextual	  causes	  of	  moral	  distress.	  	  
Moral	  distress	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  number	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  can	  be	  divided	  in	  to	  two.	   Firstly	   there	   are	   the	   particular	   causes	   that	   are	   associated	   with	   primary	  harm.	  Secondly	   there	  are	  contextual	   causes	   that	  are	  associated	  with	   secondary	  harm.	  	  
Particular	   causes	   of	   moral	   distress	   are	   the	   incidents	   that	   directly	   effect	   the	  patient	  or	  patients,	  and	  that	  cause	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress	  in	  a	  particular	  nurse	   in	   a	   particular	   circumstance.	   Nurses	   have	   been	   shown	   to	   identify	  many	  practices	  as	  causative	  of	  moral	  distress.	  These	  causes	  are	  varied,	  but	  include	  for	  example,	   doctors	   giving	   overly	   optimistic	   prognoses	   to	   patients	   or	   families,	  (Ferral,	   2006)	   families	   pushing	   for	   treatment	   to	   continue	   where	   prognosis	   is	  poor,	   (Ferral,	   2006)	   aggressive	  medical	   care	  which	  means	   that	  patients	  do	  not	  die	  well,	   (Corley,	   1995;	   Elpern	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Ferral,	   2006,	  Hamrick	  &	  Blackhall,	  2007),	   working	   at	   perceived	   unsafe	   staff	   levels	   (Rodney	   &	   Starkomski,	   1993;	  Austin	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Ohnishi	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  performing	  tests	  or	  procedures	  that	  were	   judged	   unnecessary	   (Zuzelo,	   2007).	   Of	   these	   potential	   sources	   of	   moral	  distress,	   the	   participation	   in	   cases	   of	   aggressive	   medical	   treatment	   where	  survival	  is	  unlikely	  –	  in	  other	  words	  participation	  in	  acts	  that	  are	  described,	  not	  quite	  literally	  accurately,	  as	  ‘medically	  futile’,	  have	  been	  consistently	  reported	  as	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causing	   the	   most	   acute	   and	   distressing	   symptoms	   of	   moral	   distress.4	  	  (Beckstrand	  &	  Kirchhoff,	  2005;	  Meltzer	  &	  Hckabay,	  2004;	  Ferrell,	  2006)	  
With	   contextual	   external	   causes	   of	  moral	   distress,	   some	   authors	   ground	   these	  particular	  external	  causes	   in	  a	  broader	  sociological	  context.	  There	  appear	  to	  be	  broadly	  two	  frameworks	  that	  contextualise	  these	  causes	  of	  moral	  distress.	  Both	  of	   these	   frameworks	   overlap	   and	   are	   associated	   with	   the	   secondary	   harm	  identified	  in	  moral	  distress.	  	  
Firstly,	   authors	   identify	   a	   power	   imbalance	   as	   the	   ground	  within	  which	  moral	  distress	   arises.	   For	   example,	   some	   authors	   refer	   to	   a	   power	   imbalance,	  where	  nurses	   are	   given	   lots	   of	   responsibility	   and	   little	   authority	   (Pendry	  2007)	   or	   as	  Sundin-­‐Huard	   and	   fahy	   (1999)	   state,	   nurses	   have	   roles	   that	   convey	   more	  responsibilities	   than	   rights	   to	   correct	   the	   mistakes	   of	   doctors	   or	   managers.	  Austin	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   cite	   the	   seniority	   of	   doctors	   as	   a	   cause.	   Corley	   (1995),	   an	  author	  who	  has	  written	  extensively	  in	  the	  field	  of	  moral	  distress,	  states	  her	  case	  strongly,	  identifying	  that	  nurses	  are	  subservient	  to	  two	  masters:	  the	  organisation	  that	   pays	   their	   salary	   and	   the	   physicians	  who	   direct	   their	   care.	   Some	   authors	  take	   a	   specifically	   feminist	   approach	   to	   this	   issue,	   for	   example	   Erlin	   (2001)	  identifies	  the	  prime	  cause	  of	  moral	  distress	  as	  being	  fundamentally	  caused	  by	  the	  imbalance	  of	  power	  between	  nurses	  and	  doctors	  and	  that	  it	  links	  to	  gender	  roles,	  where	  deference	  to	  the	  doctor	  is	  expected	  and	  where	  the	  professional	  autonomy	  of	   the	   nurse	   is	   violated.	   The	   nurse	   might	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this	   imbalance,	  particularly	  when	  she	  disagrees	  with	  a	  plan	  of	  care,	  become	  submissive	  and	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  4	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  ‘futile’	  care	  from	  now	  on	  to	  indicate	  aggressive	  medical	  care	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  overly	  aggressive	  and	  that	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  patient	  to	  die	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  nurses,	  with	  peace	  and	  dignity.	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do	   for	   the	   patient	   what	   is	   necessary.	   Jameton	   (1984,	   p37)	   argues	   that	   nurses	  have	   a	   history	   that	   was	   submissive	   and	   subservient	   to	   both	   physicians	   and	  institutions,	   which	   was	   not	   overthrown	   until	   the	   1970s	   and	   the	   birth	   of	  feminism.56	   	   Presumably	   despite	   this	   ‘overthrow’	   some	   of	   the	   same	   continues.	  Mathes	  (2004)	  argues	   that	  nurses	  don’t	  demonstrate	  autonomy	  of	   thought	  due	  to	  this	  subservience	  to	  doctors	  and	   institutions	  and	  Austin	  et	  al.	   (2005a)	  argue	  that	  moral	  distress	  is	  a	  result	  of	  this	  relational	  aspect	  of	  nursing.	  
Secondly,	   other	   authors	   identify	   a	   conflict	   between	   the	   values	   and	   goals	   of	  medicine	   versus	   nursing.	   For	   example,	   Gutierrez	   (2005)	   identifies	   a	   conflict	  between	  nursing	  and	  medicine,	  where	  the	  purpose	  and	  values	  of	  each	  can	  be	  in	  opposition	  to	  one	  another;	  put	  simply	  one	  to	  care,	  the	  other	  to	  cure.	  It	  could	  be	  that	   these	   individual	   goals	   might	   result	   from	   different	   ethical	   frameworks:	  perhaps	   doctors	   tend	   to	   have	   a	   consequential	   view	   where	   the	   goodness	   of	  survival	  of	  the	  few	  is	  valued,	  whereas	  nurses	  take	  a	  more	  agent	  centred	  view	  of	  morality,	  where	  the	  wrongness	  of	  causing	  harm	  to	  the	  individual	  who	  is	  treated	  but	   dies,	   is	   more	   apparent.	   Some	   support	   for	   this	   conflict	   in	   perspective	   is	  offered	  by	  Elder	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  who	  found	  that	  nurses	  and	  medical	  students	  judged	  ethical	  situations	  differently.	  Nurses	  tended	  to	  take	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  patient	  and	  argued	  from	  this	  point	  in	  an	  advocacy	  style	  whilst	  medical	  students	  tended	  to	  identify	  more	  with	  the	  profession	  of	  medicine.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  5	  Examples	  of	  such	  subservience	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Fagin	  &	  Garelick	  (2004)	  where	  quotes	  from	  the	  early	  1900s	  demonstrate	  at	  least	  some	  doctors’	  views	  of	  nurses’	  place	  in	  the	  hierarchy.	  6	  Olsen	  (1996)	  offers	  another	  feminist	  historical	  perspective	  on	  this	  issue,	  concentrating	  on	  professionalisation	  of	  nursing.	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Furthermore,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	  Gronlund	  et	  al.’s	   (2011)	  study	   found	  that	   physicians	   experience	   decision-­‐making	   in	   the	   field	   of	   nephrology,	   as	   a	  weighing	  up	  of	   the	   lesser	  of	   two	  evils.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  nurses	  who	  seem	  to	  feel	  more	   certain	   about	   right	   and	  wrong	  when	   they	   experience	  moral	   distress.	  This	   may	   all	   add	   up	   to	   demonstrate	   another	   conflict	   or	   difference	   between	  nursing	  and	  medicine;	  that	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  carrying	  the	  full	  weight	  of	  responsibility	   for	   decisions	   as	   opposed	   to	   being	   in	   part	   an	   observer	   and	  participant	   in	   those	   decisions.	   This	   isn’t	   only	   a	   restatement	   of	   previous	  discussion.	  It	  highlights	  that	  the	  decisions	  one	  might	  reach	  may	  be	  founded	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  or	  authority	  one	  carries.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  the	  nurse	  who	   doesn’t	   carry	   full	   responsibility	  might	   be	   able	   to	  more	   readily	   prefer	   the	  outcome	   of	   death	   than	   suffering	   because	   the	   loss	   of	   that	   life	   won’t	   lie	   in	   and	  ‘dirty’	  her	  ‘hands’.	  
The	   stance	  on	  conflicting	  goals	   (or	   conflicting	  moral	   frameworks)	   is	   supported	  by	  Fowler	  (1989),	  who	  found	  that	  nurses	  were	  in	  moral	  distress	  when	  they	  felt	  their	  desire	  to	  provide	  compassionate	  care,	  was	  impossible	  due	  to	  their	  intense	  involvement	  with	   life	  prolonging	   treatments,	   that	   required	   them	  to	  spend	   time	  managing	  medicines	  and	  observations	  rather	  than	  to	  concentrate	  on	  comforting	  actions.	  Sundin	  –	  Huard	  and	  Fahy	  (1999,	  p11)	   in	  their	  phenomenological	  study	  of	  moral	  distress	  support	  this	  position	  of	  contradictory	  perceptions	  and	  echo	  the	  emotions	  that	  are	  expressed	  in	  my	  narrative.	  They	  describe	  how	  nurses	  in	  ‘futile’	  situations	  felt	  that	  they	  were	  participating	  in	  actions	  that	  were	  demeaning	  to	  the	  dignity	   of	   the	   patient	   and	   that	   bordered	   on	   ‘abusing	   the	   body	   that	   just	   has	   no	  more	   life’	   in	   it.	   (p11).	  Added	  to	   this	  was	   the	   frustration	  of	  not	  being	  able	   to	  do	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nursing	  work	  that	  they	  found	  to	  be	  fulfilling;	  that	  is	  helping	  a	  patient	  and	  family	  through	  the	  dying	  process.	  	  
Nathaniel	   (2006)	  who	   is	   the	   only	  writer	   to	   specify	   that	   nurses	  who	   felt	  moral	  distress	   had	  not	   participated	   in	   actual	  moral	  wrong-­‐doing	   in	   keeping	  with	   her	  definition,	  describes	  how	  nurses	  felt	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  patients	  and	   took	   seriously	   the	   implicit	   promise	   to	   ease	   their	   suffering.	   She	   describes	  other	  causal	   factors	  of	  moral	  distress	   in	  relation	   to	   this	  sense	  of	   responsibility,	  for	  example	  times	  when	  on-­‐call	  physicians	  refused	  to	  come	  in	  to	  see	  a	  patient	  at	  a	  nurse’s	  request,	  refusals	  to	  order	  emergency	  medication	  or	  refusals	  to	  believe	  a	  nurse’s	   evaluation	   of	   a	   patient’s	   condition.	  Nathaniel	   in	   this	   paper	   agrees	  with	  the	  power	  imbalance	  between	  nurses	  and	  doctors,	  but	  rather	  than	  accepting	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  battle	  between	  right	  and	  wrong,	  she	  states	  it	  is	  an	  	  
‘asymmetrical	  power	  relationship(s)…when	  there	  is	  no	  frank	  moral	  wrong-­‐doing	  but	  rather	  divergent	  core	  beliefs’	  (p88	  )	  	  
There	   is	   a	   third	   sociological	   context	   that	   has	   received	   attention	   but	   that	   is	  dissimilar	   to	   the	   previous	   two	   I	   have	   discussed.	   Interestingly,	   a	   minority	   of	  authors	  who	  have	  written	  on	  moral	  distress,	  identify	  proximity	  to	  the	  patient	  as	  a	  contextual	  cause	  (Torguul	  &	  Sorlie,	  2006;	  Peter	  &	  Llaschenko,	  2004).	  Nursing	  is	  a	  labour	  intensive	  activity	  that	  requires	  the	  physical	  proximity	  of	  the	  nurse,	  hour	  by	  hour,	  and	  shift	  by	  shift,	  to	  meet	  the	  ongoing	  physical	  and	  psychological	  needs	  of	  patients.	  Unlike	  other	  professional	  groups,	  the	  nurse	  does	  not	  leave	  the	  ward	  nor	   does	   she	   leave	   her	   relatively	   small	   group	   of	   patients,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	  intensive	  care,	   she	  does	  not	   leave	  her	  single	  patient’s	  bed,	  except	  of	   course	   for	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short	  breaks.	  The	  nurse	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  her	  work	  has	  intimate	  involvement	  with	  suffering;	  both	  the	  suffering	  caused	  by	  disease,	  but	  also	  the	  suffering	  caused	  by	  medicine.	   She	   not	   only	   observes	   but	   also,	   smells	   and	  metaphorically	   speaking	  touches	  such	  suffering,	  such	  as	  faecal	  incontinence	  or	  the	  excoriation	  mouth	  and	  skin.	   She	   hears	   the	   groans	   of	   patients	   as	   she	   turns	   a	   patient	   who	   appears	   to	  everyone	  else	  to	  be	  comatose.	  This	  proximity	  gives	  the	  nurse	  a	  perspective	  that	  is	  unique	  and	  that	  is	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  distressing.	  (Ferrall	  &	  Coyle,	  2008)	  
These	   three	   sociological	   contexts	   reflect	  my	   narrative.	   The	   nurse	  was	   in	   close	  proximity	   to	   a	   suffering	  patient,	  where	   the	  patient’s	   suffering	   seemed	  not	  only	  pointless,	   but	   was	   also	   exacerbated	   by	   my	   medical	   colleagues	   and	   their	  prescribed	   treatment.	   Her	   proximity	   to	   other	   patients	  who	   had	   had	   doxapram	  meant	  that	  she	  had	  observed	  its	  unpleasant	  side	  effects.	  Her	  memory	  of	  another	  patient	  who	  had	  died	  on	  the	  drug,	  one	  who	  had	  been	  frightened	  and	  breathless,	  whose	  sweat	  marked	  her	  uniform	  with	  its	  smell	  as	  she	  made	  failed	  attempts	  to	  make	  him	  comfortable,	  added	  to	  her	  fears	  of	  what	  was	  to	  come.	   	  She	  wanted	  to	  ease	  Mrs	   Bird’s	   suffering,	   not	   increase	   it.	   As	   the	   clash	   of	  medical	   and	   nursing	  values	  has	  described,	  the	  nurse’s	  perspective	  clashed	  with	  that	  of	  the	  consultant:	  he	   saw	   an	   opportunity	   to	   possibly	   prolong	   her	   life	   whilst	   she	   saw	   fruitless	  suffering	   to	   come.	   And	   finally,	   the	   power	   imbalance;	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   senior	  registrar’s	  decision,	  the	  nurse	  had	  no	  authority	  to	  over	  rule	  the	  medical	  decision.	  	  
Internal	  constraints	  and	  moral	  distress.	  
As	  well	  as	  external	  constraints,	  researchers	  describe	  constraints	  that	  arise	  within	  the	   individual	   who	   experiences	  moral	   distress.	   These	   are	   described	   as	   factors	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such	  as	  fear	  of	   job	  loss,	  doubt,	  (Austin	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  Wilkinson	  1987)	  and	  lack	  of	  courage	  (Lachman	  2007,	  Murray	  2010).	  Presumably	  such	  fears	  could	  prevent	  the	  nurse	  from	  acting	  as	  an	  advocate	  for	  her	  patient,	  although	  in	  my	  own	  narrative	  the	  nurse	  did	  not	  feel	  constrained	  from	  being	  able	  to	  do	  at	  least	  this.	  	  
The	  ‘epidemiology’	  of	  moral	  distress	  	  
Most	  research	   is	   focused	   in	  critical	  care,	  and	  as	  has	  been	  stated,	  moral	  distress	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  at	  its	  most	  extreme	  in	  cases	  of	  aggressive	  medical	  care	  that	  are	   perceived	   to	   be	   ‘futile’	   on	   the	   part	   of	   nurses.	   However,	   it	   has	   also	   been	  described	   across	   different	   specialities	   in	   nursing;	   in	   paediatrics,	   (Janvier	   et	   al.	  2007,	  Austin	  et	  al.	  2009)	  military	  nursing	  (Fry	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  angelica	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  psychiatry	  (Austin	  et	  al.,	  2005b,	  Austin	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  care	  of	  the	  elderly	  (van	  der	  Dam	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   and	   in	   nurse	   practitioners	   working	   in	   the	   community	   in	  America	  (Laabs,	  2005).	  
Interestingly,	  nurse	  practitioners	  were	   found	  to	  be	  different	   than	  other	  groups.	  Although	  they	  did	  suffer	  moral	  distress	  in	  relation	  to	  for	  example,	  not	  being	  able	  to	   get	   the	   necessary	   insurance	   to	   pay	   for	   care,	   their	   distress	  was	   less	   extreme	  than	  in	  other	  groups	  of	  nurses	  and	  was	  not	  identified	  by	  the	  nurse	  practitioners	  as	  a	  problem.	  The	  authors	  surmised	  that	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  autonomy	  of	  such	  nurses.	  Alternatively	  it	  might	  indicate	  that	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  situations	  are	   not	   to	   be	   fully	   trusted;	   the	   lack	   of	   care	   for	   patients	   who	   do	   not	   have	  insurance	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   greater	   moral	   wrong	   than	   for	   patients	   who	  undergo	  treatment	  that	  after	  the	  event	  of	  death	  has	  been	  proven	  as	  futile.	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A	  minority	  of	  papers,	  describe	  moral	  distress	  in	  professional	  groups	  other	  than	  nurses.	   In	   2007	   Austin	   et	   al.	   reported	   that	   psychiatrists	   experienced	   moral	  distress	   when	   providing	   medical	   care	   for	   patients	   whilst	   at	   the	   same	   time	  safeguarding	   society	   as	   is	   required	   in	   law.	   In	   this	   instance	   they	   experienced	  conflict	  of	  interest	  in	  relation	  to	  balancing	  both	  of	  these	  factors.	  They	  felt	  that	  the	  law	   curbed	   their	   freedom	   in	  making	   autonomous	  medical	   decisions	   about	   the	  risks	   of	   giving	   potentially	   dangerous	   patients	   freedom	   in	   society.	  Hamrick	   and	  Blackhall	   (2007)	   found	  that	  doctors	  experienced	  moral	  distress	   in	   ICU	  but	   that	  nurses	   experienced	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   distress	   than	   doctors	  when	   faced	  with	  similar	  ‘futile’	  situations.	  	  
Kalvermark	  et	  al.	   (2005;	  2006)	  described	  moral	  distress	   in	  pharmacists,	  where	  high	   levels	   of	   distress	  were	   experienced	  when	  dispensation	  of	  medication	  was	  prioritized	   for	   the	  patient	  who	  shouted	   the	   loudest	   rather	   than	   in	   the	  order	  of	  queuing	  or	  need.	  Brown	  and	  Gillespie	  (1999)	  identified	  it	  in	  university	  lecturers	  and	  Iglesias	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  investigated	  the	  experience	  in	  podiatrists.	  Finally,	   it	   is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  moral	  distress	  in	  physiotherapists	  was	  reported	  as	  being	  caused	   by	   observing	   poor	   nursing	   practice	   (Barnitt,	   1998).	   Here	   it	   seems	   the	  power	   imbalance	   is	   expressed	   in	   the	   physiotherapists’	   position	   that	   does	   not	  authorise	  them	  to	  influence	  nursing	  practice.	  It	  also	  indicates	  that	  moral	  distress	  might	  also	  reflect	  the	  position	  of	  observer.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  identify	  what	  may	  be	  wrong-­‐doing	  in	  another	  professional	  group	  than	  one’s	  own.	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Effects	  of	  Moral	  Distress.	  
That	   moral	   distress	   is	   a	   significant	   phenomenon	   in	   health	   care	   provision	   is	  supported	   by	   the	   literature.	   Fowler	   (1989)	   suggested	   that	   chronic	   reactive	  distress	   contributes	   to	   burnout	   and	   it	   has	   been	   found	   that	   nurses	   who	   have	  suffered	  moral	  distress	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  move	  their	  work	  position	  or	  to	   leave	  nursing	   altogether	   (Nathaniel	   2006).	   Hamrick	   and	   Blackhall	   	   (2007)	   in	   their	  study	  of	   both	  nurses	   and	  doctors	   in	   ICU,	   found	   that	   although	  both	  professions	  experienced	  moral	  distress,	  it	  was	  only	  the	  nurses	  who	  would	  think	  about	  or	  had	  left	  a	  post	  due	  to	  this.	  Sundin-­‐Huard	  and	  Fahy,(1999)	  found	  that	  fifteen	  percent	  of	  the	  nurses	  interviewed	  had	  left	  a	  previous	  position	  because	  of	  moral	  distress.	  Although	   not	   quantified,	   this	   results	   in	   costs	   to	   the	   health	   care	   system,	   either	  through	  loss	  of	  staff,	  or	  from	  movement	  of	  staff	  from	  areas	  such	  as	  ICU,	  with	  high	  investment	   in	   training,	   to	  other	  areas	  where	   that	   training	   is	  no	   longer	  put	   into	  practice.	  	  
	  Further	   in	   support	   of	   the	   difference	   between	   nurses	   and	   doctors	   Aase	   et	   al.	  (2008)	   in	   their	  qualitative	  study	  on	   the	  existential	  aspects	  of	   cardiac	  medicine,	  describe	  the	  stress	  of	  medicine	  for	  doctors,	  such	  as	  burnout,	  grief	  and	  emotional	  distress	  at	  seeing	  suffering,	  but	  found	  that	  more	  experienced	  doctors	  could	  keep	  the	  distress	  of	  exposure	  to	  suffering	  at	  a	  distance.	  This	  may	  well	  reflect	  not	  only	  development	   of	   coping	   mechanisms,	   but	   also	   the	   fact	   that	   with	   increased	  seniority	   doctors	   are	   less	   proximate	   to	   patients.	   Interestingly,	   the	   study	   also	  found	   that	   doctors	   found	   the	   responsibility	   of	   decision-­‐making	   rewarding:	   an	  aspect	  of	  the	  work	  that	   is	  a	  stark	  contrast	  to	  nurses	  who	  for	  example,	  reported	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that	   a	   major	   regret	   in	   their	   care	   was	   the	   lack	   of	   dialogue	   between	   the	   team	  (Sorlie	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Of	  course	  as	  well	  as	  being	  rewarding,	  doctors	  can	  experience	  the	   responsibility	   for	   decision-­‐making	   a	   burden	   that	   leads	   to	   them	   feeling	  undervalued,	  accused	  and	  unsupported	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making	  (Gronlund	  et	  al.,	  2011).	   Ironically,	  not	  only	  does	   conflict	   exist	  between	   the	  goals	  of	  nursing	  and	  medicine,	   but	   conflict	   also	   exists	   in	   matters	   of	   coping	   with	   ethically	   difficult	  situations.	   The	   very	   wish	   of	   nurses	   for	   dialogue	   might	   for	   doctors	   be	   an	  experience	  of	  having	  one’s	  authority	  undermined.	  	  
Nathaniel	  (2006)	  and	  Davies	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  describe	  how	  nurses	  who	  experience	  moral	   distress	   will	   distance	   themselves	   from	   patients,	   becoming	   either	  emotionally	   unavailable	   or	   physically	   avoiding	   patients	   rooms.	   Austin	   et	   al.	  (2009)	  found	  that	  nurses	  will	  often	  employ	  a	  mechanism	  to	  reduce	  the	  sense	  of	  distress	  by	  detachment	  of	  emotional	  engagement	  with	  the	  patient	  and	  situation,	  and	   instead	   concentrate	   on	   the	   technical	   tasks	   in	   hand.	   This	   emotional	  detachment	  is	  perhaps	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  was	  found	  to	  be	  employed	  by	  vets	  who	  have	  to	  treat	  and	  kill	  animals	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  circumstances,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  morally	   challenging	   (Manette,	  2004).	  Manette	  argues	   that	   to	  employ	  such	  devices	  is	  to	  deny	  one’s	  sense	  of	  humanity,	  a	  sense	  that	  could	  also	  apply	  to	  nurses.	  	  
Nathaniel	  (2006)	  describes	  the	  emotional	  response	  as	  being	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  sad,	  guilty,	  angry,	  a	  sense	  of	  powerlessness,	  internal	  conflict,	  depression,	  outrage	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  betrayal.	  The	  experience	  is	  also	  visceral.	  Nurses	  could	  experience	  near	  syncope,	  crying,	  sleeplessness	  and	  vomiting	  (Fenton	  1988;	  Anderson,	  1990;	  Ewing	  and	  Carter	  2004;	  Nathaniel;	  2006).	  or	  described	  their	  experience	  as	   ‘gut	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wrenching’	   (Hanna,	  2005).	  Although	  most	  authors	  describe	  moral	  distress	  as	  a	  negative	  experience	  and	  an	  objectively	  negative	  event,	  Nathaniel’s	  study	  stands	  out	  because	  contrary	   to	   the	   trend,	  he	  describes	   that	  nurses	   reported	   that	   their	  nursing	   care	   was	   improved	   as	   a	   result	   of	   moral	   distress	   because	   they	   felt	  compelled	   to	   make	   up	   for	   what	   they	   considered	   to	   be	   wrong-­‐doing	   by	   giving	  more	   compassionate	   care	   and	   trying	   to	   treat	   the	  patient	  with	  dignity.	   In	   other	  words,	  using	  Manette’s	  stance,	  the	  challenge	  of	  moral	  distress,	  where	  the	  nurse	  makes	   more	   effort	   to	   deliver	   a	   high	   standard	   of	   nursing	   care,	   might	   actually	  result	  in	  an	  increased	  sense	  of	  humanity	  or	  compassion.	  	  	  
My	  narrative	  reflects	  both	  of	  these	  contradictory	  positions.	  Once	  the	  infusion	  for	  Mrs	  Bird	  had	  been	  set	  up,	  the	  distressed	  emotional	  state	  of	  the	  nurse	  led	  her	  to	  avoid	   spending	   any	   more	   time	   with	   her	   than	   was	   necessary.	   However,	   the	  experience	  also	  had	  positive	  effects	   in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  nurse	  concluded	  that	   in	  the	  future	   she	   could	   instead	   alleviate	   her	   negative	   emotional	   state	   in	   a	   positive	  direction	  by	  being	  more	  compassionate.	  Indeed	  this	  response	  to	  care	  more,	  was	  also	   found	   by	   Yoder	   (2008)	   who	   studied	   nurses	   and	   compassion	   fatigue;	   she	  found	  that	  nurses	  who	  were	  faced	  with	  traumatic	  circumstances	  either	  chose	  to	  go	  onto	  ‘autopilot’	  or	  else	  to	  engage	  more	  fully	  with	  patients	  and	  families.	  
The	  intensity	  of	  the	  moral	  distress	  response	  has	  been	  found	  by	  some	  to	  increase	  with	   age	   of	   the	   nurse	   Elpern	   et	   al.,	   (2005)	   found	   that	   in	   situations	   of	   ‘medical	  futility’,	   that	   older	   nurses	   felt	   a	   more	   acute	   response	   than	   younger	   nurses.	  	  Torjuul	   &	   Sorlie	   (2006)	   and	   Rice	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   found	   that	   moral	   distress	  increased	   in	   the	   more	   experienced	   nurses.	   These	   findings	   are	   echoed	   by	  Schwenzer	  &	  Wang	   (2006)	  who	   investigated	   the	   incidence	  of	  moral	  distress	   in	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respiratory	  therapists,	  and	  found	  that	  the	  greatest	  degree	  of	  distress	  was	  found	  in	   relation	   to	   cases	   of	   ‘futility’,	   and	   increased	   with	   age	   of	   the	   therapist.	   The	  increasing	   severity	   of	   response	   was	   suggested	   by	   Elpern	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   to	   be	  related	   to	   increased	   frustration	   at	   not	   being	   able	   to	   change	   situations	   despite	  increasing	   seniority	   and	   experience.	   However,	   perhaps	   it	   could	   alternatively	  show	  the	  residual	  build	  up	  of	  reactive	  moral	  distress	  as	  similar	  experiences	  are	  repeated.	   Elpern	   et	   al.’s	   study	   certainly	   indicates	   that	   prolonged	   exposure	   to	  suffering	  and	  the	  compassion	  with	  which	  it	  is	  associated,	  seems	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  increased	  emotional	  distress.	  	  
Resolutions	  to	  moral	  distress	  	  
Almost	   every	  paper	   that	   seeks	   to	   study	  moral	   distress	   also	  discusses	  potential	  resolutions	  to	  it.	  	  Firstly,	  the	  nurse	  can	  and	  indeed	  needs	  to	  somehow	  respond	  to	  her	  moral	   distress	   by	   deciding	   to	   perform	   an	   action,	   and	   as	   Nathaniel	   (2006)	  suggests,	  many	  of	  these	  actions	  might	  be	  risky	  to	  the	  nurse.	  As	  Jameton	  (1993)	  pointed	  out,	  she	  may	  decide	  on	  most	  occasions,	  as	   in	  my	  narrative,	   to	  advocate	  for	  her	  patient	  and	  then	  to	  comply	  with	   instructions	  and	  perform	  the	  act,	  or	   in	  the	  words	  of	  Nathaniel,	  to	  ‘give	  up’.	  	  
Alternatively	   she	   can	   refuse	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   prescribed	   medical	   care,	   in	  other	  words,	   conscientiously	  object	   to	   complying	  with	  medical	   instruction.	   She	  may	  decide	  to	  whistle	  blow,	  or	  to	  be	  partially	  complicit	  with	  an	  instruction	  whilst	  sabotaging	  it.	  Alternatively	  she	  might	  engage	  in	  covert	  communication	  as	  defined	  by	   Sundin-­‐Huard	   &	   Fahy	   (1999).	   Covert	   communication	   and	   sabotage	   are	   not	  topics	   that	  are	  readily	   found	   in	  the	  research	   literature	   for	  obvious	  reasons,	  but	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anecdotally	  it	  is	  something	  that	  many	  nurses	  have	  on	  occasions	  in	  their	  careers	  participated	  in	  as	  has	  also	  been	  observed	  by	  Birchley	  (2011).	  	  
As	  well	  as	  individual	  responses,	  there	  are	  organisational	  resolutions	  proposed	  by	  authors.	   For	   example,	   Bell	   &	   Breslin	   (2008)	   and	   Gutierrez	   (2005)	   argue	   that	  organisations	   should	  provide	  access	   to	  ethics	   education,	   ethics	  debriefings	  and	  that	  ethics	  committees	  supported	  by	  a	  clinical	  ethicist	  who	  should	  be	  available	  to	  health	  care	  workers.	  Erlin	  (2001),	  Corley	  et	  al.	  (2005),	  Kalvermark	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  describe	   measures	   that	   create	   an	   ethical	   environment,	   such	   as	   open	   and	  supportive	  dialogue.	  Catlin	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  chaplains	  and	  psychologists	  should	  be	   available	   and	   family	  members	  be	  more	   included	   in	   ethical	   decisions	  about	  patients	  and	  that	  ethical	  dialogue	  should	  be	  encouraged	  between	  nursing	  and	  medical	  students.	  	  
Education	  has	  been	   identified	  as	  a	  possible	  route	   to	  ease	  moral	  distress	  (Allen,	  2003).	  Lang	  (2008)	  discussed	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  education	  and	  Rogers	  et	  al.	  (2008)	   in	   a	   study	   in	   palliative	   care	   demonstrated	   that	   education	   about	   issues	  such	  as	  pain	  management	  and	  ethical	  aspects	  of	  care	  increased	  nurses’	  comfort	  in	   caring	   for	   dying	   infants.	  However,	   although	   this	   study	  described	   its	   aims	   as	  easing	  moral	   distress	   it	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   it	   addressed	   end	  of	   life	   care	   that	  lacks	   some	   of	   the	   challenges	   in	   acute	   medicine.	   Furthermore,	   moral	   distress	  wasn’t	   measured.	   In	   contrast,	   Kalvemark	   	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   instituted	   a	   series	   of	  ethics	  workshops	  and	  ethics	  rounds	   for	  nurses	   in	   two	  hospitals,	  but	   found	  that	  the	   moral	   distress	   experienced	   by	   nurses	   before	   and	   after	   the	   input	   did	   not	  change,	  although	  they	  enjoyed	  the	  appreciated	  the	  events.	  Austin	  et	  al.	  (2005a)	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  integrative	  educational	  strategies	  that	  identify	  and	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acknowledge	   moral	   distress.	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   educational	   approaches	  suggested	  by	   researchers,	   (Allen,	  2003)	  none	  suggested	   that	  Millette’s	   study	  of	  1994	  ought	   to	  be	  considered	   for	  structuring	   learning	  outcomes.	  She	   found	  that	  nurses	   who	   morally	   reason	   with	   an	   ethics	   of	   care	   approach	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	  justice	   approach	   were	  more	   likely	   to	   experience	  moral	   distress.	   These	   nurses	  were	   found	   to	   be	   more	   ‘morally	   sensitive’,	   and	   although	   neither	   method	   of	  reasoning	   was	   seen	   to	   be	   superior	   to	   the	   other,	   those	   with	   an	   ethics	   of	   care	  approach	  were	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  leave	  the	  profession.7	  	  Nor	  has	  any	  researcher	  proposed	   that	   an	   assessment	   of	   nurse’s	   moral	   reasoning	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	  method	  of	  identifying	  and	  targeting	  those	  who	  are	  more	  at	  risk	  of	  moral	  distress.	  
	  Gutierrez	   (2005)	   suggests	   multidisciplinary	   ethics	   rounds	   and	   that	   doctors	  might	  not	  be	  aware	  of	   the	  distress	  of	   the	  nurses	  with	  whom	  they	  work.	  Ewing	  and	   Carter	   (2004)	   describe	   moral	   distress	   specifically	   as	   a	   burden	   that	  incorporates	  a	  sense	  of	  meaninglessness	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  contributing	  to	   moral	   distress.	   They	   instituted	   workshops	   that	   addressed	   the	   theological	  explanations	  and	  perspectives	  on	  suffering,	  anger	  and	  stress	  management,	  and	  a	  talk	  by	  a	  senior	  nurse	  on	   the	  personal	  caring	  characterstics	  of	  nurses	  and	  how	  this	   can	   be	   the	   cause	   of	   distress,	   some	   of	   which	   might	   be	   moral	   distress.	  	  Although	  staff	  valued	  the	  workshop	  and	  felt	  supported	  by	  one	  another,	  no	  formal	  evaluation	  was	  done	  to	  measure	  long	  term	  outcomes,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  of	  moral	  distress.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  7	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  reasoning	  styles	  are	  varied	  in	  nurses,	  and	  in	  fact	  many	  nurses	  use	  the	  justice	  approach.	  (Duckett	  et	  al.,	  1992)	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In	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   resolutions	   that	   are	   offered	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   moral	  distress,	   it	   seems	   that	   it	   is	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   nurse	   and	   medical	  colleagues	   (or	   the	   organisation)	   that	   is	   identified	   as	   the	   focus	   rather	   than	   the	  initial	  apparent	  moral	  problem,	  for	  example,’	  futility’.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  an	  underlying	   assumption	   that	   it	   is	   the	   secondary	   harm,	   rather	   than	   the	   primary	  harm	   that	   ought	   to	   be	   the	   focus	   for	   resolution.	   This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   ‘leaps’	   that	   I	  have	   found	   in	   the	   literature,	   where	   the	   normative	   stance	   in	   the	   definition	   of	  moral	  distress	  –	  that	  is	  that	  an	  act	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  wrong	  –	  is	  contradicted	  or	   overlooked	   by	   the	   proposed	   resolutions.	   With	   what	   essentially	   results	   in	  inclusive	  and	  respectful	  communication,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  an	  understanding	  that	  moral	  distress	  will	   ease	   as	   a	   symptom.	   	  Of	   course	  perhaps	  with	   increased	  communication	  and	  collaboration	  between	  doctors	  and	  nurses,	  patient	  outcomes	  might	  change,	  but	  this	  has	  not	  been	  measured	  nor	  is	  it	  explicitly	  referred	  to.	  
Finally	  other	  resolutions	  have	  also	  been	  offered,	  that	  perhaps	  could	  be	  classified	  as	   supporting	   the	   spiritual	   paradigm,	   such	   as	   Tjedje	   (2000)	  who	   suggests	   that	  nurses	  should	  pay	  more	  attention	   to	  role	  models	  and	  heroes	  who	  have	  carried	  out	  ground	  breaking	  work	  in	  nursing.	  She	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  Lilian	  Wald,	  who	  contributed	  to	  improvement	  of	  slums	  by	  getting	  insurance	  companies	  to	  pay	  for	  costs	  of	  nursing	  care	  for	  slum	  residents.	  She	  argues	  that	  such	  story	  telling,	  along	  with	  sharing	  stories	  of	  individual	  situations	  should	  be	  encouraged.	  Austin	  	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  supports	  Tjedje’s	  position	  on	  storytelling,	  having	  found	  that	  story	  telling	  in	  a	  paediatric	  intensive	  care	  unit	  had	  been	  found	  to	  be	  helpful.	  She	  also	  argues	  that	   accepting	   and	   engaging	   with	   ‘being	   on	   the	   margins’,	   being	   an	   ‘outsider’	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ought	  to	  be	  celebrated	  by	  nurses,	  as	  they	  might	  be	  more	  readily	  able	  to	  identify	  with	  their	  patients.	  	  
	  Hamrick	   and	   Blackhall	   (2007)	   in	   their	   review	   of	   the	   resolutions	   offered	   by	  empirical	  researchers	  to	  moral	  distress	  point	  out	  that	  although	  the	  researchers	  aim	   to	   improve	   doctor-­‐nurse	   collaboration,	   they	   tend	   not	   to	   offer	   concrete	  solutions	  so	  often,	  even	  though	  these	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  end	  of	  life	   care	   decision-­‐making.	   	   In	   the	   field	   of	   end	   of	   life	   decision-­‐making	   such	  solutions	   are	   for	   example,	   mandating	   nurses’	   involvement	   in	   family	   meetings	  and	  holding	  multidisciplinary	  case	  reviews,	  or	  adding	  palliative	  care	  teams	  with	  a	  strong	  nursing	  component	  This	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  an	  important	  point	  that	  was	  highlighted	  at	  an	  interdisciplinary	  meeting	  on	  ‘Conscience	  and	  Moral	  Distress	  in	  End	   of	   Life	   Care	   (Yale	   University,	   2009).	   At	   this	   meeting,	   a	   senior	   medical	  consultant	   in	   neonatal	   intensive	   care	   was	   clearly	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   plight	   of	  morally	   distressed	  nurses.	  During	   discussion	  he	   spoke	   about	   how	  his	   unit	   had	  instigated	  a	  policy	  where	  very	  young	  neonates	  would	  be	  given	  resuscitative	  care,	  even	  though	  they	   lived	  on	  the	  boundaries	  of	  viability.	  Only	  around	  thirty	  seven	  percent	   of	   twenty	   two	   week	   old	   babies	   survive	   (Serenius	   et	   al.,	   2007)	   and	   of	  those	  that	  do,	  around	  half	  will	  have	  moderate	  to	  severe	  disability	  (Marlow	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Catlin	  et	   al.	   (2008)	  describes	  how	  such	  circumstances	   clearly	   fall	  under	  those	  that	  cause	  high	  levels	  of	  moral	  distress	  for	  nurses,	  and	  assuming	  that	  there	  were	   ethical	   arguments	   that	   sufficiently	   justified	   this	   action,	   nurses	   were	   not	  party	   to	   them,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  would	  be	   responsible	   for	   carrying	  out	  the	  majority	  of	   this	  care.	  When	  the	  consultant	  neonatologist	  was	  asked	  who	  he	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had	  invited	  to	  the	  meeting,	  he	  admitted	  that	  only	  medical	  staff	  had	  been	  invited.	  He	   continued	   that	  he	  had	  not	   even	   considered	   inviting	  nurses,	   despite	   the	   fact	  that	  he	  readily	  acknowledged	  that	   this	  would	  be	  a	  good	  thing.	   It	  was	  clear	  that	  this	  doctor	  wasn’t	  intending	  to	  exclude	  nurses,	  he	  had	  simply	  not	  given	  thought	  to	   inviting	   them:	   they	  were	   not	   recognised	   as	   professionals	  who	  might	   have	   a	  contribution	   to	   make,	   or	   indeed	   who	   might	   have	   a	   right	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  eventual	  policy,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  have	  that	  policy	  fully	  explained	  to	  them.	  	  
Conclusion	  
So	  far,	  I	  have	  given	  a	  review	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  empirical	  research	  on	  moral	  distress,	   with	   some	   limited	   analysis	   of	   that	   work,	   in	   some	   areas.	   It	   should	   be	  noted	  that	  most	  of	  this	  work	  concentrates	  on	  critical	  care	  environments,	  and	  is	  in	  the	   majority,	   American.	   Some	   sources	   of	   moral	   distress	   are	   not	   immediately	  transferable	   to	   the	   UK,	   for	   example	   issues	   around	   provision	   of	   finance	   for	  medical	   care	  by	   insurance	   companies,	   and	   although	   in	   some	   respects	   resource	  allocation	  and	  disparity	  of	  access	  to	  medical	  care	  is	  a	  ubiquitous	  problem,	  some	  issues	   such	   as	   fairness	   of	   access	   to	   medical	   care	   are	   not	   directly	   comparable	  across	   the	   Atlantic.	   Furthermore,	   there	   are	   significant	   differences	   between	  nursing	  professional	  identity	  and	  nursing	  roles	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  US.	  Some	  of	  these	   differences	   will	   be	   explored	   in	   succeeding	   chapters,	   but	   for	   now,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   make	   clear	   that	   although	   some	   of	   the	   contextual	   and	   particular	  causes	   of	  moral	   distress	  might	   differ,	   the	   experience	   of	  moral	   distress	   itself	   is	  certainly	   transferable	   across	   national	   boundaries	   to	   an	   international	   context.	  Santry	  (2009)	  quoted	  the	  Royal	  College	  of	  Nursing’s	  concern	  that	  nurses	   in	  the	  UK	  suffered	  moral	  distress	  in	  relation	  to	  poor	  staffing	  levels	  and	  moral	  distress	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has	   been	   examined	   by	   nurse	   researchers	   in	   China	   (Tang	   et	   al.,	   2007),	   	   Japan	  (Ohnishi	  et	  al.	  2010),	  Canada	  (Pauly	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  Denmark	  (van	  der	  Dam	  et	  al.	  2011),	  Ireland	  (Deady	  &	  McCarthy,	  2010)	  and	  Sweden	  (Lutzen	  et	  al.,	  2003)	  and	  the	  fundamental	  experience	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  common	  to	  nurses	  working	  in	  all	  places.	   Perhaps	   most	   particularly,	   it	   is	   common	   to	   nurses	   during	   the	   care	   of	  patients	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life,	  this	  being	  the	  area	  of	  care	  that	  creates	  the	  most	  severe	  sense	   of	  moral	   distress	   is	   experienced.	  During	  discussions	  with	  my	   colleagues,	  students	  and	  retired	  nurses,	   in	  agreement	  with	   the	   literature,	  and	  as	  Nathaniel	  (2006)	   found	   in	   her	   research,	   these	   nurses	   remembered	   and	   recounted	   their	  own	  tales	  of	  distress,	  that	  they	  vividly	  remembered.	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Chapter	  Two:	  The	  validity	  of	  moral	  distress	  as	  a	  Judgement	  of	  wrong-­doing.	  	  Introduction	  
Moral	  distress	  is	  primarily	  an	  emotional	  state.	  In	  this	  chapter	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  distress	  will	  be	  more	  closely	  examined	  to	  see	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  concept	  stands	  up	   to	   challenges	   to	   the	   assumptions	   that	   underlie	   it.	   Three	   questions	   will	   be	  addressed.	   Firstly,	   given	   that	   moral	   distress	   is	   an	   emotional	   response	   to	   an	  ‘ethical	   dilemma’;	   ought	   it	   to	   be	   trusted?	   Secondly,	   ought	   we	   to	   accept	   the	  current	   definition	   of	   moral	   distress?	   And	   finally,	   how	   will	   moral	   distress	   be	  defined	  for	  this	  thesis?	  	  The	  Validity	  of	  Emotions	  as	  a	  source	  for	  morality.	  	  As	   has	   been	   described	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   moral	   distress	   is	   primarily	   an	  emotional	   response	   to	   an	   ethically	   challenging	   situation	   where	   conflict	   exists	  between	  what	   a	   nurse	   feels	   ought	   to	   be	   done	   and	   her	   participation	   in	  what	   is	  actually	   done.	   Authors	   emphasise	   this	   emotional	   response,	   but	   only	   as	   a	  consequence	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   form	   of	   moral	   judgment.	   That	   is,	   there	   is	   an	  assumption	   that	   the	   emotional	   response	   arises	   due	   to	   the	   inability	   to	   do	   the	  ‘right	   thing’,	   but	   that	   this	   ‘right	   thing’	   has	   presumably	   been	   already	   identified.	  For	  example,	   it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	   in	  the	  case	  of	   ‘futile’	  care,	   there	  must	  be	  a	  precondition,	  based	  on	  reason,	  that	  futile	  care	  is	  wrong.	  Perhaps	  this	  assumption	  or	  reasoned	  conclusion	  prior	  to	  emotion	  reflects	  the	  status	  quo	   in	  ethics	  where	  there	   is	   a	   pervasive	   premise,	   following	   a	   long	   tradition	   in	   philosophy,	   that	   a	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dichotomy	  exists	  between	  the	  emotional	  and	  rational	  self,	  and	  that	  ultimately	  it	  is	  the	  rational	  self	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  relied	  upon	  for	  ethical	  decisions.8	  Therefore,	  the	  nursing	  literature	  avoids	  acknowledgement	  that	  moral	  distress	  may	  actually	  be	   primarily	   an	   emotional	   judgement	   (not	   just	   consequence)	   of	   ‘wrong-­‐doing’.	  Indeed,	   if	   moral	   distress	   was	   primarily	   a	   rational	   judgement	   of	   wrong-­‐doing,	  then	   surely	   the	   experiences	   would	   be	   articulated	   in	   rational	   terms,	   such	   as	   a	  discussion	   of	   the	   conflict	   between	   principles	   and	   the	   misidentification	   of	   the	  right	  principle	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  the	  particular	  circumstance	  as	  commonly	  occurs	  in	  the	  field	  of	  medial	  ethics	  (Beachamp	  and	  Childress,	  2001)	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  empirical	   literature	   reports	   experiences	   that	   are	   described	   in	   most	  circumstances,	  in	  emotional	  or	  sensual	  terms.	  9	  	  Of	  course,	  if	  moral	  distress	  is	  accepted	  as	  an	  emotional	  judgment,	  then	  it	  could	  be	  argued	   to	   be	   unreliable,	   because	   a	   large	   body	   of	   philosophy	   supports	   that	  rationality	  is	  the	  source	  for	  proper	  identification	  of	  right	  and	  wrong.10In	  support	  of	   this	   position	   on	   the	   unreliability	   of	   emotion,	   empirical	   literature	   has	   found	  that	   different	   nurses	   will	   respond	   with	   varying	   degrees	   of	   moral	   distress.	  (Jameton	   1993;	   Hanna,	   2005;	   Cavaliere	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   and	   if	   moral	   distress	   is	  accepted	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	   ‘troubled	  conscience’	   then	  Ferral	  (2006)	   found	  that	  only	   thirty	   eight	   percent	   of	   nurses	   had	   experienced	   this,	   the	   other	   sixty	   two	  percent	   presumably	   felt	   justified	   or	   insensitive	   to	   the	   moral	   aspects	   of	   their	  actions.	  This	  empirical	  finding	  has	  also	  been	  reflected	  in	  my	  teaching	  of	  qualified	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  8	  There	  is	  wide	  spread	  literature	  that	  either	  argues	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  or	  that	  otherwise	  is	  clearly	  based	  on	  this	  assumption.	  A	  good	  introduction	  to	  these	  matters	  is	  found	  in	  Singer	  (1991),	  particularly	  Part	  III	  and	  IV.	  9	  See	  p31.	  10	  See	  note	  8.	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and	   undergraduate	   nursing	   students.	   It	   has	   been	   surprising	   to	   find	   that	   some	  students	   do	   not	   express	   moral	   distress,	   even	   when	   faced	   with	   situations	   that	  could	  be	  described	  as	  clearly	  and	  objectively	  wrong.11	  	  	  On	   two	   counts	   then,	   it	   seems	   that	   moral	   distress	   can	   be	   accused	   of	   being	  unreliable	  as	  a	  source	   for	   the	   identification	  of	  ethical	  problems	  and	  answers	  to	  these	  problems.	  After	  all,	   emotional	   responses	  ought	  not	   to	  be	   trusted	  because	  emotion	   is	  unreliable.	  This	   is	   supported	  by	   the	  empirical	   research	   cited	  above,	  where	   it	   has	   been	   found	   that	   different	   people	   respond	   differently	   to	   the	   same	  situation.	  Or	  more	  correctly	  speaking,	  given	  that	  nurses	  as	  a	  professional	  group	  share	   similar	   professional	   values,	   surely	   they	   ought	   to	   respond	  more	   similarly	  than	  they	  do	  to	  the	  same	  situations.	  The	  emotional	  nature	  of	  moral	  judgement	  in	  moral	   distress	   could	   be	   the	   cause	   of	   this.	   These	   challenges	   to	   the	   validity	   of	  moral	  distress	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  emotional	  judgement.	  	  Variability	  of	  response	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  reason	  to	  discount	  emotions	  from	  ethical	  analysis:	  ethical	  journals	  exist	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  people	  rationalise	  	  and	  respond	  differently	   to	   ethical	   questions.	   However,	   emotions	   are	   often	   immediate	  responses	  to	  situations	  and	  without	  the	  inclusion	  of	  reason,	  can	  lead	  to	  less	  than	  satisfactory	  answers	  to	  ethical	  problems;	  they	  are	  unpredictable	  and	  can	  relate	  more	   to	   the	   personality	   of	   the	   agent	   and	   be	   reliant	   on	   the	   particulars	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  11	  An	  illustration	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  situation	  might	  be	  for	  example,	  a	  decision	  to	  move	  a	  gravely	  ill	  person	  to	  an	  intensive	  care	  unit	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  an	  increase	  in	  audited	  mortality	  figures	  for	  the	  ward	  in	  question.	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situation	   they	   are	   faced	   with	   (Crisp,	   2008,	   p242).	   Such	   factors	   can	  mean	   that	  they	   easily	   lead	   to	   the	   wrong	   answers	   to	   moral	   questions.	   For	   example,	   my	  emotional	   response	   to	   a	   picture	   of	   a	   desolate	   dog	   in	   need	   of	   a	   home	   might	  motivate	  me	  to	  donate	  money	  to	  an	  animal	  charity	  whilst	  the	  plight	  of	  thousands	  of	  victims	  of	  a	  natural	  disaster	  that	  I	  hear	  reported	  on	  the	  radio,	  might	  motivate	  me	   to	  do	  nothing,	  because	   I	  was	  not	  exposed	   to	  an	  emotive	   image.	   In	  order	   to	  make	  a	  response	  that	  is	  right	  for	  these	  scenarios,	  I	  would	  need	  to	  include	  reason	  in	  addition	  to	  my	  emotion,	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  better	  judgment,	  which	  may	  be	  to	  donate	  money	   to	   both	   causes.	   In	   support	   of	   this	   position,	   a	   previous	   example	  from	  the	  empirical	  research	  is	  relevant.	  	  	  Laabs’s	   (2005)	   research	   on	   nurse	   practitioners	   supports	   this	   view.	   As	   was	  discussed	   in	   chapter	   one,	   nurse	   practitioners	  were	   found	   to	   experience	  moral	  distress	   in	   response	   to	   	   	   their	   patients	   not	   being	   able	   to	   access	   care	   due	   to	  limitations	  in	  insurance	  cover	  (Laabs,	  2005).	  The	  level	  of	  distress	  in	  this	  instance	  was	   found	   to	   be	   low	   in	   comparison	   to	   nurses	   faced	   with	   ‘futile’	   situations.	  However,	  the	  differences	  that	  are	  evident	  in	  these	  responses	  do	  not	  necessarily	  indicate	   an	   accurate	   assessment	   of	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   wrongdoing.	   The	  inequality	  to	  access	  to	  medical	  care	  in	  the	  USA	  is	  possibly	  a	  grave	  wrong	  that	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  an	  issue	  that	  deserved	  substantial	  changes	  in	  government	  law	  under	  the	  Obama	  administration	  (Patient	  Protection	  and	  Affordability	  Act,	  2010).	  Despite	  the	  lack	  of	  moral	  distress	  on	  the	  part	  of	  nurse	  practitioners,	  this	  wrong-­‐doing	   could	   be	   argued	   to	   be	   a	   greater	   harm	   than	   over	   treatment	   of	   dying	  patients.	  In	  other	  words	  it	  might	  well	  be	  that	  to	  die	  young	  and	  poor	  is	  a	  greater	  harm	  than	  to	  die	  some	  days	  too	  late.	  In	  this	  case	  moral	  distress,	  at	  least	  in	  and	  of	  
	   44	  
itself,	   does	  not	   identify	   this	   as	   such,	  nor	  does	   it	   identify	   that	   this	   is	   a	  disparity	  worthy	  of	  debate.	  	  	  The	  problem	  with	  reliance	  on	  rationality.	  	  Likewise	  though,	  reliance	  on	  reason	  alone	  can	  also	  be	  problematic.	  For	  example,	  it	   is	  difficult	   to	   imagine	  how	  acts	   such	  as	  killing	   could	  be	   considered	  unethical	  without	   some	   inclusion	   of	   the	   emotion	   of	   empathy	   in	   the	   weighing	   up	   of	   the	  nature	  of	  such	  an	  act.	  A	  long	  standing	  branch	  of	  philosophy	  has	  sought	  to	  identify	  the	   place	   of	   emotions	   in	   responses	   to	   ethical	   challenges.12	   Although	   one	   could	  argue	   that	   killing	   is	  wrong	   because	   it	   removes	   the	   right	   of	   a	   person	   to	   life,	   or	  because	  it	  harms	  the	  friends	  and	  relatives	  who	  are	  linked	  with	  that	  person,	  some	  emotional	  judgment	  is	  brought	  into	  the	  reckoning.	  For	  example,	  a	  person	  values	  their	  life	  not	  only	  because	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  pleasures	  and	  events	  –many	  of	  which	  have	  an	  emotional	  as	  well	  as	  physical	  and	  spiritual	  element	   –	   that	  make	   up	   that	   life.	   The	   harm	   done	   to	   friends	   and	   relatives	   isn’t	  only	   the	   loss	   of	   income	  or	   some	  other	  utility,	   but	   the	   emotional	   and	   relational	  aspect	  of	  that	  person.	  	  	  Indeed	  a	   lack	  of	   emotion,	  which	   is	   at	   its	  most	  basic	   that	  primitive	  and	  visceral	  sense	  of	  disgust	  at	  wrong-­‐doing	  such	  as	  indiscriminate	  killing,	  is	  what	  is	  lacking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  12	  A	  good	  review	  of	  emotions	  and	  the	  various	  perspectives	  that	  range	  from	  identifying	  them	  as	  unrestrained	  forces	  unequal	  to	  rational	  consideration,	  to	  an	  acceptance	  of	  emotion	  as	  philosophically	  valid	  responses	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Van	  der	  Cingel	  (2009)	  who	  relates	  this	  history	  to	  compassion	  and	  nursing	  and	  a	  non	  nursing	  applied	  overview	  is	  available	  in	  the	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (2003)	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from	   people	  who	   are	   psychopaths	   (Holmes	   1991).	   It	   seems	   that	   it	   is	   a	   lack	   of	  emotion,	  and	  not	  a	  lack	  of	  reason	  in	  such	  individuals	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  shockingly	  immoral	  acts.	  Such	  individuals	  lack	  the	  emotionally	  based	  constraints	  to	  wrong-­‐doing	   such	   as	   empathy	   for	   another,	   or	   guilt.	   Sterzer	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   support	   this.	  They	  found	  that	  adolescent	  boys	  who	  had	  conduct	  disorder,	  an	  aspect	  of	  which	  is	  to	  carry	  out	  indiscriminate	  harm	  to	  others,	  have	  neurological	  changes	  in	  a	  part	  of	  the	   brain	   that	   is	   associated	   with	   empathy.	   And	   indeed	   it	   isn’t	   just	   the	   lack	   of	  emotion	  of	  empathy	  that	  might	  explain	  why	  psychopaths	  can	  engage	  in	  morally	  reprehensible	   behaviour.	   Herpetz	   et	   al.	   (2001)	   found	   that	   offenders	   with	   a	  diagnosis	   of	   psychopathy	   were	   found	   to	   have	   a	   pronounced	   decreased	   fear	  responses	   and	   a	   generalised	   hypo	   emotional	   responsiveness	   in	   comparison	   to	  the	  normal	  population.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  that	  my	  argument	  does	  not	  state	  that	  all	  immorality	  has	  as	  its	  source	  psychopathy,	  but	  rather,	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  empathy	  and	   emotionality	   of	   psychopaths	   supports	   my	   position	   that	   emotion	   is	   an	  important	  element	  that	  contributes	  to	  our	  sense	  of	  morality.	  	  Some	   philosophers	   have	   also	   come	   to	   this	   conclusion.	   Slote’s	   (2007)	   thesis	   on	  ethics	  of	  care,	  argues	  that	  empathy	  is	  the	  core	  human	  experience	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  construct	  of	  ethics,	  also	  supports	  this	  position.	  	  Authors	  such	  as	  Nussbaum	  (1986),	  De	  Wijze	  (2004)	  and	  Rist	  (2002)	  support	  the	  position	  that	  emotion	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  being	  an	  ethical	  person	  who	  makes	  ethical	  decisions.	  Hardcastle	  (2003)	  argues	  in	  addition	  to	  this,	  that	  it	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  integrated	  self	  and	   that	   it	   is	   central	   to	   a	   sense	  of	  unified	  agency.	   Solomon	   (2003)	  has	  written	  extensively	  on	  emotions	  and	  their	  place	  in	  ethics,	  and	  he	  provides	  a	  model	  that	  provides	  a	  satisfactory	  response	  to	  rectify	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  including	  emotions	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in	   ethical	   analysis.	   This	   approach	   to	   emotion	   as	   being	   an	   appropriate	   moral	  judgement	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  rationally	  examined,	  will	  be	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  Solomon’s	  Position	  and	  a	  Defence	  of	  Emotions	  as	  a	  Component	  of	  Morality.	  	  Solomon	  argues	   that	  emotions	  are	   judgments	  of	  ethical	   situations.	  They	  are	  an	  initial	  response	  to	  an	  ‘ethical	  dilemma’	  or	  ethical	  happening.	  The	  object	  that	  they	  judge	   has	   to	   be	   carefully	   examined	   though,	   with	   the	   use	   of	   reason.	   This	   is	  because	  emotions	  can	  be	  easily	  misunderstood	  by	  agents,	  and	  without	  care,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  misidentify	  the	  cause	  of	  an	  emotion,	  or	  in	  other	  words	  the	  object	  that	  it	  judges.	   This	   misidentification	   of	   the	   object	   of	   an	   emotion	   and	   the	   resultant	  judgment	   are	   at	   risk	   of	   leading	   to	   wrong	   final	   judgments	   about	   action.	   So	   for	  example,	  in	  my	  narrative	  and	  in	  the	  literature,	  the	  distressing	  emotions	  that	  the	  nurse	   experiences	   are	   generally	   understood,	   to	   arise	   due	   to	   a	   perception	   of	  wrong-­‐doing.	  Although	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case,	  and	  my	  thesis	  aims	  to	  explore	  this	  issue	  in	  depth,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  that	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  nurse’s	  emotional	  reactions	  are	   judgments	   of	   other	   causes.	   So	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   narrative,	   some	   of	   the	  nurse’s	  distress	  was	  most	   likely	  due	  to	  perceived	  wrong-­‐doing.	  However,	  some	  of	  her	  emotional	  distress	  was	  most	  likely	  also	  caused	  by	  the	  dismissive	  attitude	  of	  the	  registrar.	  Solomon	  warns	  that	  we	  may	  be	  	  fully	  conscious	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  our	  emotional	  reactions.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	  Again,	  to	  use	  my	  narrative	  as	  an	  example,	  some	  of	  the	  nurse’s	  emotional	  response	  might	  have	  been	  as	  a	  result	  of	  associating	  the	  treatment	  due	  for	  Mrs	  Bird	  with	  a	  memory	  of	  having	   cared	   for	   another	   patient	   in	   a	   similar	   situation,	   and	   who	   she	   had	   felt	  unable	  to	  make	  comfortable.	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  Meltzer	   and	  Huckabay	   (2004	  p205)	   support	   this	  position	   that	   other	   emotional	  factors	  can	  be	  found	  to	  co	  exist	  in	  the	  morally	  distressed	  state.	  They	  found	  that	  the	   frequency	   with	   which	   nurses	   encountered	   moral	   distress	   situations	   was	  directly	   and	   significantly	   related	   to	   the	   experience	   of	   emotional	   exhaustion.	  Sundin	  Huard	  and	  Fahy	  (1999)	  further	  support	  this,	  when	  they	  found	  that	  moral	  distress	   was	   associated	   with	   burnout.	   Closely	   associated	   with	   burnout	   is	  compassion	  fatigue.	  	  	  Compassion	   fatigue	   hasn’t	   been	   examined	   in	   relation	   to	  moral	   distress,	   but	   is	  also	   a	   potential	   correlating	   factor	   because	   it	   results	   from	   being	   emotionally	  disturbed	   by	   being	   directly	   involved	   with	   situations	   where	   care	   is	   given	   to	  people	  under	   traumatic	   circumstances;	   circumstances	   that	   are	   similar	   to	   those	  that	  cause	  the	  most	  severe	  form	  of	  moral	  distress	  (Hooper	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Showalter,	  2010;).	   Indeed	   Joinson	   (1992)	   describes	   effects	   of	   compassion	   fatigue	   such	   as	  turning	  off	   feelings,	  or	  feeling	  helpless	  and	  angry,	  which	  are	  almost	   identical	  to	  those	   experienced	   in	  moral	   distress.	   All	   of	   these	   states	  mean	   that	   the	   nurse	   is	  less	  able	  to	  carry	  out	  her	  work	  to	  a	  high	  quality.	  	  	  So,	  to	  return	  to	  the	  narrative,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  retrospect,	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  reason,	  that	  the	  nurse	  in	  the	  narrative	  can	  identify	  that	  some	  of	  her	  emotions	  were	  the	  guilt	  and	  trauma	  she	  had	  experienced	  at	  not	  being	  able	  to	  make	  the	  previous	  patient	  on	  doxaparam	  comfortable,	  despite	  all	  her	  efforts.	  Even	  so,	  despite	  an	  analysis	  of	  emotional	  response,	  one	  cannot	  know	  for	  sure,	  exactly	  the	  cause	  that	  emotions	  respond	  to.	  They	  are	  difficult	  entities	   to	  pin	  down,	  and	  Solomon	  argues	  that	  so	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long	  as	  they	  are	  recognised	  as	  such,	  they	  can	  nevertheless	  alert	  us	  to	  situations	  that	  deserve	  attention.	  Although	  they	  are	  primitive	  in	  nature,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  do	  not	  deserve	  this	  recognition.	  	  	  This	   thesis	   accepts	   Solomon’s	   position	   that	   emotion	   is	   a	   valid	   form	   of	   ethical	  judgement	   so	   long	  as	   it	   is	   supported	  by	   reasoned	  analysis:	   indeed	   this	  work	   is	  one	   of	   reasoned	   analysis	   of	   the	   moral	   distress	   that	   was	   experienced	   as	   an	  emotional	   judgement	   in	   the	   narrative.	   However,	   once	   emotion	   is	   accepted	   as	  valid,	   it	   leads	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   moral	   distress	   is	   a	   unique	  emotional	  response	  to	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  circumstance,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  emotion	  experienced	  in	  all	  ethically	  challenging	  situations.	  	  Moral	  Distress	  is	  a	  Unique	  Emotional	  Response	  to	  Ethical	  Challenges.	  	  There	  are	  many	  papers	   in	  medical	   and	  nursing	  ethical	   journals	   that	   examine	  a	  variety	   of	   ethical	   problems	   that	   are	   not	   identified	   as	   ‘moral	   distress’,	   but	   that	  nevertheless	  could	  create	  an	  emotional	  response	  that	  might	  be	  indistinguishable	  from	  moral	  distress.13	  	  	  For	  example,	  Hope	   (2009)	  discusses	   the	  problems	  nurses	   face	   in	  balancing	   the	  care	   and	   safety	   needs	   of	   patients	   with	   dementia.	   In	   prescribing	   nursing	   care,	  nurses	   are	   faced	  with	   the	   competing	  demands	  of	  promoting	   the	   safety	  of	   their	  patients	  against	  promoting	  their	  patients’	  autonomy.	  These	  decisions	  can	  result	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  13	  From	  now	  on,	  for	  ease	  of	  writing	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  ‘ethical	  dilemma’	  even	  though	  most	  situations	  that	  are	  written	  about	  in	  medicine	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  true	  dilemma;	  this	  is	  a	  way	  of	  describing	  them	  in	  common	  usage.	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in	  significant	  changes	   to	  a	  patient’s	   life,	   resulting	   in	  actions	  designed	  to	  reduce	  that	  patient’s	  freedom	  of	  movement.	  	  	  Surely	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  reaching	  decisions	  around	  moral	  dilemmas	  always	  result	  from	  some	  kind	  of	  constraint,	  and	  that	  that	  constraint	  is	  synonymous	  with	  the	   constraint	   that	   is	   identified	   as	   unique	   to	  moral	   distress.	   If	   this	   is	   so,	   then	  moral	  distress	  is	  not	  such	  a	  useful	  concept.	  So,	  to	  return	  to	  my	  example	  of	  safety	  
versus	   autonomy;	  where	   a	   nurse	  has	  decided	   to	  no	   longer	   allow	   the	  patient	   to	  open	   the	   front	  door	  due	   to	  a	  worsening	  medical	  condition,	   she	  nurse	  will	  have	  ultimately	  conceded	  that	  the	  constraint	  of	  keeping	  the	  patient	  safe	  over	  rides	  the	  constraint	  of	   impeding	  a	  person’s	  autonomy.	  Or	  alternatively,	  that	  the	  principle	  of	   acting	   in	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   patients	   overrides	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	  express	  autonomy.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  doctor	  who	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  dilemma	  to	  treat	  a	  critically	  ill	  patient	  whose	   survival	   is	   unlikely,	   has	   to	   balance	   the	   chance	   of	   cure	   against	   the	  prolonging	  of	  suffering	  and	  the	  next	  of	  kin’s	  wishes.	  In	  such	  a	  situation	  the	  doctor	  will	  make	  his	  decision	  again,	  ultimately	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  constraint,	  whether	  that	  constraint	   be	   the	   non	   consent	   of	   a	   next	   of	   kin,	   or	   the	   limitations	   of	  medicine.	  Most	   professionals	   faced	   with	   such	   ‘dilemmas’	   will	   experience	   emotional	  discomfort	   in	   making	   associated	   ethical	   decisions.	   The	   removal	   of	   a	   person’s	  freedom	  is	  an	  act	  that	  most	  of	  us	  would	  rather	  not	  perform,	  especially	  if	  distress	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  patient	  is	  a	  ‘side	  effect’	  of	  that	  act.	  Likewise,	  treating	  a	  patient	  under	  questionable	  clinical	  circumstances	  due	  to	  the	  persuasion	  of	  next	  of	  kin	  is	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uncomfortable	   if	   one	   is	   concerned	   about	   the	   use	   of	   resources	   and	   additional	  suffering	  that	  a	  patient	  may	  suffer.	  	  	  These	   examples	  not	   only	  highlight	   that	   all	   ‘ethical	   dilemmas’	   involve	  having	   to	  face	   some	   kind	   of	   constraint,	   but	   that	   in	   most	   circumstances	   there	   is	   also	   an	  associated	  emotional	  discomfort.	  What	  requires	  clarification	  here,	  is	  whether	  or	  not	   ‘moral	   distress’	   deserves	   attention	   as	   a	   unique	   kind	   of	   emotional	   distress,	  and	   if	   so	  why.	   	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   this	   each	   of	   the	   previous	   examples	  will	   be	  reviewed.	  	  If	  we	  return	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  nurse	  who	  decides	  to	  remove	  a	  patient’s	  freedom	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  safety,	  although	  she	  might	  experience	  some	  emotional	  discomfort,	  and	   indeed,	   this	   emotional	   discomfort	   could	   continue	   after	   the	   decision,	  when	  she	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  consequences	  of	  that	  decision,	  such	  as	  the	  patient	  becoming	  disorientated	  or	  angry	  at	  not	  being	  able	  to	  open	  a	  door,	  that	  emotional	  distress	  is	  countered	  by	  a	   sense	  of	  having	   reached	   the	   right	  decision.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  constraint	   that	   the	   nurse	   applied	   to	   the	   original	   situation,	   was	   one	   that	   she	  agreed	  to	  be	  right.	  It	  is	  a	  risk	  at	  this	  point	  to	  over	  simplify	  this	  sense	  of	  rightness.	  Although	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   nurse	   could	   have	   concluded	   that	   the	   constraint	   of	  safety	  ought	  to	  override	  the	  constraint	  of	  promotion	  of	  autonomy,	  it	   is	  possible	  that	  she	  also	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  for	  different	  reasons.	  For	  example,	  she	  might	  have	  come	   to	   the	  decision	   to	  promote	  safety	  because	  she	  agrees	   it	   to	  be	  right	   that	   hospital	   health	   and	   safety	   policy	   be	   followed,	   over	   and	   above	   any	  consideration	  of	  patient	  autonomy.	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Likewise	   the	  doctor	  who	  decides	   to	   treat	   a	   patient	   based	  on	   the	  wishes	   of	   the	  patient’s	  next	  of	  kin,	  may	  well	  suffer	  discomfort	  at	  seeing	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  actions	  –	   the	  prolonged	  suffering	  of	   the	  patient	  or	  use	  of	   resources	  –	  however,	  that	   discomfort	   is	   countered	   again,	   by	   his	   belief	   that	   he	   has	   made	   the	   right	  decision.	  In	  this	  instance,	  under	  unhopeful	  but	  also	  uncertain	  prognosis,	  he	  may	  well	  agree	  that	  next	  of	  kin	  wishes	  to	  treat	  ought	  to	  take	  precedence	  over	  his	  own	  clinical	   judgment	   to	   end	   treatment.	   However,	   as	   in	   the	   previous	   example,	   the	  doctor	  might	  make	  this	  decision	  based	  on	  other	  criteria,	  such	  as	  believing	  that	  it	  is	  right	  to	  follow	  hospital	  policy	  if	  that	  policy	  states	  that	  involvement	  of	  next	  of	  kin	   in	  medical	  decisions	   is	   to	  be	  promotoed.	   	   Indeed,	   as	  has	  been	   found	   in	   the	  empirical	   work,	   not	   all	   nurses	   experience	  moral	   distress	   and	   presumably	   it	   is	  because	  they	  have	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  as	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  examples	  above,	  where	   some	   reasoned	   justification	   has	   been	   made	   whereby	   no	   conflict	   is	  experienced.	  14	  	  At	  this	  point	  then,	  it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  emotional	  distress	  is	  associated	  with	  reaching	  decisions	  in	  many	  ‘ethical	  dilemmas’.	  However,	  this	  distress	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  ‘moral	  distress’	  because	  the	  nurse	  or	  doctor	  has	  come	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  resolution,	  whereby	  their	  decision	  is	  in	  congruence	  with	  what	  they	  identify	  to	  be	  right.	  They	  have	  faced	  a	  constraint,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  ‘moral	  distress’,	  but	  that	  constraint	  is	  one	  with	  which	  they	  do	  not	  disagree.	  Following	  on	  from	  this	  then,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  asked	  does	  any	  situation	  where	  a	  constraint	  is	  faced	  and	  conceded	  to,	  but	   that	   where	   that	   constraint	   is	   not	   agreed	   with,	   result	   in	   moral	   distress?	  Certainly	   the	   literature	   and	   the	   two	   common	  definitions	   of	  moral	   distress	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  14	  See	  p41.	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were	  given	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  would	  seem	  to	  indicate	  this.	  So,	  the	  nurse	  who	  decides	  to	  lock	  the	  door	  for	  a	  patient	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  hospital	  policy,	  when	   she	   believes	   the	   hospital	   policy	   to	   be	   wrong,	   will	   suffer	   what	   is	   called	  ‘moral	   distress’.	   Likewise,	   the	  doctor	  who	   follows	   the	  next	   of	   kin’s	  wishes,	   but	  believes	  that	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  allow	  next	  of	  kin	  to	   influence	  clinical	  decisions,	  will	  suffer	  moral	   distress	   if	   she	   concedes	   to	   the	   constraint	   of	   following	   the	   next	   of	  kin’s	  wishes	  that	  she	  believes	  to	  be	  wrong.	  	  	  Some	   of	   the	   research	   literature	   supports	   this	   stance.	   For	   example,	   the	  psychiatrists	   who	   were	   found	   to	   experience	   moral	   distress	   caused	   by	   their	  compliance	  with	  the	  legal	  system,	  suffered	  moral	  distress	  precisely	  because	  they	  conceded	  to	  a	  constraint	  that	  they	  did	  not	  necessarily	  believe	  to	  be	  right	  (Austin	  et	   al.,	   2007).	   Similarly,	   the	  moral	   distress	   caused	   to	  nurses	  working	   at	   staffing	  levels	   they	  believe	  to	  be	  set	   too	   low	  by	  hospital	  management,	  are	  also	  working	  under	  a	  constraint	  that	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  wrong	  (Rodney	  &	  Starkomski,	  2005).	  	  In	   these	   examples,	   and	   as	   the	   previous	   discussion	   of	   the	   varying	   natures	   of	  constraint	  have	  illustrated,	  certainly	  we	  can	  narrow	  emotional	  distress	  in	  ethical	  decision-­‐making,	   to	   ‘moral	   distress’	   on	   this	   basis.	   Furthermore,	  moral	   distress	  can	   be	   distinguished	   from	   other	   forms	   of	   emotional	   distress,	   firstly	   because	   it	  involves	  having	  to	  accept	  a	  constraint.	  Secondly	  though,	   it	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	   other	   forms	   of	   emotional	   distress	   because	   by	   necessity,	   the	   professional	  must	   identify	  harm	   in	  her	   interpretations	  of	   the	  situation.	  This	   takes	   the	  nurse	  who	   experiences	   moral	   distress	   beyond	   the	   nurse	   who	   is	   equally	   or	   perhaps	  more	  distressed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  great	  suffering.	  Suffering	  and	  the	  distress	  it	  causes	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is	   part	   of	   the	   natural	   order,	   and	   therefore	   does	   not	   include	   malicious	   intent,	  wrong	   professional	   judgement	   or	   preventable	   harm	   that	   is	   identified	   in	  moral	  distress.	  	  	  However,	   I’m	  not	  convinced	  that	   the	  definition	  of	  moral	  distress	  so	   far	  given	   is	  sufficiently	  narrow	  for	  fruitful	  ethical	  analysis.	  It	  results	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  all	  professional	   groups	   and	   all	   health	   care	   professionals	   (HCPs)	   are	   described	   as	  experiencing	   something	   similar,	  when	  perhaps	   it	   ought	   to	   be	   a	   concept	   that	   is	  narrowed	   to	   use	   for	   nurses	   only,	   and	   aside	   from	   nurses,	   only	   for	   groups	   of	  professionals	  who	  share	  many	  characteristics	  with	  nurses.15	  In	  order	  to	  support	  this	  position,	  the	  difference	  between	  moral	  distress	   in	  these	  instances	  (ie	  other	  professional	   groups)	   and	   moral	   distress	   where	   it	   is	   experienced	   in	   its	   more	  extreme	  forms,	  has	  to	  be	  considered.	  	  	  Moral	  distress	  is	  too	  broadly	  defined	  	  As	  was	  described	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  moral	  distress	  is	  suffered	  in	  its	  most	  extreme	   form,	  or	   in	  other	  words	  at	   its	  most	  distressing,	  when	  nurses	  are	  faced	  with	  caring	  for	  patients	  who	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	   in	   ‘futile’	  situations,	  and	  where	  aggressive	  medical	  care	  is	  continued.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  examples	  of	  the	  nurse	  and	  doctor	  who	  face	  the	  patient	  with	  dementia	  and	  the	  critically	  ill	  patient,	  or	   the	   psychiatrist	   and	   the	   nurse	   working	   under	   an	   unwelcome	   law	   or	   low	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  15	  McCarthy	  &	  Deady	  (2008)	  also	  discuss	  the	  problems	  with	  definitional	  accuracy	  in	  moral	  distress	  but	  argue	  instead	  for	  a	  broader	  concept	  which	  includes	  all	  health	  professionals.	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staffing	   levels	   respectively,	   the	  nurse	   in	   the	   ‘futile’	   situation	  also	   concedes	   to	  a	  constraint	  that	  she	  does	  not	  agree	  with.	  	  	  However,	   the	   nurse	   in	   the	   ‘futile’	   situation	   experiences	   conditions	   that	   are	  distinct	  from	  the	  others.	  First	  of	  all,	  she	  is	  directly	  exposed	  to	  the	  suffering	  of	  life	  and	   death	   consequences.	   Furthermore,	   unlike	   the	   doctor	   who	   faced	   the	   same	  kind	   of	   situation,	   she	   will	   remain	   with	   the	   patient	   and	   experience	   far	   more	  exposure	   to	   the	   negative	   and	   distressing	   consequences	   of	   a	   decision	   to	   treat.	  Indeed	  as	  Slote	   (2007)	  points	  out,	   to	  act	  has	  associated	  with	   it	   a	  higher	   causal	  responsibility	   than	  not	   to	   act;	   in	   other	  words	   sometimes	   to	   omit	   to	   act	   can	  be	  psychologically	   easier	   than	   to	   act.	   Nurses	   do	   not	   describe	   these	   experiences	  explicitly,	   but	   instead	   describe	   suffering	   they	   feel	   they	   cause	   and	   observe	   in	  metaphoric	   terms	   such	   as	   ‘torture’	   (Hefferman	   &	   Heilig,	   1999,	   Gill,	   2005),	  ‘flogging	  a	  dead	  horse’	  (Heland	  2006)	  or	  ‘keeping	  dead	  people	  alive’	  (Erlin	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  p524)	  	  	  Again,	   unlike	   the	   doctor,	   she	   will	   be	   the	   person	   who	   will	   carry	   out	   much	  (although	  not	  all)	  of	   this	   ‘flogging’,	   and	   if	   she	  doesn’t	  directly	   ‘flog’	  herself,	   she	  will	  assist	  in	  that	  action.	  The	  nurse	  is	  proximal	  to	  the	  patient	  and	  this	  proximity	  is	  associated	  with	  increased	  sense	  of	  moral	  distress	  (Torguul	  &	  Sorlie,	  2006)	  and	  as	  Slote	  (2007)	  argues,	   ‘perceptual	  and	  temporal	   immediacy’	   is	  associated	  with	  greater	  empathy	  with	  another’s	  plight	  and	  suffering.	  (p27)	  	  	  Along	   with	   these	   differences,	   ultimately	   the	   line	   that	   distinguishes	   the	   nurse	  from	   the	   doctor,	   is	   that	   the	   authority	   to	   decide	   lies	   with	   the	   doctor,	   and	   the	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doctor	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   instruct	   the	   nurse	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   medical	  procedures.	  The	  constraint	  that	  the	  nurse	  experiences	  in	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  weighing	  up	  moral	  principles	  and	  constraints,	  but	  is	  rather,	  a	  matter	  of	  what	  and	  who	  she	  is	  defined	  to	  be.	  Her	  situation	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  similar	  to	   that	   of	   the	   junior	   doctor	   who	   carries	   out	   the	   instruction	   of	   his	   senior.16	  However,	   the	   junior	   doctor,	   unlike	   the	   nurse	   is	   not	   so	   exposed	   to	   the	  consequences	  of	  medical	  decisions	  because	  he	  does	  not	  remain	  with	  the	  patient	  and	   is	   not	   responsible	   for	   assessing	   and	   resolving	   those	   consequences.	   In	  addition	   to	   this,	   the	   junior	  doctor	   is	   in	  a	   training	  position,	  where	  eventually	  he	  will	  become	  the	  person	  who	  has	  authority	  to	  make	  those	  decisions.	  Although	  he	  might	  be	  currently	  constrained	  by	  who	  and	  what	  he	   is,	  unlike	  the	  nurse,	   in	   the	  foreseeable	  future	  the	  doctor	  will	  no	  longer	  be.	  	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  doctors	  are	  also	  constrained	  by	  authority	  in	  so	  much	  as	  they	   are	   also	   limited	   by	   hospital	   policy,	   resource	   allocation	   and	   political	  decision-­‐making.	  However,	  although	  this	  may	  be	  the	  case,	  even	  so	  their	  position	  is	  different	   to	  nurses.	  Although	   the	  consultant	  psychiatrist	  might	  disagree	  with	  the	  law’s	  position	  on	  preservation	  of	  the	  safety	  of	  society,	  he	  is	  in	  disagreement	  with	  a	  body	  of	  professionals	  who	  are	  recognised	  as	  his	  equal	   in	  terms	  of	  social	  and	   intellectual	   status.	   His	   voice	   will	   be	   heard	   in	   media	   discussion	   and	   the	  committees	   that	   reach	   consensus	   about	   such	   decisions.	   The	   nurse	   is	   not	  recognised	  to	  be	  of	  equal	  status,	  socially	  or	   intellectually.	  Who	  and	  what	  she	   is	  recognised	  to	  be,	   is	  a	  constraint	   that	   is	  not	  shared	  by	  the	  doctor.	  The	  events	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  16	  Moral	  distress	  has	  been	  identified	  in	  junior	  doctors	  (Hilliard	  et	  al,	  2007)	  and	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  manage	  it	  have	  been	  raised	  in	  medical	  literature	  recently	  (McDougall,	  2011).	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the	   Yale	   (2009)	   meeting	   on	   conscientious	   objection	   further	   supports	   this	  distinction.17	  	  In	  conclusion	  to	  this	  argument	  then,	  it	  seems	  that	  moral	  distress	  can	  be	  defined	  as	   the	   emotional	   anguish	   that	   results	   from	   carrying	   out	   the	   ‘wrong’	   action	  (perceived	  or	  actual)	  in	  response	  to	  constraints	  that	  stop	  one	  from	  carrying	  out	  what	   the	   nurse	   identifies	   to	   be	   the	   ‘right’	   action,	   as	   is	   proposed	   by	   Jameton	   (	  1984	   and	   1993),	   Nathaniel	   (2006)	   and	   Wilkinson	   (1987).	   Further	   to	   this,	   I	  propose	   that	   moral	   distress	   is	   primarily	   an	   emotional	   judgement	   of	   ‘wrong’	  action	  that	  requires	  further	  rational	  analysis.18	  However,	  this	  definition	  leads	  to	  a	   situation	  where	  many	  morally	   charged	   situations	   can	   lead	   to	  moral	   distress,	  and	   be	   experienced	   by	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   professionals.	   The	   broadness	   of	   this	  definition	  means	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  issues	  that	  are	  directly	  and	  uniquely	  associated	  with	   the	  concept.	  Moral	  distress	   is	   capable	  of	   jumping	  from	  staffing	  levels	  (Rodney	  &	  Starkomski,	  2005)	  to	  end	  of	  life	  decision-­‐making,	  (Ferral,	  2006,	  Elpern	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Hamrick	  &	  Blackhall,	  2007)	   from	  legal	   issues	  around	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   society	   (Austin	   et	   al.,	   2007)	   to	   the	   ordering	   of	   a	  disgruntled	   queue	   of	   patients	   who	   await	   dispensation	   of	   drugs	   from	   a	  pharmacist	   (Kalvermark	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   This	   broad	   variety	   of	   causes,	   in	   the	   end	  leads	  one	  to	  question	  why	  moral	  distress	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  concept	  at	  all?	   Why	   not	   simply	   look	   at	   each	   of	   these	   morally	   charged	   and	   objectively	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  17	  See	  p37.	  18	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  moral	  distress	  is	  without	  rational	  judgement,	  but	  rather,	  that	  it	  requires	  further	  rational	  input	  to	  avoid	  the	  normative	  recommendations	  that	  are	  currently	  offered	  without	  further	  rational	  examination.	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different	   situations	  and	  weigh	  up	   the	  rightness	  and	  wrongness	  associated	  with	  each	  separately?	  	  	  In	   answer	   to	   this	   challenge,	   it	   seems	   that	   moral	   distress	   becomes	   important	  when	  the	  issues	  associated	  with	  it	  can	  be	  collectively	  shown	  to	  be	  in	  association	  with	   not	   only	  moral	   distress,	   but	  when	   the	   issues	   can	   also	   be	   shown	   to	   be	   in	  association	   with	   one	   another,	   and	   finally	   and	   most	   importantly,	   when	   these	  issues	  impact	  on	  patient	  care.	  	  	  The	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  moral	  distress	  leads	  to	  nurses	  leaving	  the	  profession	  or	  leaving	  specialist	  areas	  of	  practice	  or	  withdrawing	  from	  patients	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	   care	   is	   replaced	   by	   concentration	   on	   technical	   aspects	   of	   care.	   In	   other	  words	  it	  often	  leads	  to	  nurses	  nursing	  less	  well.19	  	  	  Although	  there	  is	  comparatively	  little	  work	  done	  on	  doctors	  and	  moral	  distress,	  that	  work	  that	  has	  been	  done	  as	  has	  been	  previously	  stated,	  shows	  that	  doctors	  do	  not	  seem	  to	   leave	  or	  change	  their	  specialisms	  in	  response	  to	  moral	  distress,	  they	  do	  not	  report	  that	  they	  omit	  to	  carry	  out	  some	  of	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  their	  role	  as	  does	  the	  nurse.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  work	  seems	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  stress	  that	  can	  sometimes	  be	  rewarding20	  	  	  In	   order	   to	  make	  moral	   distress	   a	   concept	  with	   greater	   validity	   it	   ought	   to	   be	  more	   narrowly	   defined.	   That	   is	   firstly,	   that	   moral	   distress	   arises	   when	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  19	  See	  p31.	  20	  See	  p30.	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professional	   is	   requested	   to	   perform	   an	   act	   that	   they	   perceive	   to	   be	   wrong.	  Secondly,	  that	  it	  is	  an	  act	  that	  they	  concede	  to	  carry	  out	  because	  the	  authority	  to	  decide	   that	   the	  act	   is	   to	  be	  performed,	   lies	  with	   some	  one	  else.	   	   In	   its	   strictest	  sense,	   and	   this	   I	   wish	   to	   promote	   in	   this	   thesis,	   this	   authority	   ought	   to	   be	  someone	   who	   lies	   outside	   of	   one’s	   own	   professional	   group.	   This	   means	   that	  nurses	   can	   be	   shown	   to	   experience	  moral	   distress,	   but	   the	   junior	   doctor	   does	  not.	   Put	   simply,	   moral	   distress	   arises	   when	   a	   person	   doesn’t	   want	   to	   do	  something,	  but	  has	  to	  do	  it	  because	  someone	  else,	  and	  who	  is	  different	  to	  them,	  has	  	  told	  them	  to.	  This	  sense	  of	  moral	  distress	  certainly	  pervades	  the	  literature.	  	  As	  has	  been	  discussed,	  the	  contextual	  constraint	  that	  is	  repeatedly	  referred	  to,	  is	  often	  described	  as	  a	  power	  imbalance.	  Interestingly,	  the	  more	  narrow	  definition	  that	   I	   have	   come	   to	   is	   perhaps	   a	   more	   correct	   version	   of	   what	   most	   of	   the	  literature	  seeks	  to	  describe	  and	  resolve.	  However,	  maybe	  there	  is	  a	  resistance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  nurse	  researchers	  to	  fully	  accept	  that	  this	  ‘power	  imbalance’,	  exposes	  the	   fact	   that	  moral	  distress	   is	  a	  consequence	  of	  who	  the	  nurse	   is	  and	  what	  she	  does.	   In	   other	  words,	  moral	   distress	   arises	   in	   a	   professional	  who	   is	   under	   the	  authority	  of	  another	  profession	  and	  who	  is	  duty	  bound	  by	  the	  very	  definition	  of	  who	  she	  is,	  to	  do	  what	  she	  is	  told	  to	  do.	  This	  differs	  from	  the	  literature	  because	  the	  literature	  insinuates	  this	  power	  difference	  as	  a	  wrong	  rather	  than	  statement	  of	  fact.	  	  If	  indeed	  a	  power	  imbalance	  exists,	  it	  is	  one	  that	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  role	  that	  the	  nurse	   inhabits	   and	   contradicts	   the	   concept	   of	   nurse	   autonomy	   that	   is	   so	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frequently	  referred	  to	  in	  academic	  literature	  and	  job	  descriptions.21	  	  Finally,	  the	  definition	   should	   include	   proximity	   to	   suffering	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   harm	  being	  done	  to	  another.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  primarily	  as	  an	   empathic	   response	   to	   another	   that	   ends	   in	   anguish	   for	   the	   professional	  because	   they	  perceive	   that	  what	   they	  are	  doing	   is	  harmful.	  For	   this	   thesis	   then	  moral	  distress	  will	  accepted	  under	  the	  resultant	  definition	  that:	  	   ‘moral	  distress	  is	  a	  nurse’s	  emotional	  judgement	  of	  primary	  wrong-­‐doing	   to	   the	  patient	  and	  secondary	  wrong-­‐doing	   to	   the	  nurse	  and	  indirectly	   the	   patient,	   that	   is	   based	   on	   close	   proximity	   to	   and	  empathy	   with,	   a	   patient’s	   suffering	   and	   the	   perception	   that	   she	  increases	   that	   patient’s	   suffering	   through	   performing	   actions	   for	  which	  she	  is	  responsible,	  but	  that	  are	  under	  the	  order	  and	  authority	  of	  another	  professional	  group;	  usually	  the	  doctor.’	  	  	  This	   definition	   is	   the	   basic	   premise	   that	   supports	   the	   choice	   to	   accept	   moral	  distress	  in	  nurses	  as	  a	  valid	  term.	  	  Conclusion.	  	  The	  validity	  of	  moral	  distress	  as	  an	  emotional	  judgement	  has	  been	  defended	  and	  a	  narrow	  definition	   that	   identifies	  moral	   distress	   as	   being	  unique	   to	   the	  nurse	  who	   is	   proximate	   to	   her	   patient’s	   suffering	   has	   been	   formulated.	   Emotional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  21	  Nurse	  autonomy	  will	  be	  discussed	  later.	  Job	  descriptions	  in	  the	  nursing	  press	  often	  refer	  to	  clinical	  nurse	  specialists	  as	  ‘autonomous	  practitioners	  and	  /	  or	  state	  that	  the	  nurse	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  act	  autonomously	  in	  the	  job	  descriptions.	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judgement	  of	  ‘ethical	  dilemmas’	  has	  been	  accepted	  to	  be	  an	  important	  element	  of	  morality.	  Solomon’s	  view	  that	   this	  element	  of	  morality	   is	  valid	  so	   long	  as	   it	   co-­‐exists	  with	   reasoned	  analysis	  has	  been	  accepted	  as	   the	   foundation	   from	  which	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  develop.	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Chapter	  Three:	  Conscientious	  objection	  to	  futile	  orders:	  An	  analysis	  of	  Catlin	  et	  al.	  
(2008)	  	  Introduction	  	  Although	  a	  number	  of	  other	  potential	  actions	  in	  response	  to	  moral	  distress	  have	  been	  described;	  choices	  such	  as	  covert	  communication,	   subversion	  and	  whistle	  blowing,	  in	  this	  thesis,	  consideration	  will	  be	  narrowed	  to	  the	  question	  of,	  to	  do	  or	  not	  to	  do	  as	  was	  expressed	  in	  the	  narrative.	  	  	  Having	  narrowed	  the	  definition	  of	  moral	  distress	   in	  chapter	   two,	   from	  now	  on,	  moral	  distress	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ‘futile’	  doctors’	  orders	  will	  be	  examined.	  This	  was	  the	  question	   that	   was	   raised	   in	   the	   original	   narrative	   where	   the	   nurse	   identified	  ‘futile’	   orders,	   where	   she	   advocated	   for	   the	   patient	   and	   argued	   for	   the	  discontinuation	   of	   those	   orders,	   and	   where	   she	   finally	   faced	   the	   decision	   of	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  carry	  out	  those	  orders.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  justification	  for	  use	  of	  Catlin	  et	  al.’s	  (2008)22	  paper	  as	   a	   foundational	   piece	   for	   reasoned	   analysis	   of	  moral	   distress.	   After	   this,	   the	  remainder	  of	   this	  chapter	  will	  be	  a	   review	  and	   initial	  analysis	  of	  her	  proposals	  that	  will	   be	   further	   examined	   over	   the	   coming	   chapters.	   It	  will	   include	   both	   a	  report	   of	   Catlin’s	   ideas,	   but	   also	   some	  preliminary	  discussion	   about	   inferences	  about	   the	   assumptions	   and	   arguments	   that	   she	   promotes	   but	   that	   are	   not	  explicitly	   stated.	   The	   analysis	   will	   be	   limited	   to	   deciphering	   Catlin’s	   meaning,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  22	  For	  ease	  of	  reference	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  just	  ‘Catlin’	  from	  now	  on.	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along	   with	   some	   comment	   on	   internal	   validity	   and	   where	   appropriate,	   a	  clarification	  of	  some	  omissions	  and	  confusions	  that	  have	  been	  identified.	  Where	  papers	  are	   referred	   to	   that	   support	  or	  do	  not	   support	  her	  position,	   these	  have	  been	   found	   on	   external	   review	   of	   the	   literature.	   Papers	   that	   she	   cites	   will	   be	  indicated	  as	  such.	  	  Moral	  distress	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  conscience.	  	  Catlin	  proposes	  that	  the	  ANA	  code	  of	  nursing	  (ANA,	  2001)	  ought	  to	  be	  altered	  so	  that	   conscientious	   objection	   is	   supported	   as	   a	   response	   from	   nurses	   who	   are	  morally	   distressed	   by	   ‘futile’	   orders,	   or	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Catlin,	   to	   instigate	  protocols	   that	   would	   refuse	   ‘to	   provide	   end	   of	   life	   interventions	   that	   cause	  suffering,	  appear	  to	  be	  harmful,	  or	  seem	  futile.’	  (p.106)	  	  	  This	   paper	   has	   been	   chosen	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   there	   are	   many	  papers	  that	  address	  similar	  circumstances	  and	  experiences	  to	  moral	  distress	  and	  that	   define	   the	   experience	   as	   ‘troubled	   conscience’.	   (Juthberg	   &	   Sundin,	   2010;	  Dahlqvist	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Gronlund	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  	  or	  ‘stress	  of	  conscience’	  (Glasberg	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Juthberg	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Indeed,	  they	  are	  divided	  from	  papers	  on	  moral	  distress	   only	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   definitional	   terms	   that	   lead	   to	   a	   slightly	   different	  emphasis	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   analysis	   is	   made,	   but	   essentially	   moral	   distress	   is	  synonymous	  with	  a	  crisis	  of	  conscience,	  except	  that	  in	  moral	  distress	  constraints	  are	  identified	  as	  primary	  and	  secondary	  causes	  that	  lead	  to	  harm.	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Secondly,	  the	  question	  that	  the	  nurse	  in	  the	  narrative	  felt	  impelled	  to	  answer	  was	  one	  of	  how	  to	  act	  in	  good	  conscience.	  She	  identified	  a	  situation	  where	  she	  could	  refuse	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   doctor’s	   orders;	   Catlin	   proposes	   a	   change	   in	   the	   nursing	  code	   of	   conduct	   that	   could	   make	   such	   an	   act	   one	   that	   is	   professionally	  sanctioned.	  	  	  Thirdly,	   like	   the	   nurse	   in	   the	   narrative,	   Catlin	   is	   not	   alone	   in	   framing	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  a	  justifiable	  response	  for	  nurses	  to	  make	  in	  relation	  to	  doctors’	   orders.	   For	   example,	   Katz	   Sperlich	   et	   al.	   (1996)	   describe	   how	   nurses	  collectively	   took	   a	   conscientious	   stand	   against	   male	   circumcision	   that	   is	  performed	   routinely	   in	   the	   US	   in	   babies,	   and	   that	   led	   them	   to	   collectively	  conscientiously	   object	   to	   assisting	   doctors	   in	   carrying	   out	   the	   procedure.	  Subsequently	  hospital	   policy	  was	   restructured	   to	   specify	   how	  objecting	  nurses	  were	   to	   be	   accommodated	   and	   no	   longer	   have	   any	   obligation	   to	   participate	  directly	   in	   the	   procedure	   (St	   Vincent’s	   Hospital,	   1995)23	   This	   case	   does	   not	  specify	  moral	  distress	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  and	  indeed	  the	  definition	   I	   have	   made	   of	   moral	   distress	   does	   not	   necessarily	   include	   male	  circumcision	   as	   a	   possible	   cause,	   although	   it	   does	   seem	   reasonable	   to	   propose	  that	  at	  least	  some	  nurses	  involved	  in	  the	  procedure	  might	  be	  included	  in	  my	  own	  definition.	  	  	  There	   is	   also	   anecdotal	   evidence	   that	   nurses	  might	   wish	   to	   claim	   the	   right	   to	  conscientious	   objection	   to	   doctors’	   orders.	   Allnurses.com	   (2002)	   hosts	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  23	  There	  is	  a	  youtube	  video	  of	  some	  of	  the	  nurses’	  responses	  ‘The	  nurses	  of	  St	  Vincent’s	  saying	  ‘No’	  to	  circumcision’	  	  (2006)	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discussion	  between	  nurses	  that	  was	  begun	  by	  a	  nurse	  who	  refused	  to	  administer	  pain	   relief	   as	  prescribed	  by	   the	  doctor.	  Conscientious	  objection	   featured	   in	   the	  subsequent	  discussion.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  in	  a	  broader	  context,	  Catlin	  does	  not	  stand	  alone	  in	  making	  the	  suggestion	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  the	  face	  of	  higher	  authority	  in	  medical	  decision-­‐making	   might	   be	   an	   ethically	   justifiable	   response	   to	   distressing	  circumstances.	   Birchley	   (2011)	   also	   proposes	   that	   conscientious	   objection	   to	  more	  general	  and	  non-­‐specified	  situations	  ought	  to	  be	  promoted	  as	  a	  recognised	  right	   for	   HCPs.	   Although	   my	   analysis	   will	   concentrate	   on	   Catlin’s	   work,	   it	   is	  worth	   noting	   that	   Birchley	   argues	   for	   the	   rights	   for	   health	   care	   workers	   to	  conscientiously	  object.	  However	  this	  differs	  from	  Catlin.	  He	  argues	  that	  all	  HCPs	  ought	   to	   be	   able	   to	   conscientiously	   object	   but	   that	   this	   objection	   would	   be	  required	   to	   be	   presented	   to	   a	   committee	   of	   professionals	   and	   lay	   people.	   The	  purpose	   that	   this	   would	   fulfill	   would	   be	   to	   safeguard	   patients	   and	   to	   prevent	  surreptitious	   activities	   in	   health	   care	   practice	   such	   as	   those	   found	   in	   the	  Tuskegee	   experiment	   (Jones	   1981)	   This	   contrasts	   with	   Catlin’s	   position,	   who	  presents	   conscientious	   objection	   as	   an	   individual	   or	   group	   action,	   but	  nevertheless	   demonstrates	   a	   broader	   interest	   in	   conscientious	   objection	   that	  extends	  beyond	  the	  typical	  cases	  such	  as	  abortion.	  	  The	   scholars	   at	   the	   meeting	   on	   moral	   distress	   at	   the	   Bioethics	   Center,	   Yale	  University	  (Yale	  University,	  2009)	  also	  met	  to	  propose	  a	  project	  to	  write	  a	  book	  on	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  a	  resolution	  for	  moral	  distress.	  Although	  taking	  a	  wider	  remit	  than	  the	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  aggressive	  medical	  treatment	  as	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suggested	   by	   Catlin,	   this,	   along	  with	   the	   other	   papers	   identified,	   demonstrates	  that	  there	  is	  a	  consensus	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  might	  be	  justified.	  	  Fourthly,	  Catlin	  directly	  relates	  the	  empirical	  description	  of	  moral	  distress	  to	  the	  philosophical	   concept	   of	   conscience	   and	   gives	   a	   solid	   justification	   for	   the	  normative	   recommendations	   to	   incorporate	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	  American	   Code	   of	   Ethics	   for	   Nurses	   as	   a	   response	   to	   moral	   distress.	   Such	   a	  recommendation	   allows	   for	   further	   exploration	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   wrong-­‐doing	  that	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  in	  the	  field	  insinuates	  but	  does	  not	  meet	  ‘head	  on’.	  As	  has	   been	   stated,	   most	   of	   the	   discussion	   about	   resolutions	   to	   moral	   distress	  focuses	   on	   activities	   such	   as	   improved	   communication	   and	   education.24	   This	  bypasses	   the	   earlier	   explanations	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   moral	   distress	   that	   such	  authors	  identify,	  and	  that	  were	  termed	  ‘primary	  harm’	  in	  chapter	  one.25	  Catlin’s	  solution	  however,	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  harm	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  being	  done	  to	  patients,	  thus	  justifying	  conscientious	  objection.	  	  	  To	  narrow	  the	  analysis	  of	  moral	  distress	  to	  that	  of	  conscience	  and	  conscientious	  objection,	  means	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  primary	  harm	  that	  moral	  distress	  may	  or	  may	  not	   indicate	   can	   be	   grappled	  with.	   Is	   overly	   aggressive	  medical	   care	   a	  wrong-­‐doing	   that	   nurses	   ought	   to	   disassociate	   from?	   Further	   to	   this,	   conscientious	  objection	  is	  an	  action	  that	   firmly	  asserts	  the	  autonomy	  of	  an	   individual	  to	  have	  control	  over	  his	  or	  her	  own	  actions.	  It	  concedes	  that	  a	  person	  is	  responsible	  for	  his	  or	  her	  own	  actions,	  and	   in	  so	  doing	   it	  also	   faces	   the	  secondary	  harm	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  24	  See	  p33-­‐38	  25	  See	  p22.	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power	   difference	   between	   doctors	   and	   nurses,	   that	   authors	   have	   identified.	  Conscientious	   objection	   makes	   clear	   that	   ultimately,	   whatever	   the	   power	  relations,	   no	   person	   has	   authority	   to	   make	   another	   do	   something	   that	   they	  believe	  to	  be	  wrong.	  	  Of	   course	   there	   is	   also	   a	   vast	   array	   of	   literature	   around	   the	   subject	   of	  conscientious	   objection	   and	   abortion	   and	   emergency	   contraception.26	   This	  literature	   is	   not	   of	   specific	   interest	   to	  my	   research	   question	   per	   se	   because	   it	  addresses	   a	   well-­‐trodden	   path	   that	   examines	   the	   rightness	   of	   killing	   in	   utero.	  However,	  some	  such	  literature	  will	  be	  used	  to	  inform	  the	  arguments	  that	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  that	  ultimately	  will	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  nurses	  ought	  not	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  doctors’	  orders	  in	  the	  case	  of	  moral	  distress	  as	  I	  have	  defined	  it	  for	  my	  thesis.	  	  	  Finally,	   depending	   on	   the	   answers	   to	   the	   questions	   of	   the	   accuracy	   of	   moral	  distress	   being	   described	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   conscience	   and	   thereafter	   an	   accurate	  identification	  of	  wrong-­‐doing	  or	  not,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  explore	  resolutions	  to	  moral	   distress	   that	   do	   not	   leap	   from	   empirical	   descriptions	   to	   normative	  resolutions	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  current	  literature.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  26	  Hanna	  (2005)	  did	  carry	  out	  a	  research	  study	  on	  moral	  distress	  and	  nurses	  who	  assisted	  in	  elective	  abortions.	  The	  association	  of	  moral	  distress	  with	  nurses	  who	  conscientiously	  agree	  to	  participate	  in	  abortion	  means	  that	  this	  study	  might	  be	  flawed	  in	  so	  far	  as	  its	  definition	  of	  moral	  distress	  might	  be	  contended.	  Nevertheless	  the	  results	  are	  interesting	  and	  emotional	  responses	  of	  the	  nurses	  are	  congruent	  with	  those	  experienced	  in	  moral	  distress	  in	  its	  more	  broadly	  researched	  form.	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However,	   there	   are	   some	   potential	   problems	   with	   Catlin’s	   paper	   that	   require	  defence.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	   is	  the	  UK,	  and	  Catlin’s	   is	  a	  US	  paper.	  There	  are	  some	   differences	   in	   the	   ideologies	   exposed	   in	   the	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   for	   the	   UK	  (NMC,	   2008a)	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   in	   the	   US.	   Furthermore,	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  health	  care	  delivery	  that	  could	  make	  an	  extrapolation	  of	  the	  proposals	  that	  Catlin	  makes	  to	  the	  UK,	  invalid.	  However,	  these	  differences	  are	  not	  great	  enough	  to	  undermine	  the	  basis	  for	  such	  an	  extrapolation.	  	  Firstly,	   although	  Catlin’s	  paper	   is	  US	  based,	   the	  development	  of	  nursing	  within	  the	  UK	  has	  been	  significantly	   influenced	  by	   seminal	   theoretical	  work	   in	   the	  US	  and	   dialogue	   exists	   across	   continents	   in	   international	   journals	   that	   examine	  nursing	   practice.27	   The	   similarities	   between	   the	   continents	   and	   between	   the	  bedside	   practice	   of	   nursing	   and	  medicine	   are	  more	   similar	   than	   dissimilar.	   In	  addition	  to	  this,	  much	  of	  what	  nurses	  do	  in	  the	  UK,	  including	  the	  development	  of	  specialist	   roles	  and	  degree	   level	  educated	  basic	   level	  nurses,	  has	  been	   inspired	  by	   the	  work	   of	   the	   profession	   in	   the	   US	   and	   therefore	  my	   examination	   of	   the	  ideas	   in	   the	  US	  are	   important	  because	   they	  could	  be	  seminal	   in	  changing	   ideas	  and	  working	  practices	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  (Woods,	  1997;	  Davis,	  1999).	  This	  historical	  development	  of	  nursing	  will	  become	  significant	  later,	  when	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  has	  led	  to	  invalid	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  nursing	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  moral	  distress	  that	  nurses	  experience.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  27	  There	  are	  many	  contributors	  to	  this	  work,	  but	  Benner	  (1984),	  and	  her	  work	  on	  the	  development	  of	  nursing	  expertise	  and	  Henderson	  (1997)	  and	  Orem’s	  (McLaughlin	  Renpenning	  &	  Taylor,	  2003)	  development	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  nursing	  care	  and	  Parahoo’s	  (1997)	  early	  consideration	  of	  nursing	  research	  have	  all	  had	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  nursing	  process,	  nursing	  models	  and	  the	  development	  of	  nursing	  research	  in	  the	  UK.	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  Finally,	  although	   there	  are	  distinctions	  between	  US	  and	  UK	  healthcare	  delivery	  that	   create	   unique	   ethical	   questions	   that	   relate	   to	   each	   -­‐	   for	   example	   the	  inequalities	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  privately	  funded	  US	  health	  care	   system	   creates	   empirical	   scenarios	   and	   ethical	   concerns	   that	   are	   not	  reflected	   in	   the	   centralised	   finance	   system	   that	   is	   present	   in	   the	   UK	   	   (Stone,	  1993;	  Baker	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Baker	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress	  is	  a	  ubiquitous	  problem	  for	  nurses	  internationally,	  where	  the	  constraints	  to	  practice	  are	   shared	   by	   nurses	   whatever	   their	   nationality.	   This	   is	   supported	   by	   the	  research	   performed	   on	  moral	   distress	   in	   the	   variety	   of	   countries	   identified	   in	  chapter	  one.	  	  Second	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   paper	   is	   US	   based,	   it	   is	   also	   written	   with	   specific	  reference	  to	  neonates	  in	  intensive	  care	  and	  children	  in	  paediatric	  intensive	  care.	  Some	  of	  the	  ethical	  issues	  that	  arise	  in	  such	  clinical	  work	  are	  specific	  to	  the	  age	  of	  the	  patients.	  For	  example,	  viability	  and	  active	  treatment	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  viability	  will	  be	  particular	  circumstances	  that	  cause	  moral	  distress	  in	  the	  neonatal	  nurse	  and	  not	  the	  adult	  nurse.28	  However,	  all	  branches	  of	  nurses	  suffer	  moral	  distress	  in	   common,	   and	   adult	   and	   childrens’	   nurses	   have	   also	   been	   shown	   to	   suffer	  moral	   distress	   in	  many	   care	   settings	   where	   ‘futile’	   treatment	   is	   considered	   to	  occur.	  The	  neonatal	  nurses	  and	  nurses	   in	  other	   fields	  will	  suffer	  moral	  distress	  under	   the	   definition	   I	   offered	   in	   chapter	   two.	   Catlin’s	   description	   of	   moral	  distress	  clearly	  falls	  under	  this	  definition.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  28	  This	  has	  already	  been	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  but	  Janvier	  &	  Barrington	  (2005)	  provide	  further	  discussion	  about	  the	  clinical	  outcomes	  associated	  with	  active	  treatment	  of	  neonates	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  viability.	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  As	   shall	   soon	   be	   described,	   Catlin’s	   arguments	   about	   the	   appropriateness	   of	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  a	  response	  to	  moral	  distress	  is	  applicable	  to	  all	  nurses	  who	   are	   exposed	   to	   aggressive	   treatment	   of	   patients;	   patients	   who	   morally	  distressed	  nurses	  would	  rather	  see	  treated	  palliatively.	  	  	  	  She	  presents	  a	  paper	  where	   the	  empirical	  work	  done	   to	   find	  out	  about	  nurses’	  attitudes	  towards	  and	  use	  of	  conscientious	  objection	   in	  cases	  of	  moral	  distress,	  leads	  on	  to	  a	  normative	  recommendation	  that	  the	  nursing	  code	  of	  conduct	  ought	  to	   be	   changed	   to	   support	   conscientious	   objection	  when	   nurses	   are	   faced	  with	  situations	  that	  they	  believe	  allow	  the	  delivery	  of	  aggressive	  medical	  treatment	  to	  deny	   a	   patient’s	   rights	   to	   palliative	   care.	   Should	   such	   a	   proviso	   have	   been	  included	   in	   the	   NMC	   code	   of	   conduct,	   in	   my	   own	   narrative,	   the	   nurse	   would	  certainly	  have	  conscientiously	  objected	  to	  setting	  up	  the	  doxapram	  infusion	  and	  conceded	  to	  the	  offer	  of	  another	  colleague	  set	  up	  the	  infusion	  for	  her.	   	  Catlin:	  Underlying	  assumptions,	  empirical	  findings	  and	  arguments.	  	  Catlin	   begins	   her	   paper	   by	   establishing	   what	   I	   will	   term	   her	   ‘foundational	  assumptions’	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   nursing	   and	  moral	   distress.	   	   She	   argues	   that	  nurses	  are	  a	  body	  of	  professionals	  with	  a	   long	   theoretical	  history	   in	  which	   the	  nurse	   is	  defined	  as	  a	  person	  who	   is	   called	   to	  care	  by	  patients	  and	   families	  and	  communities	   and	  who	   responds	   to	   the	   person	   under	   her	   care	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	  beneficial	  to	  the	  recipient	  and	  meaningful	  to	  both	  the	  recipient	  and	  herself.	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She	  uses	   four	  authors	   to	  offer	  her	  definitional	  understanding	  of	  moral	  distress.	  Firstly	   she	   quotes	   Jameton’s	   (1984)	   definition	   of	   moral	   distress	   as	   a	  phenomenon	  that	  occurs	  when	  the	  nurse	  knows	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  but	  can’t	  do	  it	  because	  constraints	  stop	  her	  from	  doing	  so.	  She	  then	  quotes	  Rushton	  (2006),	  who	   states	   that	  moral	   distress	   occurs	  when	   clinicians	   are	   unable	   to	   put	  moral	  choices	   into	   moral	   action.	   Thirdly	   she	   quotes	   Gordon	   and	   Hamric’s	   (2007)	  assertion	   in	   their	   paper	   on	   nursing	   advocacy,	   that	   nurses	   have	   a	   moral	  imperative	   to	   do	   the	   right	   thing.	   Finally,	   she	   quotes	  Rushton	   and	  his	   assertion	  that	  where	  a	  nurse	  is	  unable	  to	  take	  the	  right	  course	  of	  action	  she	  is	  obliged	  to	  maintain	  her	  personal	  and	  professional	  integrity	  and	  raise	  a	  conscientious	  voice	  and	   possibly	   to	  make	   a	   conscientious	   refusal.	   This	   choice	   of	   authors	   indicates	  that	  Catlin	  takes	  the	  view	  that	  nurses	  have	  access	  to	  knowledge	  about	  the	  ‘right	  thing’	  to	  do	  when	  others	  –	  that	  is	  the	  organisation,	  doctors	  or	  families	  –	  seem	  to	  prefer	  to	  do	  the	  ‘wrong	  thing’	  or	  fail	  to	  see	  that	  what	  they	  do	  is	  wrong.	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	  have	  a	   clear	  understanding	  of	  what	  Catlin	  understands	   to	  be	  the	   ‘wrong	   thing’,	   and	   in	   this	   paper	   it	   is	   explicitly	   described	   as	   the	   overuse	   of	  technology	  that	  causes	  suffering	  and	  effectively	  denies	  those	  who	  will	  die,	  access	  to	  proper	  care,	  that	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  curative	  in	  nature,	  but	  rather,	  palliative.	  She	  uses	  Kain	  (2006),	  Carter	  and	  Leuthner	  (2003)	  and	  Levetown	  (1996)	  to	  support	  her	  position.	  These	  authors	  do	  point	  out	  the	  burdens	  of	  treatment,	  for	  example	  in	  the	   case	   of	   Carter	   and	   Leuthner,	   the	   controversy	   over	   artificial	   hydration	   and	  nutrition	  in	  neonates	  is	  examined	  and	  the	  burdens	  of	  such	  treatment	  in	  the	  dying	  compared	  to	  some	  advantages	  of	  the	  alternative	  state	  of	  starvation,	  put	  forward	  amongst	   the	   reasons	   to	   withdraw	   such	   treatment	   as	   a	   palliative	   measure.	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Catlin’s	   position	   is	   supported	   by	   other	   authors	  who	   she	   does	   not	   cite,	   such	   as	  Solomon	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  who	  found	  that	  many	  nurses	  and	  house	  officers	  had	  acted	  against	   their	   conscience	   in	   end	   of	   life	   care,	   where	   they	   felt	   that	   overly	  burdensome	   treatment	   was	   given	   to	   patients	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   artificial	  hydration	   and	   nutrition	   remains	   an	   issue	   that	   makes	   nurses	   and	   doctors	  uncomfortable	   (Schmidlin	   2008;	   Van	   der	   Riet	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   Such	   concerns	   are	  also	  relevant	  to	  nursing	  of	  adult	  patients	  who	  for	  example,	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  prolonged	   death	   after	   medical	   treatments	   such	   as	   artificial	   feeding	   (Krishna,	  2011).	  Indeed	  some	  authors	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  question	  the	  morality	  of	  hand	  feeding	  patients	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  become	  intensive	  care	  dependent	  thereafter	  (Cochrane	  2009).	  	  However,	   the	   evidence	   in	   this	   field	   is	   not	   conclusive,	   empirically	   nor	   ethically.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  retrospective	  study	  on	  patients	  who	  received	  palliative	  care	  on	  an	   oncology	  ward,	   Krishna	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   found	   that	   artificial	   hydration	   did	   not	  alter	   hydration	   related	   symptoms	   or	   medication	   use,	   nor	   did	   it	   extend	   the	  survival	   of	   patients.	   	   Undoubtedly	   some	   practitioners	   would	   have	   wrongly	  perceived	   this	   intervention	   as	   the	  unnecessary	   extending	  of	   life.	  However,	   this	  study	  showed	  that	  although	   it	  didn’t	   seem	  to	   improve	  matters,	   it	  did	  not	  make	  them	   worse	   either.	   Higginson	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   in	   their	   systematic	   review	   of	   the	  literature	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  palliative	  care	  teams,	  further	  muddy	  the	  waters,	  and	  found	   that	   these	   teams	   did	   not	   bring	   significant	   benefits	   to	   patients	   in	   the	  hospital	   setting.	   Timmers	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   found	   that	   nurses	   in	   a	   general	   adult	  intensive	  care	  unit	  could	  expect	  mortality	  rates	  to	  be	  around	  sixteen	  percent	  in	  the	   ICU,	  and	   the	  ward	  nurses	  who	   followed	   through	  care	   for	  patients	  admitted	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from	  ICU,	  could	  expect	  to	  see	  eleven	  percent	  of	  the	  patients	  who	  come	  from	  ICU	  to	  die	  before	  discharge.	  Clearly,	  whatever	  treatments	  are	  used,	  nurses	  are	  in	  the	  difficult	  position	  of	  caring	  for	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  such	  patients	  who	  will	  die.	   Of	   course,	   the	   alternate	   view	   is	   that	   the	  majority	   survive	   such	   treatment.	  Furthermore,	   the	   expectation	   that	   the	   experience	  of	   death	   can	  be	   improved	  or	  shortenened	   is	   not	   an	   end	   that	   can	   be	   predicted	   or	   achieved	   with	   certainty.	  Ironically,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  good	  nursing	  care	  also	  extends	  dying,	  as	  patients	  are	  prevented	   from	   developing	   pressure	   ulcers,	   are	  moved	   to	   promote	   circulation	  and	  breathing	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  take	  note	  that	  Catlin’s	  position	  that	  nurses	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  care	  orders	  that	  deny	  a	  patient	  palliative	  care,	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  doctor	  who	  refuses	  to	  give	  a	  patient	  who	  is	  acknowledged	  as	  dying,	  palliative	  care;	  but	  rather,	  refers	  to	  the	  doctor	  who	  continues	  to	  treat	  a	  patient	  who	  the	  nurse	  identifies	  ought	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  die	  instead.	  	  	  She	  does	  not	  make	   this	  distinction	   in	  meaning	  clear	  and	   this	   is	  an	  error	   in	  her	  work	   –	   both	   of	   these	   circumstances	   are	  morally	   different.	   If	   a	   doctor	   were	   to	  deny	   a	   patient	  who	   is	   acknowledged	   as	   dying,	   palliative	   care,	   then	   this	  would	  clearly	   contradict	   what	   is	   acknowledged	   to	   be	   good	   practice	   and	   be	   morally	  wrong.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  patient	  who	  is	  treated	  until	  the	  very	  end,	  even	  though	   it	  would	  have	  been	  better	   to	  offer	   the	  same	  patient	  palliative	  care,	   it	   is	  not	   until	   the	   event	   of	   death	   that	   one	   can	   be	   certain	   that	   palliative	   care	  would	  have	  been	  the	  right	  option.	  Until	  retrospective	  judgement	  can	  be	  made	  then,	  here	  the	   doctor	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   is	   in	   a	   morally	   grey	   zone	   that	   is	   defined	   by	  
	   73	  
uncertainty	   of	   outcome	   or	   as	   Repenshek	   (2009)	   identifies	   it,	   moral	   distress	  under	  such	  circumstances	  is	  a	  discomfort	  at	  being	  in	  a	  state	  of	  moral	  subjectivity.	  The	  right	  way	  forward	  is	  neither	  clear	  nor	  necessarily	  agreed	  upon.	  	  	  The	   two	   potential	   circumstances	   –	   that	   of	   denying	   a	   patient	   who	   is	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  dying	  palliative	  care	  and	  that	  of	  denying	  a	  patient	  palliative	  care	  who	   is	   not	   generally	   acknowledged	   as	   dying	   -­‐	  might	   give	   rise	   to	   what	   is	  termed	  ‘moral	  distress’,	  if	  the	  nurse	  is	  constrained	  from	  doing	  the	  right	  thing.	  But	  as	  has	  been	  noted,	  Catlin	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  talking	  about	  the	  former.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  later	  chapters,	  the	  first	  situation	  ought	  to	  be	  termed	  ‘moral	  outrage’	  as	  it	   is	   not	   in	   a	   grey	   area,	   but	   is	   clearly	   a	   wrong-­‐doing,	   if	   professional	   and	  institututional	  standards	  are	  taken	  as	  the	  norm.	  	  Moral	  outrage	  has	  been	  defined	  as	   anger	   provoked	  by	   the	   perception	   that	   a	  moral	   standard	   has	   been	   violated.	  	  (Batson	  et	  al..,	  2007)	  Similarly	  to	  moral	  distress,	   the	  emotional	  nature	  of	  moral	  outrage,	  leads	  to	  problems	  with	  its	  interpretation	  too	  (O’Mara	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  To	   support	   her	   position,	   that	   presumably	   refers	   to	   the	   latter	  meaning,	   that	   is	  ‘futile’	  care	  orders,	  Catlin	  quotes	  the	  American	  Nurses	  Association’s	  (ANA,	  1993)	  report	   that	   careful	   assessment	   of	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   providing	   high-­‐	   tech	  curative	  medical	  care	  to	  those	  who	  require	  comfort,	  relief	  and	  a	  peaceful	  death	  should	   be	   made	   to	   avoid	   futile	   treatment	   (p	   102)	   She	   also	   quotes	   Paris	   &	  Shreiber	  (1996)	  who	  state	  that	  ‘futile	  care’,	  at	  the	  request	  of	  patients	  themselves	  or	  relatives,	  who	  are	  not	  ready	  to	  see	  a	  loved	  one	  die,	  ought	  never	  to	  be	  delivered	  to	   patients,	   because	   patient	   autonomy	   becomes	   irrelevant	   under	   such	  circumstances,	  even	  if	  relatives	  wish	  treatment	  to	  continue.	  The	  ‘wrong	  thing’	  is	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therefore	  happening	  in	  health	  care	  and	  requires	  to	  be	  rectified	  because	  Paris	  &	  Shreiber	  observe	  that	  patients	  and	  relatives	  can	  have	  undue	  influence	  on	  medical	  staff.	  Of	  course	  again,	   this	  has	   to	  be	  balanced	  against	   the	  evidence	   that	  doctors	  will	  stand	  against	  the	  views	  of	  relatives,	  when	  futility	  is	  certain.	  However	  even	  in	  the	   case	   of	   extreme	   prematurity	   legal	   cases	   have	   shown	   the	   complexity	   and	  conflicts	   of	   opinions	   between	   doctors	   and	   relatives,	   and	   where	   the	   law	   will	  support	   treatment	  where	  basic	   aspects	  of	  quality	  of	   life	   even	   in	   those	   severely	  disabled,	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  of	  value	  to	  parents	  (Morris,	  2009).	  	  Implicit	   in	   Catlin’s	   work	   are	   two	   arguments	   that	   I	   have	   identified	   during	   my	  analysis.	   The	   first	   relates	   to	   moral	   distress	   and	   the	   primary	   and	   secondary	  nature	  of	  harm	  or	  wrong-­‐doing,	  and	  the	  second	  relates	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  nursing.	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  each	  in	  turn.	  	  The	  Nature	  of	  Wrong-­‐doing.	  	  Firstly,	   Catlin	   does	   not	   just	   identify	   ‘wrong-­‐doing’	   as	   the	   hopeless	   case	   where	  futile	   treatment	   is	  given	   in	   the	  situation	  of	  what	  seems	   to	  be	   impending	  death.	  She	  also	  insinuates	  another	  ‘wrong	  thing’;	  that	  is	  to	  treat	  patients	  where	  life	  can	  be	   extended	   ‘beyond	   cognition	   or	   function’	   (p102).	   This	   statement	   is	   not	  developed	   any	   further	   in	   her	   paper,	   but	   clearly	   indicates	   a	   different	  understanding	   of	   wrong-­‐doing,	   that	   has	   a	   different	   meaning	   to	   prolonging	   a	  death.	  This	  statement	  does	  not	  draw	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  dying,	  but	  rather	  the	  ethics	  of	   quality	   of	   life	   and	   the	   various	   interpretations	   that	   can	   be	  made	   about	   a	   life	  worth	   living	   in	   disabled	   circumstances.	   As	   was	   drawn	   attention	   to	   in	   chapter	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one,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  some	  neonates,	  high	  tech	  treatments	  will	  result	  in	  the	  saving	  of	  lives	  that	  will	  be	  severely	  disabled	  (Marlow	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  nurse	  then,	  can	  be	  morally	  distressed	  not	  only	  because	  a	  patient	  is	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  a	  peaceful	  death but	   also	   because	   medical	   treatment	   can	   enable	   or	   force,	   depending	   on	  one’s	  perspective,	  the	  patient	  to	  continue	  to	  live.	  In	  the	  adult	  field	  nurses	  can	  be	  morally	   distressed	   by	   the	   placement	   of	   gastrointestinal	   feeding	   in	   elderly	  patients	  post	  stroke.	  Denti	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  study	  supports	  their	  concern	  about	  the	  outcome	  for	  such	  patients	  in	  terms	  of	  disability	  and	  prolonging	  of	  death.	  Denti	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  outcomes	  tended	  to	  be	  very	  poor	  for	  very	  elderly	  stroke	  victims.	  	  Second	  to	  this,	  Catlin,	  also	  insinuates	  that	  the	  nurse	  has	  a	  unique	  perspective	  that	  seems	   to	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   identify	   wrong-­‐doing	   when	   others,	   such	   as	   the	  doctor	  or	  relatives,	  do	  not.	  Although	  I	  have	  cited	  papers	  that	  clearly	  demonstrate	  that	   the	   field	   of	   aggressive	   medical	   care	   is	   full	   of	   ethical	   and	   empirical	  complexity,	  Catlin	  and	  other	  authors	  who	  write	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  moral	  distress	  simplify	   the	   debate	   to	   one	   where	   aggressive	   treatment	   becomes	   ‘futile’	  treatment.	  This	  perspective	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  Catlin,	   leads	   to	   the	  obligation	   for	   the	  nurse	  to	  act	  as	  the	  patient’s	  advocate.	  This	  twofold	  aspect	  of	  nursing	  –	  the	  unique	  perspective	   and	   the	   nurse	   as	   advocate	   –	   is	   key	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   and	  response	  to	  moral	  distress,	  but	  is	  most	  often	  not	  directly	  and	  explicitly	  referred	  to.	  Again,	  this	  will	  have	  further	  attention	  in	  later	  chapters.	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Conscience	  and	  conscientious	  objection	  	  	  Catlin	  links	  moral	  distress	  with	  the	  ANA’s	  (2001)	  code	  of	  conduct	  statement	  on	  conscientious	  objection.	  This	  will	  be	  explored	  further	  in	  chapter	  six,	  but	  for	  now,	  the	  ANA	  states	  that	  nurses	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  preserve	  both	  their	  sense	  of	  personal	  and	  professional	  integrity	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  ‘integrity	  preserving	  compromise	  only	   to	   the	   degree	   that	   it	   remains	   an	   integrity	   preserving	   compromise’	   (5.4)	  Nurses	  who	  are	  in	  situations	  that	  –	  	  	   ‘exceed	  acceptable	  moral	  limits	  or	  involve	  violations	  of	  the	  moral	  standards	   of	   the	   profession…may	   express	   their	   conscientious	  objection	   to	   participation.	   Where	   a	   particular	   treatment,	  intervention	   or	   activity,	   or	   practice	   is	  morally	   objectionable	   to	  the	  nurse,	  whether	  intrinsically	  so	  or	  because	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  for	   the	   specific	   patient,	   or	   where	   it	   may	   jeoprardise	   both	  patients	  and	  nursing	  practice,	  the	  nurse	  is	  justified	  in	  refusing	  to	  participate	   on	  moral	   grounds.	   Conscientious	   objection	  may	  not	  insulate	  the	  nurse	  from	  formal	  and	  informal	  penalty.’	  (5.4)	  	  With	   reference	   to	   this	   idea,	   Catlin	   brings	   up	   the	   right	   of	   the	   nurse	   to	   act	   non	  malificently	   and	   makes	   reference	   to	   the	   unique	   perspective	   of	   the	   nurse	   in	  relation	  to	  her	   ‘right	  and	  responsibility’	   to	  act	  as	  patient’s	  advocate	  (p103).	  She	  doesn’t	   explain	   exactly	   why	  moral	   distress	   equates	   to	   a	   troubled	   conscience	   –	  indeed	   she	   doesn’t	   mention	   the	   words	   ‘troubled	   conscience’.	   She	   does	   define	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conscience	   as	   the	   awareness	   of	   the	   moral	   quality	   of	   an	   action	   (Enclopedia	   of	  Bioethics,	  cited	  on	  p	  104)	  and	  that:	  	   	  	   ‘Using	  one’s	  conscience	  implies	  a	  moral	  sense,	  internalized	  	  norms,	   and	   a	   sense	   of	   integrity.	   A	   crisis	   of	   conscience	   is	   an	  attempt	   to	   restructure	   one’s	   deepest	   and	   most	   fundamental	  convictions.’	  	  	  It	  seems	  therefore	  that	  she	  equates	  moral	  distress	  with	  a	  ‘crisis	  of	  conscience’	  and	  that	   the	   crisis	   the	   nurse	   faces	   in	   moral	   distress	   presumably	   must	   involve	   an	  assault	  on	  her	  convictions.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  crisis	  of	  conscience,	  Catlin	  argues	  that	   the	   ANA	   position	   on	   conscientious	   objection	   ought	   to	   be	   redefined	   to	  specifically	  include	  objection	  when	  a	  patient	  is	  ‘denied	  palliative	  care’,	  (p103)	  and	  when	  the	  nurse	  suffers	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  moral	  distress.	  She	  doesn’t	  explain	  why	  this	   addition	   ought	   to	   be	   necessary,	   as	   surely	   a	   patient	   being	   denied	   palliative	  care	  is	  something	  that	  would	  be	  morally	  objectionable	  to	  nurses	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	   ANA	   statement	   already.	   Based	   on	  my	   analysis	   of	   Catlin	   so	   far,	   perhaps	   she	  believes	  that	  this	  situation	  ought	  to	  be	  explicitly	  described	  because,	  based	  on	  her	  findings	   with	   regard	   to	   ‘futile’	   treatment,	   the	   overtreatment	   of	   patients	   is	   a	  wrong-­‐doing	   that	   the	  nurse	  has	  a	  specific	  obligation	   to	  prevent.	  Further	   to	   this,	  implied	   in	   the	   need	   for	   conscientious	   objection	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   nurse	   is	  powerless	  to	  effect	  a	  change	  of	  treatment	  for	  such	  patients.	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Conscientious	  objection	  as	  a	  collective	  activity	  	  On	  analysis	   it	  became	  clear	  Catlin’s	   and	   the	  ANA’s	  understanding	  of	   conscience	  and	   conscientious	   objection	  moves	   beyond	   the	   understanding	   of	   conscience	   as	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  exists	  in	  a	  wider	  community.	  This	  move	  away	  from	   the	   individual	   is	   a	   step	   beyond	   the	   focus	   of	   conscience	   as	   it	   is	   ordinarily	  understood	  and	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  in	  later	  chapters.	  However,	  at	  this	  point	  it	  is	  important	   to	  note	   that	  both	   the	  ANA	  and	  Catlin	   seem	   to	   include	  nursing	  or	   the	  nursing	  profession	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  not	  just	  the	  individual	  nurse	  and	  her	  individual	  values	   as	   a	   focus	   for	   conscientious	   objection;	   or	   perhaps	   the	   other	   way	   to	  understand	   this,	   is	   that	   the	   act	   of	   conscientious	   objection	   protects	   both	   the	  integrity	  of	   the	  single	  nurse	  and	   the	  nursing	  profession.	  This	   is	  observed	   in	   the	  ANA’s	  stipulation	  about	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  the	  profession	  and	  nursing	  practice	  –	  both	  of	  which	  are	  a	  professional	   rather	   than	  personal	  value.	  This	   is	   clear	  when	  Catlin	  proposes	  that	  where	  one	  nurse	  conscientiously	  objects,	  others	  might	  agree	  with	  the	  stand	  and	  subsequently	  a	  change	  in	  practice	  might	  occur	  (p104).	  During	  her	  paper,	  Catlin	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  shift	   from	  the	   individual	  nurse	  and	  her	  own	  values	   and	   the	   nursing	   profession	   and	   its	   values.	   Mostly	   she	   addresses	   the	  individual	   nurse,	   but	   this	   group	   aspect	   of	   conscientious	   objection	   is	   certainly	  present,	   and	   although	   she	   doesn’t	   explicitly	   state	   it,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	  that	   one	   way	   of	   influencing	   change	   where	   a	   number	   agree,	   is	   by	   a	   number	   of	  nurses	   conscientiously	   objecting	   at	   the	   same	   time.(p104)	   As	   was	   previously	  stated,	   this	   action	   was	   what	   changed	   policies	   on	   nurse	   participation	   in	   non	  therapeutic	  male	  circumcision	  in	  St	  Vincent’s	  Hospital	  in	  the	  US.	  	  
	   79	  
Later	   it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  individual	  nurse	  and	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  profession	  are	  two	  different	  things.	  Catlin	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  this	  ‘change	  in	  practice’	  might	  be,	  but	  presumably	  it	  might	  lead	  to	  an	  alteration	  in	  the	  course	  of	  treatment	  of	  a	  specific	  individual,	  or	  else	  it	  might	  lead	  to	   a	   change	   in	  policy	   and	  practice	   towards	  many	   individuals.	   In	  other	  words,	   if	  enough	   nurses	   conscientiously	   object	   to	   the	   ‘denial	   of	   palliative	   care’	   to	  individuals,	   then	   the	   ‘denial	  of	  palliative	  care’	  may	  cease	  as	  a	  wrong-­‐doing.29	  Of	  course	  such	  an	  end	  would	  have	  ethical	  consequences.	  Some	  patients	  who	  would	  have	   survived	   against	   the	   odds	   would	   instead	   die.	   The	   over	   simplistic	   view	   of	  wrong-­‐doing	  that	  can	  be	  presented	  in	  cases	  of	  aggressive	  treatment	  that	  does	  not	  save	   a	   life,	   again	   fails	   to	   recognise	   the	  moral	   uncertainty	   in	   such	   situations	   as	  Repenshek	  (2009)	  highlighted.	  	  Conscientious	  objection	  –	  Catlin’s	  view	  of	  supporting	  literature	  	  This	  shift	   to	  a	  more	  collective	  understanding	  of	  conscience	  described	  in	  the	   last	  section	   is	   perhaps	   linked	   to	   Catlin’s	   concentration	   on	   the	   military	   and	  conscientious	  objection.	  In	  her	  search	  for	  papers	  on	  conscientious	  objection	  and	  nursing	   she	   mentions	   only	   the	   six	   articles	   that	   she	   found	   through	   a	   CINAHL	  search.	  She	  reports	  that	  five	  of	  these	  are	  about	  abortion	  and	  that	  only	  one	  refers	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  barriers	  to	  objection	  (p104).	  This	  mention	  of	  the	  words	  ‘rights	  and	  barriers’	  seems	  to	  infer	  a	  lack	  of	  power	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  nurse.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  29	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  male	  circumscision	  that	  was	  made	  by	  nurses	  at	  St	  Vincent’s	  Hospital	  didn’t	  stop	  the	  practice,	  only	  the	  obligation	  of	  nurses	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  it.	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Further	   to	   this	   proposal,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   she	   does	   not	  mention	   or	  analyse	  the	  many	  sources	  that	  are	  available	  on	  conscientious	  objection	  that	  relate	  to	   health	   care	   law	   and	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   medicine.30	   Instead	   she	  bypasses	  these	  papers,	  that	  often	  discuss	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  conscientious	  objection	   on	   patients	   such	   as	   denial	   or	   difficulty	   in	   obtaining	   access	   to	   legal	  medical	   care	   and	   moves	   instead	   to	   discuss	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	  military.31	  	  Catlin’s	  Comparison	  between	  Military	  and	  Nursing	  Conscientious	  Objection.	  	  She	   states	   that	   nurses	   are	   similar	   to	   soldiers	  who	   object	   to	   individual	  wars	   or	  specific	  acts	  of	  war	  when	  they	  object	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  specific	  act.	  Although	  this	  isn’t	  explicitly	  stated,	  I	  propose	  that	  she	  also	  finds	  nurses	  similar	  to	  soldiers	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  be	  disempowered	  and	  subject	  to	  constraints	  such	  as	  higher	  authority;	  the	   nurse	   like	   the	   soldier	   is	   required	   to	   obey	   orders	   regardless	   of	   personal	  opinion.	  
 This	  part	  of	  her	  paper	   is	  perhaps	   the	  part	  with	  most	   confusions	   in	   the	   internal	  validity	   of	   arguments	   that	   she	   presents.	   I	  will	   be	   offering	  more	   detailed	   contra	  arguments	   to	   her	   fundamental	   assumptions	   and	   arguments	   later,	   but	   in	   this	  chapter	  will	  offer	  some	  analysis	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  internal	  validity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  30	  These	  are	  numerous	  and	  often	  concentrate	  on	  conscience	  and	  abortion,	  therapeutic	  male	  circumcision	  and	  other	  sources	  that	  specifically	  address	  conscience	  and	  healthcare.	  	  31	  See	  as	  examples,	  Cantor	  &	  Baum	  (2004);	  Dickens	  (2009).	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  The	   first	   confusion	   in	   her	   work	   occurs	   when	   she	   makes	   comparison	   between	  nursing	  and	   the	  military,	  and	  describes	   the	  men	  who	  refused	   to	  be	  drafted	   into	  the	  army	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  war,	  as	  similar	  to	  nurses	  facing	  moral	  distress	  and	  choosing	  not	  to	  act:	  this	   is	  a	  description	  of	  men	  avoiding	  becoming	  soldiers	  and	  would	  better	  equate	  to	  the	  person	  who	  decides	  not	  to	  become	  a	  nurse.	  However,	  after	  this	  error	  she	  does	  also	  describe	  soldiers	  who	  object	  to	  specific	  wars.	  These	  she	  states	  are	  like	  nurses	  who	  object	  to	  specific	  actions	  in	  their	  nursing	  work.	  In	  this	  section	  each	  case	  will	  be	  reported	  in	  turn	  and	  assessed	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  indeed	  soldiers	  who	  object	  to	  specific	  wars	  as	  Catlin	  proposes.	  	  	  Soldiers	  who	  conscientiously	  object	  and	  their	  similarities	  to	  nurses	  who	  might	  do	  the	  same	  	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  section	  is	  not	  to	  investigate	  the	  details	  of	  military	  legal	  action	  –	  this	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  law	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  health	  care,	  and	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  level	  of	  analysis	  presented	  in	  Catlin’s	  paper.	  The	  aim	  at	  this	  point	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Catlin	  uses	  reports	  of	  some	  military	  cases	   to	   support	   her	   position	   on	   conscientious	   objection	   and	   nursing,	   and	   to	  demonstrate	  that	  her	  position	  on	  this	  cannot	  be	  fully	  sustained. 	  Firstly	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Kevin	   Benderman	   I	   was	   unable	   to	   access	   the	   website	  referenced	  by	  Catlin,	  but	   from	  further	  searches	   it	  seems	  that	  he	  conscientiously	  objected	  to	  returning	  to	  Iraq	  as	  a	  soldier	  because	  his	  experiences	  on	  a	  previous	  duty	  there	  had	  led	  him	  to	  conclude	  that	  all	  war	  is	  wrong	  (Antiwar.com,	  2005a).	  In	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other	  words,	  his	   conscientious	  objection	  was	   to	  war,	   rather	   than	  a	   specific	  war	  and	   therefore	   he	   would	   rather	   not	   be	   a	   soldier.	   This	   would	   equate	   more	  accurately	   to	   a	  nurse	  deciding	   to	  no	   longer	  be	   a	  nurse	   rather	   than	  objecting	   to	  specific	  medical	  treatment	  as	  claimed	  by	  Catlin.	  Unlike	  the	  nurse	  who	  leaves	  the	  profession,	  the	  soldier	  is	  duty	  and	  legally	  bound	  to	  serve	  his	  contract.	  	  Sergeant	   Camilo	   Mehia	   (Citizen	   soldier,	   2005)	   also	   conscientiously	   objected	   to	  returning	  to	  war	  in	  Iraq.	  He	  claimed	  conscientious	  objection	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  he	   had	   observed	   and	   no	   longer	   wished	   to	   participate	   in	   violations	   against	  international	   law,	   such	  as	   torture	  of	  prisoners,	   that	  he	  had	  observed	  during	  his	  tour	  of	  duty	  in	  Iraq.	  	  	  This	   case	   also	   does	   not	   equate	   with	   Catlin’s	   claim	   that	   soldiers	   sometimes	  conscientiously	  object	   to	  specific	  wars.	  On	  this	  occasion	  she	  ought	  to	  describe	  a	  soldier	   who	   conscientiously	   objected	   to	   an	   illegal	   act,	   and	   this	   would	   more	  accurately	   equate	   to	   the	   nurse	   who	   conscientiously	   objects	   to	   an	   illegal	   act	   in	  healthcare.	   Such	   acts	   are	  more	   similar	   to	   euthanasia	   than	   to	   overtreatment.	   Of	  some	  interest	  though,	  is	  that	  the	  soldier	  refers	  to	  torture	  in	  reference	  to	  what	  he	  saw	  happening.	   	  This	   echoes	   the	  nurse’s	   response,	  when	  she	   feels	   that	  patients	  are	  tortured	  by	   ‘futile’	  treatment.	  Catlin	  does	  not	  draw	  comparison	  here	  but	  the	  perception	  of	   being	   involved	   in	   torture	  must	   at	   least	   in	  part	   explain	   the	   strong	  emotional	  reaction	  that	  the	  nurse	  experiences	  in	  moral	  distress;	  clearly	  torture	  is	  an	  act	  that	  is	  a	  contradiction	  to	  the	  care	  and	  compassion	  that	  underpins	  nursing.	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The	  third	  soldier	  that	  Catlin	  refers	  to	   is	  Pablo	  Paredes	  (Democracy	  Now,	  2005).	  He	   objected	   to	   the	   Iraqi	   war	   and	   failed	   to	   board	   a	   ship	   bound	   for	   war	   and	  subsequently	   was	   charged	   and	   not	   permitted	   to	   claim	   conscientious	   objector	  status.	  Here	  Catlin	  does	  have	  an	  example	  of	  a	  soldier	  who	  conscientiously	  objects	  to	  a	  specific	  war,	  however,	  unlike	   the	  nurse,	  he	  again	  objects	  on	   the	  grounds	  of	  illegality;	  that	  is	  that	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq	  was	  an	  illegal	  war.	  In	  both	  these	  cases	  then,	  Catlin	  fails	  to	  identify	  the	  significance	  of	   legality	  of	  action,	  and	  as	  I	  have	  already	  stated,	  legality	  of	  action	  is	  not	  in	  question	  when	  a	  doctor	  prescribes	  a	  treatment	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  nurse,	  one	  that	  is	  overly	  aggressive	  or	  ‘futile’.	   
 The	   last	   soldier	   that	   Catlin	   refers	   to	   is	   Lt	   Ehreh	  Watada.	   He	   like	   the	   previous	  soldier	   objected	   to	   the	   Iraq	  war	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  war	  was	   illegal	   and	  immoral.	   He	   perhaps	   most	   clearly	   demonstrates	   Catlin’s	   proposal	   that	  conscientious	  objection	  might	  bring	  about	  a	  change	  in	  practice.	  His	  speech	  prior	  to	  his	   court	  martialing	  was	  broadcast	   and	  encouraged	  others	   to	   act	   against	   the	  war	  in	  Iraq.	  32	  In	  this	  speech	  he	  identified	  his	  powerlessness	  to	  change	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  presented	  his	  conscientious	  objection	  and	  his	  public	  articulation	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  it,	  as	  an	  empowering	  act.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  mentioned	  morality	  as	  well	  as	   legality	   is	  perhaps	  also	   important	   in	  the	  support	  of	  Catlin’s	  argument	  that	  soldiers	  and	  nurses	  are	  similar.	  Although	  most	  soldiers	  object	  to	  what	  they	  see	  as	  illegal	  acts,	  these	  acts	  can	  also	  be	  wrong	  because	  they	  are	  immoral,	  even	  if	  recognised	  by	  law.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  32	  ‘Erhen	  Watada’s	  Last	  Speech	  Before	  His	  Court	  Martial	  Hearing’	  is	  a	  film	  that	  presents	  his	  arguments	  for	  his	  decision	  to	  conscientiously	  object.	  (Watada,	  2007)	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Perhaps	  then	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  nurse	  is	  similar	  to	  this	  soldier	  example,	  because	   both	   are	   sometimes	   asked	   to	   perform	   immoral	   acts	   that	   are	   not	  necessarily	  illegal.	  Furthermore,	  the	  nurse	  may	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  soldier	  when	  she	  articulates	   her	   reasons	   for	   conscientious	   objection	   publically	   and	   uses	   the	  example	   of	   her	   own	   self	   sacrifice	   (from	   employment)	   as	   an	   encouragement	   for	  others	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  or	  to	  think	  about	  and	  change	  their	  practice.	  Again,	  I	  want	  to	   highlight	   though	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   soldiers	   and	   nurses.	   Lt	   Ehren	  attempted	  to	  resign	  from	  the	  army	  once	  he	  identified	  his	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  his	  perceived	  illegality	  of	  the	  Iraq	  war.	  He	  was	  unable	  to	  do	  so	  and	  in	  the	  end	  his	  case	  was	  dismissed	  from	  court	  in	  2009.	  	  	  The	  nurse,	  unlike	   the	  soldier	   is	  under	  no	  compulsion	   to	  remain	   in	  her	  post	  and	  contractual	   agreements	  with	   the	   employer	   are	   easily	   discontinued.	   Indeed,	   the	  literature	  that	  describes	  the	  exit	  of	  nurses	  from	  the	  profession	  or	  specific	  fields	  of	  work	   might	   fail	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   this	   is	   an	   acceptable	   expression	   of	  conscientious	  objection	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  nurse,	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  perceived	  in	  a	  positive	  light.	  Catlin	  reports	  the	  fact	  that	  nurses	  leave	  their	  positions	  but	  does	  not	  indicate	   that	   this	   might	   indeed	   be	   a	   positive	   and	   empowered	   expression	   of	  conscientious	   objection	   to	   involvement	   in	  medical	   specialties	  where	   aggressive	  treatment	  is	  the	  norm.	  	  Catlin’s	  proposal	  for	  conscience	  clause	  in	  the	  ANA	  code	  of	  conduct	  	  To	   finish	   this	   theoretical	   examination	   of	   Catlin’s	   work	   I	   will	   summarise	   the	  concluding	  concept	   that	  Catlin	  proposes	  as	   the	   foundation	   for	  a	  development	  of	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the	  conscientious	  objection	  statement	  that	  has	  already	  been	  described	  in	  the	  ANA	  code	  of	  conduct.	  	  She	  describes	  this	  concept	  in	  three	  phases:	  attributes	  of	  conscientious	  objection,	  antecedents	  to	  objecting	  and	  consequences	  of	  objection	  and	  after	  identification	  of	  these,	  proposes	  the	  defining	  statement:	  	   ‘For	   the	  nurse,	   conscientious	  objection	  may	  occur	  when	   the	  nurse	  interprets	   that	   the	   care	   that	   has	   been	   assigned	   for	   the	   patient	   is	  harmful	   or	   causing	   suffering.	   The	  nurse	   does	   not	  wish	   to	   provide	  this	  form	  of	  care	  and	  feels	  sincerely	  and	  has	  felt	  for	  some	  time	  that	  this	  is	  a	  question	  of	  conscience.	  The	  nurse	  objects	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  care	  orders,	  willing	  to	  assist	  in	  other	  forms	  of	  care	  and	  not	  wishing	  to	  abandon	  the	  patient’	  (p.105)	  	  	  This	   definition	   does	   not	   fully	   include	   the	   statements	   within	   the	   attributes,	  antecedents	  and	  consequences	  that	  are	  listed	  in	  her	  text	  (p104),	  and	  this	  means	  that	   her	   definition	   does	   not	   quite	   include	   all	   of	   her	   proposals	   around	  conscientious	   objection.	   They	   are	   that	   the	   nurse	   has	   a	   duty	   of	   non	  malificence,	  that	   the	   nurse	   perceives	   carrying	   out	   the	   act	   in	   question	   as	   threatening	   her	  integrity,	  that	  the	  nurse	  will	  not	  abandon	  the	  patient	  and	  appropriate	  coverage	  is	  arranged,	  that	  the	  nurse	  must	  accept	  the	  self	  consequences	  and	  risks	  of	  objection	  and	   that	   these	   might	   include	   sanctions	   such	   as	   loss	   of	   employment	   or	  alternatively	  bring	  about	  a	  change	  in	  practice	  based	  on	  the	  support	  of	  others.	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There	  are	  some	  assumptions	  that	  are	  worthy	  of	  further	  consideration.	  Unlike	  the	  case	   of	   legally	   acceptable	   conscientious	   objection,	   where	   a	   person	   is	   offered	  protection	  from	  punishment,	  Catlin	  and	  the	  ANA	  code	  of	  conduct	  make	  clear	  that	  conscientious	  objection,	  even	  though	  it	  would	  be	  professionally	  sanctioned,	  might	  lead	   to	   contractual	   punishment	   such	   as	   loss	   of	   a	   job.	   This	   perhaps	   reflects	   the	  external	   contextual	   cause	   of	   power	   imbalance	   that	   was	   identified	   in	   chapter	  one.33	  Furthermore,	   if	  nurses	  are	  at	   risk	  of	   suffering	  detrimental	  outcomes	   to	  a	  sanctioned	  professional	  practice,	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  this	  perceived	  harm	  to	  patients,	  she	  may	  be	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  wrong-­‐doing,	  should	  she	  be	  forced	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  act	  she	  believes	  to	  be	  wrong	  or	  alternatively,	  should	  she	  receive	  some	  punishment	  for	  conscientiously	  objecting.	  	  	  This	  position	   is	  supported	  when	  consideration	   is	  given	  to	   the	  choice	  of	  soldiers	  that	  Catlin	  made	  in	  her	  paper.	  None	  of	  these	  soldiers	  were	  legally	  recognised	  as	  conscientious	  objectors,	  but	  presumably	  in	  Catlin’s	  eyes,	  they	  ought	  to	  have	  been.	  	  	  Empirical	  findings	  that	  support	  Catlin’s	  proposal	  	  Catlin	  proposes	  that	  a	  concept	  is	  not	  properly	  verified	  without	  a	  concept	  analysis;	  an	  exercise	  where	  a	  concept	  is	  taken	  to	  those	  in	  clinical	  practice	  and	  its	  practical	  currency	  assessed.	  	  	  She	  does	  not	  make	  clear	  why	  this	  hybrid	  analysis	  is	  important,	  but	  certainly	  one	  can	   deduce	   that	   if	   nurses	   do	   not	   recognise	   the	   concept	   as	   being	   in	   any	   way	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  33See	  p23.	  
	   87	  
recognisable	   to	   them	   and	   to	   their	   practice,	   it	   might	   not	   be	   useful	   to	   practical	  ethical	  decision-­‐making.	  Secondly,	  although	  she	  does	  not	  stipulate	  this,	   it	  seems	  that	  such	  an	  analysis	  might	  be	  used	  to	  support	  the	  ethical	  arguments	  presented;	  in	  other	  words,	  if	  nurses	  agree	  with	  the	  concept	  as	  defined	  by	  Catlin	  then	  this	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  implemented.	  Although	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  such	  concepts	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  relevant	  to	  nursing	  practice,	  the	  support	  offered	  by	  the	  ‘majority	  vote’	  in	  ethics	  is	  not	  necessarily	  supportable.	  	  Her	  research	   involved	  questioning	  sixty-­‐six	  neonatal	  and	  paediatric	  critical	  care	  nurses	  who	  worked	  in	  intensive	  care	  settings.	  She	  found	  that	  seventy-­‐five	  percent	  of	   them	  had	   thought	  of	   conscientious	  objection	   in	   relation	   to	   their	  practice	  and	  that	  fifty-­‐two	  percent	  would	  like	  to	  object	  to	  aggressive	  interventions	  that	  ‘do	  not	  change	   outcomes’.	   	   Obviously	   the	   difficulty	   here	   is	   that	   nurses	   might	   wrongly	  perceive	  that	  outcomes	  would	  have	  been	  better	  had	  treatment	  been	  withdrawn,	  or	  had	  been	  less	  aggressive.	  However	  as	  Krishna	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  demonstrated,	  this	  isn’t	   necessarily	   the	   case.	   Forty-­‐four	   percent	   wanted	   to	   object	   to	   technologic	  interventions	  for	  twenty	  two	  to	  twenty	  four	  week	  gestational	  age	  of	  newborns	  or	  newborns	  with	  conditions	  ‘incompatible	  with	  life’.	  Thirty	  percent	  stated	  that	  they	  wished	   to	   object	   to	   pressure	   from	   families	   who	   would	   not	   agree	   to	   change	   to	  palliative	  care.	  	  	  Some	  of	   the	  questions	   that	   these	  nurses	  were	  required	   to	  answer	   in	  relation	   to	  their	  sense	  of	  moral	  distress,	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  difficult	  nature	  of	  care	  under	  such	  extreme	  circumstances	  and	  instead	  bypass	  this	  complexity	  with	  some	  statements	  that	   specify	   clear	   wrong-­‐doing.	   	   Although	   I	   have	   no	   wish	   to	   suggest	   that	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aggressive	  treatment	  of	  patients	  is	  always	  right,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	   of	   doctors	   instigate	  medical	   treatments	  where	   it	   is	   known	   for	   certain	  that	  there	  will	  be	  no	  change	  in	  outcome,	  and	  where	  that	  outcome	  is	  presumably	  death.	   Indeed,	   perhaps	   she	   gains	   such	   a	   high	   percentage	   support	   for	   these	  incidents	  because	  she	  frames	  ethical	  scenarios	  too	  simply	  and	  in	  this	  instance	  at	  least,	  wrongly,	  because	  the	  ‘no	  change	  in	  outcome’	  is	  stated	  as	  a	  fact	  rather	  than	  a	  perception	  of	  ‘fact’.	  	  	  It	   is	   disappointing	   that	   Catlin	   does	   not	   take	   her	   practical	   considerations	   about	  conscientious	  objection	  further.	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  numbers	  of	  nurses	  wishing	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  are	  high	  -­‐	  one	  can	  presume	  around	  a	  third	  to	  a	  half	  of	  any	  single	  shift	  on	  duty,	  should	  her	  sample	  be	  reflective	  of	  all	  nurses	  –	  will	  be	  inclined	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  care	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  patients	  that	  have	  been	  identified.	  The	   data	   does	   not	   specify	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   same	   nurses	   repeatedly	  wish	   to	  conscientiously	   object	   to	   the	   variety	   of	   conditions	   described.	   If	   this	   is	   not	   the	  case,	  then	  surely	  if	  a	  mixture	  of	  patient	  conditions	  are	  	  present	  on	  a	  ward	  or	  unit,	  then	  the	  percentage	  of	  nurses	  wishing	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  might	  be	  higher	  than	  this,	   if	   the	  sum	  of	  nurses	  and	  patient	  conditions	  are	  added	  together.	  Catlin	  does	   not	   address	   the	   fact	   that	   should	   these	   nurses	   take	   up	   a	   right	   to	  conscientiously	  object,	  with	   the	  percentages	   identified,	   the	  smooth	  running	  of	  a	  unit	   or	   ward	   and	   the	   delivery	   of	   nursing	   care	   to	   resident	   patients	   could	   be	  compromised,	   at	   least	   in	   so	   far	   as	   a	   focus	  of	   activity	  would	  become	   finding	  out	  who	  is	  willing	  or	  not	  willing	  to	  cover	  care	  of	  a	  specific	  patient.	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It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  the	  wrong-­‐doing	  identified	  in	  Catlin’s	  empirical	  work	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  that	  highlighted	  in	  her	  theoretical	  discussions.	  For	  example,	  the	  treatment	  of	  twenty	  two	  to	  twenty	  four	  week	  babies	  is	  a	  contentious	  subject	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  because	  as	  has	  been	  discussed	  earlier,	  such	  babies	  are	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  viability	  and	  are	  at	  high	  risk	  of	  permanent	  disability.	  This	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  denial	  of	  palliative	  care.	  Should	  nurses	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  treating	  these	  patients	  on	   this	   basis,	   it	   seems	   to	  me	   that	   Catlin	   needs	   to	   specify	   severe	   disability	   as	   a	  harm	   to	   which	   nurses	   can	   conscientiously	   object	   to	   causing.	   Of	   course,	   should	  living	  with	  severe	  disability	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  consequence	  that	  nurses	  value	  as	  a	  harm	  that	  is	  worse	  than	  death,	  a	  Pandora’s	  box	  is	  opened	  where	  the	  fundamental	  principles	   of	   nursing	   care:	   compassion	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	   dignity	   of	   all,	  including	   those	   who	   are	   seriously	   disabled,	   that	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   nursing,	  (Chambers	  and	  Ryder,	  2009)	  is	  brought	  into	  question.	  This	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  where	   lack	   of	   detailed	   examination	  of	   the	   rational	   basis	   for	  moral	   distress,	   can	  lead	  nurses	  to	  conclusions	  about	  right34	  that	  might	  not	  be	  so	  right	  after	  all.	  	  Finally	  Catlin	   found	  from	  her	  work	  that	  around	  forty	   five	  percent	  of	  nurses	  had	  acted	   in	   a	   way	   that	   could	   be	   considered	   a	   personal	   conscientious	   objection	  without	  formally	  objecting.	  Of	  these,	  seventeen	  percent	  had	  voiced	  their	  opinions	  to	   the	   physician,	   two	   percent	   had	   documented	   disagreement	   on	   a	   chart,	   ten	  percent	  had	  asked	  another	  nurse	   to	   take	   the	  assignment	  and	   three	  percent	  had	  called	  an	  ethics	  committee	  or	  called	  in	  another	  physician	  and	  ten	  percent	  overtly	  or	  covertly	  refused	  to	  follow	  an	  order.	  It	  is	  questionable	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  above	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  34	  In	  this	  case	  the	  rightness	  of	  non-­‐treatment	  of	  very	  young	  neonates	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  disabled	  outcome	  for	  some.	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actions	  truly	  constitute	  conscientious	  objection,	  even	  though	  the	  nurses	  seem	  to	  have	   framed	   it	   in	   this	   way.	   Those	   who	   asked	   another	   nurse	   to	   take	   their	  assignment	  might	  well	   have	   conscientiously	   objected,	   but	   it	   could	   alternatively	  have	   been	   that	   instead	   they	   were	   in	   a	   state	   of	   moral	   distress,	   and	   given	   the	  emotional	  nature	  of	   this	  state,	  other	   factors	  could	  have	   led	  them	  to	  asking	   for	  a	  change	  in	  assignment	  such	  as	  feeling	  emotionally	  burnt	  out.	  However,	  the	  other	  cases	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  accurately	  describe	  conscientious	  objection:	  questioning	  an	  order,	   or	   recording	   disagreement	   could	   be	   acts	   that	   are	   more	   accurately	  described	  as	  advocacy	  or	  ensuring	  that	  one	  is	   legally	  covered	  should	  a	  case	  end	  up	   in	  court.	  The	  calling	   in	  of	  another	  physician	  could	  reflect	  an	  outright	  clinical	  disagreement	   or	   demonstrate	   a	   nurse	   who	   questions	   the	   competence	   of	   the	  attending	  doctor.	   Indeed,	  all	  of	   the	  above	  scenarios	  could	  result	   from	  a	  clash	  of	  professional	   opinions	   rather	   than	   truly	   reflect	   the	   nature	   of	   conscience,	   as	   it	   is	  generally	  understood.	  	  	  The	  remaining	  half	  of	  nurses	  had	  never	  objected	  and	  this	  group	  stated	  that	  they	  had	  put	  aside	  their	  personal	  beliefs	  and	  followed	  the	  doctor’s	  request	  although	  all	  respondents	   reported	   that	   they	   felt	   the	  need	   to	  object	   to	   therapies	   that	  did	  not	  change	   the	   underlying	   condition	   of	   a	   dying	   patient	   and	  wanted	   guidance	   from	  nursing	  organisations	  on	  how	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Conclusion	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   the	   implicit	   and	   explicit	   arguments	   that	   Catlin	   presents	   in	   her	  proposal	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  the	  denial	  of	  palliative	  care	  ought	  to	  be	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formally	   recognised	   in	   the	   ANA	   code	   of	   nursing	   conduct.	   As	   has	   already	   been	  explained,	  I	  will	  extrapolate	  this	  to	  the	  UK	  code	  of	  nursing	  conduct	  and	  the	  next	  chapters	   will	   examine	   the	   theoretical,	   legal	   and	   professional	   arguments	   that	  support	  and	  refute	  Catlin’s	  position.	  	  Some	  initial	  analysis	  of	  her	  proposals	  have	  been	  made	  and	  despite	  the	  problems	  identified	  with	  her	  work,	   the	   similarities	  between	  soldiers	  and	  nurses	  deserves	  further	  exploration.	  The	  identification	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  the	  mode	  by	  which	   the	   nurse	   expresses	   her	   dissent	   or	   disagreement	   with	   the	   doctor	   needs	  further	   analysis;	   is	   it	   truly	   a	   conscientious	   objection	   or	   is	   it	   a	   professional	  disagreement?	  Finally,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  that	  is	  faced	  in	  situations	  of	  moral	  distress,	  is	  far	  from	  certain.	  	  	  
	   92	  
Chapter	   Four:	   The	   philosophy	   of	   conscience	   and	   its	   application	   to	   conscientious	  
objection	  to	  ‘futile’	  orders.	  	  Introduction	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  and	  those	  that	  follow,	  specific	  perspectives	  and	  arguments	  about	  conscience	   and	   conscientious	   objection	   that	   will	   exclude	   some	   well-­‐trodden	  approaches	  that	  are	  readily	  accessible.35	  This	  is	  because	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  present	  new	  arguments	  that	  are	  not	  present	  in	  the	  current	  literature,	  but	  also	  because	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   nurse	  who	  disagrees	  with	   a	  doctor’s	  orders,	  is	  one	  where	  the	  arguments	  that	  already	  exist	  do	  not	  necessarily	  capture	  the	  situation	  fully.	   In	  particular,	   the	  primary	  and	  secondary	  harms	  that	  are	   identified	   in	  moral	   distress	   are	   not	   addressed.	   Unlike	   the	   doctor	   or	   nurse	  who	   objects	   to	   participating	   in	   an	   abortion	   or	   blood	   transfusion,	   this	   is	   not	   a	  simple	  case	  of	  one	  person’s	  personal	  values,	  rights	  and	  professional	  obligations	  conflicts	   with	   another’s	   choice	   and	   legal	   right	   to	   pursue	   that	   choice.	  Furthermore,	   with	   conscientious	   objection	   to	   a	   doctor’s	   orders,	   there	   are	   two	  relationships;	   the	  nurse	   to	   the	  doctor	   and	   the	  nurse	   to	   the	  patient.	   The	   values	  that	   the	   nurse	   expresses	   might	   be	   conscientious,	   however	   they	   might	   be	  excluded	   from	  what	   is	   commonly	   termed	   ‘conscience’	   because	   the	   doctor	  who	  treats	  a	  patient	  aggressively,	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  nurse	  objecting	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  professional	  rather	  than	  personal	  values.	  These	  questions	  will	  be	  addressed	  over	  the	   next	   three	   chapters,	   beginning	   with	   a	   philosophical	   examination	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  35	  See	  for	  example	  Wicclair’s	  (2011)	  book	  on	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  health	  care	  that	  is	  the	  most	  recent	  title	  to	  give	  an	  excellent	  review	  and	  comprehensive	  presentation	  of	  arguments	  on	  this	  topic.	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conscience	   in	   this	   chapter,	   moving	   to	   a	   legal	   examination	   and	   finally	   an	  examination	  of	  professional	  codes	  of	  conduct	  in	  chapter	  six.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  two	  main	  premises	  presented	  by	  Catlin	  will	  be	  examined.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  conscience	  is	  an	  important	  source	  to	  identify	  right	  and	  wrong	  action.	  The	  second	   is	   that	   the	   nurse	   is	   justified	   in	   conscientious	   objection	   under	   the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  Catlin,	  because	  she	  is	  asked	  to	  participate	  in	  primary	  harm	  to	  patients.	  Kolnai	  (1958)	  has	  been	  chosen	  as	  a	  primary	  source	  to	  examine	  these	   questions	   because	   his	   paper	   on	   erroneous	   conscience	   gives	   a	   solid	  philosophical	   enquiry	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   conscience	   that	   is	   not	   commonly	  referred	   to	   in	   current	   papers.	  He	   also	   acts	   as	   a	   strong	   source	   to	   deal	  with	   the	  strongest	   objection	   to	   my	   position;	   that	   is	   that	   nurses	   who	   are	   not	   given	   the	  opportunity	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  may	  end	  up	  submitting	  to	  orders	  that	  are	  atrocious.	  This	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  more	  fully	  in	  chapter	  seven.	  	  An	  intuitive	  grasp	  of	  conscience.	  	  	  Before	  examination	  of	  the	  literature,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  explore	  an	  intuitive	  grasp	  of	  conscience,	   after	   all	   surely	   if	   conscience	   is	   an	   inherent	   or	   learned	   ability	   to	  identify	  right	  and	  wrong	  action,	  its	  definition	  must	  be	  inherently	  accessible	  and	  at	  least	  partially	  consistent	  with	  the	  literature,	  if	  it	  is	  something	  we	  can	  all	  claim	  to	  possess.	  In	  meeting	  this	  end	  it	  is	  perhaps	  useful	  to	  consider	  what	  the	  absence	  of	   conscience	   would	   be	   like.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   persons	   would	   perform	  actions	  that	  do	  not	  in	  any	  way	  take	  into	  account	  the	  harm	  that	  might	  be	  done	  to	  others;	   those	   ‘others’	   being	   for	   example,	   fellow	   human	   beings,	   non	   human	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animals	  or	  less	  easily	  identified	  objects	  such	  as	   ‘the	  environment’.	   	  Presumably,	  such	  an	   individual	  would	  act	   in	  a	  way	   that	   satisfies	  his	  own	  whims,	  wants	  and	  needs.	  Clearly,	   such	  an	   individual,	   and	  a	  world	  made	  up	  of	   the	  same,	  would	  be	  one	  that	  could	  not	  function	  coherently.	  	  	  I	   suppose	  a	  caveat	   to	   this	   is	   that	   the	  world	  managed	  to	   function	  coherently	   for	  millennia	  without	  moral	  beings	   inhabiting	   it,	   if	  one	   is	   to	  accept	   the	  assumption	  that	   animals	   are	   amoral.36	   	   However,	   whether	   or	   not	   non-­‐human	   animals	   are	  moral	   or	   not,	   they	   do	   not	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   effect	   the	   environment	   as	  profoundly	  as	  do	  humans.	  Human	  intelligence	  has	  shown	  itself	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  causing	   significant	   harms	   to	   our	   own	   species	   in	  war,	   and	  more	   lately	  we	  have	  become	   aware	   of	   a	   more	   general	   harm	   in	   the	   form	   of	   environmental	   damage	  such	  as	  deforestation	  and	  global.	  	  	  Whatever	   the	   case,	   one	   has	   to	   conclude	   that	   given	   the	   potential	   for	   harm	   and	  given	  the	  ability	  of	  humans	  to	  perceive	  that	  harm,	  right	  and	  wrong	  has	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  reckoning	  when	  any	  competent	  individual	  contemplates	  an	  action	  with	  potential	  to	  cause	  harm	  to	  another.	  In	  other	  words	  we	  are	  essentially	  moral,	  and	  the	  inward	  sense	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  do	  right	  or	  wrong	  -­‐	  that	  is	  conscience	  -­‐	  is	  at	   least	   partly	   responsible	   for	   moral	   action.37	   Conscience	   therefore	   can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  36	  By	  ‘coherently’	  I	  mean	  that	  evolution	  has	  successfully	  maintained	  life	  prior	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  human	  beings.	  Therefore,	  if	  humans	  are	  the	  only	  organisms	  to	  have	  morality,	  morality	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  life.	  However,	  if	  empathy	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  morality	  as	  Slote	  (2007)	  argues,	  then	  amorality	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  characteristic	  that	  only	  humans	  possess.	  For	  an	  emotive	  example	  see	  ‘Female	  Elephants	  Save	  Drowning	  Baby’	  .(Year	  unknown)	  37	  Other	  influences	  on	  our	  capacity	  to	  act	  morally	  are	  features	  such	  as	  genetics	  and	  environmental	  factors	  that	  are	  outside	  of	  our	  control.	  (Dickenson,	  2007)	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reasonably	  be	   identified	  as	   the	  source	  of	  our	  sense	  of	  moral	   responsibility	  and	  affects	   us	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   perform	   morally	   responsible	   actions.	   It	   is	   an	  essential	   prerequisite	   to	   moral	   agency,	   and	   acting	   contrary	   to	   our	   conscience	  disturbs	  our	  sense	  of	  integrity.	  	  	  It	  seems	  that	  conscience	  can	  be	  good	  thing	  for	  the	  person	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  the	  conscientious	  individual’s	  actions	  except	  of	  course,	  that	  this	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	   action	   that	   the	   conscience	   dictates	   ought	   to	   be	   done.	   Once	   that	   action	  becomes	  the	  object	  that	   impacts	  on	  others	  and	  therefore	  open	  to	  judgement	  by	  others,	  it	  brings	  with	  it	  all	  the	  irresolvable	  problems	  and	  differing	  points	  of	  view	  that	   fill	   ethical	   and	   philosophical	   journals	   and	   present	   some	   of	   the	   most	  challenging	  cases	  in	  courts	  of	  law.	  	  This	  reflects	  the	  reality	  that	  what	  is	  right	  is	  not	  so	  easily	  identified	  because	  the	  nature	   of	   right	   and	   wrong	   is	   not	   something	   that	   is	   totally	   accessible	   to	   us.	  Philosophers	  do	  not	  agree	  upon	   its	  absolute	  nature.38	   Is	   it	  an	  unchanging	  truth	  that	   we	   somehow	   have	   to	   decipher	   by	   the	   use	   of	   reason?	   Is	   it	   an	   ideology	  constructed	  and	  agreed	  upon	  by	  specific	  groups	  of	  individuals	  in	  specific	  times,	  without	  form	  or	  solidity	  other	  than	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  those	  that	  perceive	  it?	  Indeed,	  the	  justification	  to	  restrict	  a	  person’s	  right	  to	  express	  their	  conscience	  is	  surely	  reliant	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   right	   and	   wrong	   are	   objective,	   or	   at	   least	   legally	  recognised,	   truths	   beyond	   which	   a	   person	   cannot	   do	   what	   exactly	   as	   his	  conscience	   dictates,	   because	   one	   person’s	   conscience	   might	   not	   be	   congruent	  with	   another’s.	   Such	  matters	   are	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis,	   but	   they	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  38	  Rist	  (2002)	  makes	  an	  in	  depth	  exploration	  of	  this	  question	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worth	  some	  consideration	  because	  they	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  we	  face	  when	   considering	   the	   individual	   rights	   to	   express	   conscience,	   and	   that	   if	   not	  recognised,	   can	   lead	   to	   overly	   simplistic	   arguments	   about	   how	   an	   individual	  ought	   to	   be	   able	   to	   express	   his	   conscience,	   that	   tends	   to	   bypass	   the	   absolute	  nature	  of	   the	  action	   in	  question.	   In	  so	  doing	   there	   is	  a	  danger	  of	   leaping	   to	   the	  focus	  on	  self,	  and	  one	  person’s	  right	  to	  express	  their	  conscience	  versus	  another	  person’s	  right	  to	  act	  in	  a	  contrary	  manner39.	  	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  this	  second	  aspect	  of	  conscience	  will	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  and	  indeed	  if	  anything,	   take	   precedence.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   end	   result	   of	   conscience	   -­‐	   the	  action	  and	  its	  consequences	  -­‐	  is	  as	  much	  an	  essential	  element	  to	  conscience	  as	  is	  the	   self.40	   My	   preference	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   underlying	   philosophy	   and	   the	  nature	  of	  moral	  truth	  is	  one	  that	  recognises	  that	  moral	  truth	  is	   ‘out	  there’.	  This	  concept	  of	  objective	  moral	  truth	  is	  important	  for	  resolving	  the	  problems	  brought	  by	   moral	   distress	   and	   also	   for	   my	   reasons	   for	   opposing	   Catlin’s	   position	   that	  conscientious	  objection	  ought	  to	  be	  permissible	   for	  nurses.	  This	  will	  be	  equally	  as	  important	  as	  the	  nurse	  feeling	  what	  she	  is	  doing	  is	  wrong,	   is	  whether	  or	  not	  what	  she	  is	  doing	  is	  in	  fact	  wrong.41	  As	  far	  as	  I’m	  concerned,	  it	  is	  only	  if	  the	  latter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  39	  See	  for	  example	  papers	  that	  discuss	  conscientious	  objection	  and	  delivery	  of	  abortion	  procedures	  and	  the	  dispensing	  of	  the	  contraceptive	  or	  post	  coital	  contraceptive	  pill.	  These	  debates	  tend	  to	  centre	  on	  rights	  of	  the	  patient	  to	  receive	  a	  legally	  permissible	  procedure	  versus	  the	  rights	  of	  professionals	  to	  protect	  their	  sense	  of	  integrity	  and	  good	  conscience.	  These	  debates	  are	  perhaps	  more	  active	  in	  the	  US,	  although	  the	  British	  Pharmaceutical	  Association	  recently	  upheld	  guidelines	  to	  allow	  pharmacists	  to	  conscientiously	  refuse	  to	  dispense	  hormonal	  contraception	  (BBCa,	  2010;	  General	  Pharmaceutical	  Council,	  2010.)	  40	  Please	  note	  that	  ‘self’	  refers	  to	  both	  integrity	  of	  self,	  and	  autonomy	  with	  regard	  to	  responsibility	  and	  control	  over	  one’s	  actions.	  41	  If	  objective	  wrong-­‐doing	  is	  identified,	  then	  it	  might	  be	  that	  the	  nurse	  is	  justified	  and	  can	  be	  professionally	  supported	  to	  conscientiously	  object.	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aspect	  of	  conscience	  –	  the	  act	  -­‐	  involves	  objectively	  observable	  wrongdoing,	  that	  the	  question	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  becomes	  a	  possible	  justifiable	  resolution	  to	  the	  problem	  in	  question.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen,	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  definite	  wrong	  dong,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  is	  not	  the	  ideal	  solution.	  	  	  The	  Nature	  of	  Conscience	  and	  its	  importance	  for	  nursing.	  	  This	   intuitive	   sense	   of	   conscience	   is	   supported	   by	  much	   of	   the	   literature,	   and	  Kolnai	   (1958)	   faces	  head	  on	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  conflicting	  senses	  of	  what	   is	   understood	   to	   be	   right,	   as	   it	   exists	   in	   one	   individual	   compared	   to	   the	  next.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen,	  his	  account	  is	  particularly	  useful	  for	  this	  thesis.	  Others	  add	  ideas	  that	  are	  also	  worthy	  of	  consideration.	  	  	  According	  to	  Catlin,	  conscience	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  internal	  moral	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  right	  and	  wrong.	  Kolnai	  supports	  this	  position,	  stating	  that	  conscience	  is	  the:	  	  	   ‘moral	  awareness…self	  criticism,	  remorse,	  warning,	  acquittal	  or	  approbation	  in	  reference	  to	  one’s	  own	  conduct:	  past,	  present	  or	  tentatively	  planned.	  Conscience	  means	  further	  moral	  judgment	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  one’s	  conduct.’	  	  (p	  175)	  	  He	   takes	   conscience	   further	   than	   the	   rather	   generalised	   definitions	   chosen	   by	  Catlin,	   and	  makes	   one	   aware	   that	   it	   encompasses	   not	   just	   our	   convictions	   and	  obligations,	   but	   our	  motivation	   and	  most	   importantly	   that	   it	   directly	   connects	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with	   our	   actions:	   it	   is	   something	   dynamic	   and	   has	   real	   impact	   on	   the	   world	  around	   us.	   Kolnai	   has	   some	   warnings	   to	   make	   about	   conscience	   that	   will	   be	  returned	   to	   later,	   but	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   many,	   including	   myself,	   see	  conscience	  to	  be	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  human	  morality.	  	  	  Some	   authors	   view	   conscience	   slightly	   differently,	   for	   example,	   Nussbaum	  (2008)	   expands	   the	   definition	   of	   conscience.	   She	   does	   not	   see	   it	   solely	   as	   a	  capacity	  for	  agency	  and	  choice,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  included	  in	  Kolnai’s	  definition,	  but	  expands	  it	  to	  the	  search	  for	  meaning,	  and	  unlike	  some	  philosophers,	  includes	  emotion	   and	   imagination.	   Lutzen	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   certainly	   support	   this	   view	   of	  conscience	   when	   they	   report	   that	   nurses	   and	   physicians	   often	   refer	   to	  conscience	   when	   narrating	   meaning	   in	   ethically	   difficult	   situations.	   This	  extension	  of	  conscience	  into	  the	  spiritual	  realm	  captures	  some	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress:	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  moral	  distress	  correlates	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  meaninglessness	  (Sorlie	  et	  al.	  2003).	  and	  indeed	  those	  that	  nurses	  care	  for	  at	  the	   end	  of	   life	   also	  need	   to	   find	   a	   sense	  of	  meaning	   if	   they	   are	   to	  have	   a	   good	  death	  (Kastenbaum	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  	  For	   practical	   purposes,	   Nussbaum’s	   view	   is	   not	   useful	   for	   identifying	  when	   or	  how	  a	  nurse	  might	  be	  justified	  in	  a	  decision	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  doctors’	  orders:	  the	  exercising	  of	  such	  a	  right	  requires	  an	  articulation	  that	  can	  be	  clearly	  understood	   by	   others.	   However,	   the	   sense	   of	   meaningless	   that	   accompanies	  moral	  distress,	   is	  certainly	  deserving	  of	  attention	  when	  conscience	  is	   framed	  in	  this	   way,	   and	   will	   be	   useful	   in	   chapter	   seven,	   when	   practical	   resolutions	   that	  exclude	  conscientious	  objection	  are	  offered.	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  The	   concept	   of	   conscience	   has	  withstood	   the	   test	   of	   time	   and	   there	   is	   a	   long-­‐standing	   respect	   for	   it	   that	   is	   found	   in	   theology	   as	   well	   as	   philosophy.	   For	  example,	   Thomas	   Aquinas,	   despite	   a	   conservative	   view	   on	   church	   authority,	  argued	   that	   ultimately	   individuals	   had	   to	   follow	   the	   inner	   light	   of	   their	  conscience,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  in	  opposition	  to	  church	  authority.	  Catholic	  theologians	  continue	  to	  argue	  that	  ignoring	  the	  conscience	  leads	  to	  hardness	  of	  heart	  where	  one	  no	  longer	  feels	  guilt	  or	  the	  need	  for	  repentance	  (Lawrence	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Guilt	  has	  also	  been	  found	  to	  correlate	  with	  experiences	  of	  moral	  distress,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  withdrawal	  from	  patients	  that	  nurses	  sometimes	  make	  in	  response	  to	  moral	  distress,	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  this	  sense	  of	  guilt	  and	  disharmony.	  Indeed,	  perhaps	  some	   who	   no	   longer	   feel	   or	   respond	   to	   moral	   distress	   have	   acquired	   the	  ‘hardness	   of	   heart’	   that	   theologians	   propose	   is	   a	   response	   to	   the	   inability	   or	  choice	  not	   to	  heed	   the	  voice	  of	  conscience.	  Obviously	   the	  concern	   for	  nurses	   is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  damaged	  relationship	  with	  God,	  but	  rather	  a	  damaged	  relationship	  with	  one’s	  patients	  or	  with	  oneself.	  The	   ideal	  resolution	  to	  moral	  distress	  then,	  could	  be	  one	  where	  the	  sense	  of	  compassion	  and	  connection	  that	  the	  nurse	  has	  with	  her	  patient	  is	  sustained.	  	  Similarly,	  to	  the	  theologians,	  Cannold	  (1994)	  states	  that	  to	  ignore	  the	  conscience	  seems	   to	   have	   a	   deleterious	   effect	   on	   one’s	   ability	   to	   be	   an	   integrated	   person,	  who	   is	   able	   to	   interact	  with	   others	   in	   an	   integrated	  way	   that	   leads	   to	   internal	  disharmony	   of	   the	   self.	   Self	   it	   seems,	   is	   central	   to	   conscience,	   and	   in	   a	  mirror	  image	  that	  reflects	  a	  co-­‐dependent	  relationship	  to	  this,	  integrity	  and	  harmony	  of	  the	  self	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  that	  allows	  a	  sense	  of	  conscience	  to	  be	  sustained.	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  This	   sense	   of	   integrity	   is	   important	   with	   regard	   to	   conscience	   and	   Wicclair	  (2000),	   a	   philosopher	   who	   has	   written	   extensively	   on	   conscience	   and	  conscientious	   objection	   in	   medicine,	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   most	   promising	  justification	  for	  HCPs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  is	  that	  it	  protects	  moral	  integrity,	   and	   that	   maintaining	   good	   conscience	   is	   central	   to	   self	   respect	   and	  avoidance	  of	  self	  betrayal.	  	  	  Further	   to	   this,	   as	   I	   have	   previously	   highlighted,	   and	   as	   Kolnai’s	   definition	  supports,	   autonomy	   and	   a	   sense	   of	   moral	   responsibility	   for	   one’s	   actions	   are	  intimately	  entwined	  with	  conscience	  and	  also	  need	  preservation.	  Juthberg	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  would	  certainly	  support	  this	  position,	  stating	  that	  without	  conscience	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  express	  it,	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  responsibility.	  Furthermore,	  a	  sense	  of	  individual	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  congruent	  with	  the	  valued	  Western	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  -­‐	  the	  idea	  that	  each	  person	  is	  essentially	  an	  individual	  with	  a	  free	  will	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  express	  his	  will.	  	  	  This	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  is	  instilled	  in	  nurses	  who	  are	  urged	  to	  be	  responsible,	  knowledgeable	   doers	   who	   are	   accountable	   for	   their	   actions	   (NMC	   2008a,	  McGann,	   2004)	   The	   GoodWork©	   Project	   that	   examined	   the	   characteristics	   of	  individuals	  and	  excellence	   in	  work,	  and	  that	   involved	  fifty	  researchers	  at	  seven	  universities,	  identified	  that	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  was	  closely	  associated	  with	  one’s	   sense	  of	  moral	   identity:	   those	  with	  a	   strong	   sense	  of	  moral	   identity	  also	  had	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  (Damon	  &	  Bronk	  ,	  2007).	  It	  was	  also	  found	  that	  this	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   for	   one’s	   actions,	   is	   essential	   to	   carrying	   out	   one’s	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work	   diligently,	   and	  without	   them	   there	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   excellence	   (Gardner,	  2007).	  	  	  These	  are	  valid	  reasons	  to	  preserve	  the	  nurse’s	  sense	  of	  good	  conscience	  and	  to	  avoid	  the	  opposite	  state	  that	  is	  created	  in	  moral	  distress	  or	  troubled	  conscience:	  to	  erode	  a	  nurse’s	  sense	  of	  good	  conscience	  must	  also	  risk	  eroding	  this	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  and	  accountability,	  an	  end	  result	  that	  would	  be	  a	  retrograde	  step	  for	   the	  nursing	  profession	  and	   for	   the	   individual	  patient	  who	   is	  nursed.	   In	   this	  sense,	  already	  one	  can	  see	  how	  conscience	  is	  an	  important	  collective	  experience	  for	  the	  nursing	  profession.	  Because	  conscience	  links	  to	  responsibility,	  it	  links	  to	  the	  autonomy	  required	  to	  exercise	  responsibility.	  The	  road	  to	  nursing	  becoming	  (what	   is	   presented	   by	   nurses	   at	   least)	   an	   autonomous	   profession,	   has	   relied	  upon	   winning	   battles	   associated	   with	   gaining	   these	   facets	   and	   becoming	  recognised	   as	   a	   profession	   separate	   to	  medicine	   (Rafferty	   1996,	   Raffetry	   et	   al.	  1997).	   This	   road	   to	   what	   might	   be	   termed	   autonomy,	   has	   been	   one	   in	   which	  prejudice	   has	   had	   to	   be	   overcome,	   such	   as	   the	   identification	   of	   nurses	   with	  female	   stereotypes,	   and	   that	   has	   lent	   heavily	   from	   feminist	   ideology	   in	   its	  development,	  particularly	  from	  the	  1970s	  	  to	  the	  1980s	  (Hoffman,	  1991.;	  Webb	  2002).	  This	  feminist	  stance	  has	  been	  relatively	  defensive	  in	  nature	  (Chinn,	  1995)	  and	   not	   always	   without	   conflict.42	   Carol	   Gilligan’s	   reinterpretation	   of	   ethics	  provided	  a	  new	  road	  for	  feminist	   influence	  on	  nursing	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  seven	  (Gilligan,	  1982).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  42	  Malka	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  uneasy	  relationship	  that	  nursing	  has	  with	  feminism	  when	  she	  describes	  a	  Pittsburgh	  femimist	  asking	  ‘Why	  a	  nurse	  and	  not	  a	  doctor?’.	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Within	  these	  reasons,	   it	  ought	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  potentially	  three	  ends	  identified,	   that	   are	   worthy	   of	   preservation.	   Firstly	   there	   is	   the	   end	   of	   moral	  integrity	   itself.	   Secondly	   there	   is	   the	   result	   of	   that	   integrity;	   the	   good	  work	   or	  specifically	  in	  the	  case	  of	  nursing,	  the	  good	  nursing	  care	  that	  the	  patient	  receives.	  Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   profession	   of	   nursing	  whose	   existence	  depends	   on	   its	   identity	   –	   both	   professional	   and	   moral	   (if	   these	   are	   to	   be	  separated).	   All	   of	   these	   ends	   are	   important,	   but	   often	   in	   discussions	   about	  conscience,	  the	  end	  for	  the	  patient	  is	  overlooked	  as	  the	  self	  or	  the	  profession	  is	  attended	  to.	  This	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  later.	  	  So	  far	  then,	  there	  is	  solid	  support	  for	  Catlin’s	  position	  in	  so	  far	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  good	  conscience	   for	   the	   nurse	   is	   something	   that	   ought	   to	   be	   preserved.	   Catlin	   isn’t	  clear	   about	   how	   nurses’	   expression	   of	   conscience,	   or	   conscientious	   objection,	  ought	   to	   impact	   on	   the	   individual	   patients	   they	   serve.	   However,	   the	   essential	  nature	   of	   this	   expression,	   ought	   to	   be	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   sense	   of	  responsibility,	   striving	   for	   excellence	   and	  diligent	  working	   that	   is	   expressed	   in	  the	   state	   of	   good	   conscience	   and	   that	   results	   in	   a	   good	   end	   point	   for	   patients.	  That	  conscientious	  objection	   is	  a	  means	   to	  achieving	  a	  good	  end	   for	  patients	   is	  questionable.	  43	  	  In	  conclusion	  then,	  conscience	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	   four-­‐fold	  object.	  Firstly	  there	   is	  the	   sense	   of	   moral	   awareness	   that	   is	   the	   motivating	   and	   self-­‐critical	   faculty	  required	  for	  ethical	  living	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  moral	  integrity.	  Secondly	  there	  is	  the	  action	   that	   results	   from	   conscience,	   that	   I	   argue	   is	   as	   much	   a	   constituent	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  43	  Further	  consideration	  of	  this	  issue	  will	  be	  made	  in	  chapter	  six	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conscience	  worthy	   of	   as	  much	   consideration	   as	   is	   the	   preservation	   of	   sense	   of	  integrity.	   Thirdly	   is	   the	   capacity	   to	   express	   one’s	   conscience	   and	   to	   have	   full	  responsibility	  for	  the	  causal	  effects	  of	  one’s	  actions	  as	  is	  identified	  by	  autonomy.	  Finally,	  it	  seems	  that	  conscience	  might	  be	  intimately	  linked	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  meaning	  and	  purpose.44	  	  	  Conscience	  is	  by	  its	  nature	  erroneous	  	  So	   far	   it	   seems	   that	   conscience	   is	   a	  good	   thing.	  However,	   it	   is	  not	   so	   simple	  as	  that	   and	   indeed,	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	   case	   of	   HCPs	   is	   even	   more	  questionable,	   as	   Savulescu	   (2006)	   draws	   attention	   to,	   conscience	   can	   be	   an	  excuse	  for	  vice,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  an	  excuse	  not	  to	  do	  one’s	  duty.	  He	  argues	  that	  if	  conscientious	  objection	  is	  a	  contradiction	  of	  that	  duty,	  then	  it	  is	  wrong	  and	  immoral.	  Kolnai	  offers	  further	  analysis	  of	  conscience	  that	  brings	  to	  question	  the	  rightness	   of	   nurses	   refusing	   to	   carrying	   out	   a	   doctor’s	   order,	   under	   Catlin’s	  conditions.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  serious	  objection	  to	  Catlin’s	  position	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	   premise	   that	   conscience	   is	   not	   a	   reliable	   source	   for	   identifying	   right	   and	  wrong	  action.	  In	  Kolnai’s	  words,	  the	  conscience	  is	  erroneous.	  	  Kolnai’s	  Position	  	  Kolnai,	   sees	   conscience	   as	  moral	   awareness.	   Based	   on	   his	  moral	   principles	   or	  values,	  the	  agent	  has	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  is	  right	  to	  do	  or	  not	  do.	  His	  conscience	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  44	  There	  is	  contention	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  personal	  and	  professional	  meaning	  and	  purpose	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  conscience.	  This	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  chapter	  six.	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responsible	   for	   guarding	   his	   chosen	   actions	   and	   relates	   not	   only	   to	   universal	  norms,	   but	   also	   to	   translation	   of	   those	   norms	   in	   to	   practice	   in	   actual	  circumstances.	  	  	  Although	  he	  admits	  that	  we	  have	  an	  intuitive	  tendency	  to	  regard	  conscience	  he	  identifies	  a	  problem:	  	   ‘We	  expect	  a	  man	  to	  behave	  rightly,	  rather	   than	  merely	  appraise	  rightly,	  or	  merely	  behave	  according	   to	  his	  appraisal,	  and	   this	  we	  consider	   ‘sinning	   against	   the	   light’	   	   essentially	   guilty,	   but	   also	  attach	   a	  moral	   disvalue	   to	   a	   person’s	   following	  his	   errant	   lights’	  (p172)	  	  This	  problem	  of	  conscience	  potentially	  being	  incorrect	  in	  its	  appraisal	  of	  right	  or	  wrong,	   has	   not	   been	   discussed	   in	   the	   discourse	   on	   moral	   distress,	   except	  indirectly	   by	   the	   recent	   paper	   by	   Repenshek	   (2009)	   who	   argues	   that	   nurses	  perceive	  wrong-­‐doing	  in	  situations	  that	  are	  in	  fact	  morally	  ambiguous.	  	  Kolnai	   proposes	   that	   conscience	   cannot	   be	   relied	   upon	   to	   consistently	   and	  correctly	   identify	   right	   and	  wrong	   action.	   He	   states	   that	   ‘conscience’	   therefore	  must	   always	   be	   considered	   erroneous.	   As	   far	   as	   he	   is	   concerned	   conscience	   is	  synonymous	  with	  ‘erroneous	  conscience.’	  :	  	   ‘Conscience	  that	  cannot	  hope	  to	  be	  correct	  ,	  and	  ....cannot	  fear	  to	  be	   erroneous,	   is	   not	   Conscience	   in	   the	   …	   dignified	   sense	   of	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moral	   self-­‐criticism,	   judgement	   and	   belief	   –	   which	   essentially	  aspires	   to	   truth	   and	   tries	   to	   escape	   from	   error,	   and	   in	   fact	  expresses	   the	   agent’s	   endeavour	   to	   ponder	   and	   argue	   his	  decisions…in	  the	  open	  court	  of	  objective	  morality.’	  (p.179)	  	  	  He	  cites	  examples	  to	  support	  his	  position	  such	  as	  how	  some	  individuals	  can	  be	  overly	   scrupulous	   about	   the	   wrongness	   of	   their	   actions,	   and	   perhaps	   more	  convincingly,	  he	  describes	  how	  the	  same	  individual	  will	  judge	  the	  moral	  quality	  of	  his	  actions	  differently	  over	  time:	  even	  though	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  act	  remains	  the	  same,	   the	   conscience	   it	   seems	   is	  malleable	   and	   judges	   it	   differently.45	   	   This	   is	  supported	  by	  empirical	  evidence.	  For	  example	  Cronqvist	  (2004)	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	   nurses’	   experiences	   of	   ethical	   difficulties	   in	   ICU,	   found	   that	   nurses	   often	  changed	   perspectives	   within	   the	   same	   interview,	   such	   as	   the	   nurse	   who	   was	  morally	   distressed	   at	   the	   delivery	   of	   surgical	   care	   to	   an	   eighty-­‐five	   year	   old	  patient.	  She	  stated	  within	  the	  interview	  that	  this	  patient	  ought	  not	  to	  have	  been	  treated,	   but	   then	   commented	   after	   reflection,	   that	   in	   her	   experience,	   she	   had	  seen	  such	  patients	  recover,	  and	  that	  perhaps	  given	  this	  fact,	  her	  initial	  judgment	  was	  incorrect.	  	  	  That	   conscience	   is	  by	   its	  nature	  necessarily	  erroneous,	  Kolnai	  argues,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  ought	  not	  be	  respected	  or	  valued.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Kolnai	  states	  that	  conscience	  deserves	  to	  be	  respected,	  because	  the	  best	  we	  can	  achieve	  is	  to	  allow	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  45	  Hardwig	  (1997)	  offers	  a	  different	  perspective	  that	  supports	  this	  position	  in	  his	  discussion	  about	  autobiography,	  biography	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  narrative	  ethics.	  He	  points	  out	  the	  malleability	  of	  one’s	  interests,	  beliefs,	  desires	  and	  motives	  and	  a	  person’s	  inability	  to	  truly	  identify	  them.	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an	   agent	   to	   always	   act	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   is	   congruent	   with	   his	   erroneous	  conscience.	  Furthermore,	  not	  only	  do	  we	  allow	  an	  agent	   to	   act	   in	   this	  way,	  we	  admire	  him	  for	  doing	  so,	  even	  if	  his	  views	  differ	  to	  our	  own.	  Of	  course	  this	  is	  not	  so	  simple	  as	  it	  first	  appears,	  given	  that	  some	  people	  will	  have	  a	  conscience	  that	  not	  only	  differs	  to	  our	  own,	  but	  that	  is	  in	  direct	  and	  violent	  conflict	  with	  it.	  	  	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   some	  misunderstanding	   of	   Kolnai’s	   position	   can	   arise	  from	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘erroneous’.	  He	  does	  not	  mean	  by	  this	  that	  conscience	  is	  never	   right	   and	   wholly	   untrustworthy.	   This	   would	   not	   be	   congruent	   with	   his	  wish	   to	   promote	   conscience	   as	   a	   dignified	   aspect	   of	   human	  moral	   endeavour.	  Indeed,	  for	  his	  understanding	  of	  conscience	  in	  general,	  fallible	  is	  perhaps	  a	  better	  word	  to	  use	  than	  ‘erroneous’.	  Why	  he	  chooses	  the	  word	  ‘erroneous’	  over	  ‘fallible’	  is	   not	   explicitly	   discussed	   in	   his	   paper,	   but	   it	   seems	   that	   this	   arises	   from	   the	  subject	   he	   focuses	   on	   for	  much	   of	   his	   paper;	   that	   is	   the	   investigation	   of	  when	  conscience	  can	  be	  truly	  identified	  as	  ‘erroneous’;	  that	  is	  when	  moral	  agents	  claim	  to	   use	   their	   conscience	   in	   directing	   them	   towards	  wrong-­‐doing	   that	   can	   enter	  into	   the	  world	   of	   atrocity,	   or	   as	   shall	   be	   argued,	   error	   is	  made	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  misinformation46	  	  Kolnai	   sets	   to	   resolve	   the	   ambiguity	   that	   we	   ought	   to	   admire	   a	   person	   who	  follows	  his	  conscience,	  but	  that	  this	  can	  lead	  the	  same	  person	  to	  commit	  acts	  that	  are	  morally	  reprehensible	  and	  absolutely	  require	   intervention	  to	  stop	  them,	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  46	  In	  this	  thesis,	  the	  word	  ‘erroneous’	  will	  be	  used	  to	  accurately	  reflect	  Kolnai’s	  presentation,	  but	  the	  reader	  can	  understand	  conscience	  in	  a	  general	  sense	  as	  ‘fallible’,	  except	  under	  conditions	  where	  gross	  wrong-­‐doing	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  case	  for	  example	  of	  ‘overlain	  conscience’.	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recourse	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘overlain	  conscience’.	  This	  is	  where	  the	  agent	  takes	  a	  non-­‐moral	  absolute	  as	  the	  source	  of	  his	  conscience.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  this	  he	  cites	  the	  atrocities	   committed	   by	   Nazis	   during	   World	   War	   Two,	   where	   totalitarian	  ideology	   became	   the	   source	   of	   morality	   that	   contradicted	   longstanding	  consensus	   about	   the	   morality	   of	   killing,	   or	   the	   status	   of	   human	   beings.	   It	   is	  interesting	  to	  note	  how	  an	  academic	  paper	  can	  result	  from	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  time,	   but	   clearly	   the	   same	   questions	   about	   the	   ability	   of	   humans	   to	   commit	  atrocity	  seemingly	  with	  clear	  consciences	   is	  still	   relevant	   today.	  Such	  atrocities	  have	  included	  the	  actions	  of	  doctors	  and	  nurses	  (Shields,	  2003).	  	  	  This	  ambiguity	  also	  brings	  to	  question	  the	  nature	  of	  integrity	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	   not	   seen	   solely	   as	   a	   sense	   of	   personal	   wholeness,	   but	   as	   a	   sense	   of	  completeness	   and	   wholeness	   that	   is	   virtuous	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘soundness’	   or	  ‘sinlessness’	   ‘uprightness’	   ‘honesty’,	   ‘sincerity’,	   ‘uncorrupted	   virtue’	   (Gillon	  1985)	   and	   that	   is	   incompatible	   with	   the	   ‘integrity’	   displayed	   by	   those	   who	  committed	   atrocities	   in	   Nazi	   Germany.47	   At	   this	   point	   it	  might	   seem	   that	   such	  extreme	  acts	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  situations	  described	  in	  this	  thesis,	  but	  they	  will	  become	  relevant	  later	  on.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  47	  An	  interesting	  point	  for	  further	  exploration	  of	  the	  moral	  conundrum	  that	  arises	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  good	  conscience,	  personal	  integrity	  and	  virtue	  combined	  with	  atrocious	  or	  morally	  reprehensible	  acts	  are	  the	  films	  ‘Downfall’	  (2004)	  directed	  by	  Hirschbigel	  and	  ‘Pierrepoint:	  The	  last	  hangman’	  (2006)	  directed	  by	  Shergold.	  In	  both	  these	  films	  main	  characters	  can	  be	  seen	  displaying	  virtues	  such	  as	  compassion,	  sacrifice	  of	  self,	  loyalty	  to	  another	  or	  to	  the	  state,	  whilst	  also	  carrying	  out	  or	  supporting	  acts	  such	  as	  mass	  extermination	  of	  Jews	  or	  hanging	  convicted	  criminals.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  later,	  but	  contradictory	  to	  this,	  others	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  carrying	  out	  atrocious	  acts	  with	  good	  virtue	  but	  also	  without	  necessarily	  being	  deemed	  morally	  reprehensible,	  in	  the	  film	  ‘Schindler’s	  list’	  (1993)	  directed	  by	  Spielberg,	  when	  doctors	  and	  nurses	  euthanize	  patients	  prior	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  German	  soldiers	  and	  the	  known	  event	  of	  execution	  which	  would	  follow	  (what	  makes	  this	  different	  is	  the	  implied	  consent	  of	  the	  patients.)	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  Kolnai	   makes	   an	   almost	   aside	   comment	   that	   is	   significant	   for	   my	   position	   on	  moral	  distress;	  that	  is	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  error	  in	  conscience	  can	  be	  erroneous:	  	  	  ‘in	  the	  trivial	  sense	  of	  conscience	  as	  moral	  decision	  hic	  et	  nunc,	  misinformed	  as	  to	  the	  facts’	  (p176)	  	  This	   description	   of	   the	   ‘trivial	   sense’	   of	   being	   misinformed	   to	   the	   facts	   is	  uncomfortable	   to	   read,	   but	   it	   is	   the	   first	   objection	   to	   be	   raised	   in	   response	   to	  Catlin,	  having	  already	  called	  into	  question	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  we	  can	  trust	  our	  consciences	   for	   identifying	   accurately,	   right	   from	   wrong.	   That	   is	   that	   moral	  distress	   arises	   in	   nurses	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   are	   lacking	   or	  misinformed	  of	  the	  facts	  that	  result	  in	  them	  judging	  right	  and	  wrong	  incorrectly.	  	  	  Kolnai	   proposes	   that	   in	   the	   identification	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   conscience	   is	  acceptably	  erroneous	  or	  is	  instead	  unacceptably	  erroneous,	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  draw	   on	   consensus	   as	   a	   guide.	   So	   for	   example,	   in	   Nazi	   Germany,	   those	   who	  supported	   and	   committed	   atrocities	   such	   as	   extermination	   of	   Jews	   and	  euthanasia	  of	   learning	  disabled	  patients,	   did	  not	  hold	  moral	   values	   that	   are	  by	  consensus	  deemed	  to	  be	  right:	  there	  is	  a	  long	  standing	  history	  in	  philosophy	  and	  religion	  that	  killing	  of	  humans	  is	  wrong	  except	  under	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  and	  certainly	  not	  because	  one	  human	  has	  a	  inherent	  characteristic	  that	  justifies	  the	  act.	  Such	  consensus	  may	  of	  course	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  form	  of	  relativism	  and	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dependent	  on	  a	  society	  at	  a	  certain	  time.48	  Nevertheless,	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  has	  a	   relativistic	   stance,	   it	   seems	  reasonable	   to	  accept	   longstanding	  consensus	   that	  has	  stood	  the	  test	  of	  time	  and	  events.	  For	  the	  relativist,	  there	  isn’t	  really	  anything	  better	  anyway,	  and	  for	  the	  one	  who	  accepts	  universal	  truths,	  consensus	  is	  a	  route	  to	  identify	  those	  truths,	  through	  reason	  and	  for	  me	  at	  least,	  emotion.	  	  	  Kolnai	  states:	  	  	   ‘That	  consensus	  is	  not	  …	  exhaustively	  represented	  in	  any	  specified	  system,	  creed,	  person	  or	  collective.	  It	  is	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  universe	  of	  moral	   intutions,	   	   traditions	   and	   codes,	   which	   are	   necessarily	  incomplete	  and	  fraught	  with	  ambiguities’	  (p.	  194)	  	  As	  far	  as	  he	  is	  concerned	  the	  agent	  involved	  in	  atrocious	  acts,	  does	  not	  have	  an	  erroneous	  conscience	  in	  common	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  humanity,	  but	  rather,	  has	  what	  he	  terms	  an	  ‘overlain	  conscience’	  (p.188)	  This	  is	  when	  an	  individual	  adapts	  their	  conscience	   to	   a	   non	   moral	   absolute.	   He	   states	   that	   this	   is	   a	   human	   entity,	  communal	   or	   individual,	   where	   an	   institution	   or	   ideology	   usurps	   fundamental	  morality.	  Nazism	  was	  an	  example	   in	  Kolnai’s	   time,	  but	  perhaps	   the	  child	  abuse	  scandal	   in	   the	   Roman	   Catholic	   Church,	   is	   a	  modern	   day	   example.49	   To	   submit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  48	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  there	  are	  some	  grave	  issues	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  over	  which	  we	  can’t	  reach	  consensus	  such	  as	  abortion	  or	  execution	  of	  murderers.	  49	  A	  significant	  cause	  of	  the	  child	  abuse	  scandal	  was	  the	  prioritisation	  of	  the	  scandal	  and	  subsequent	  damage	  that	  might	  be	  caused	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  church,	  over	  the	  safety	  of	  children	  and	  bringing	  offending	  priests	  to	  justice.	  (Doyle,	  2003)	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fully	  to	  an	  overlain	  conscience	  means	  in	  Kolnai’s	  eyes,	  that	  conscience	  becomes	  an	  absent	  force.	  	  He	   presents	   two	   characteristics	   of	   conscience	   that	   serve	   to	   contradict	   Catlin’s	  position.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   conscience	   is	   erroneous	   and	   the	   second	   is	   that	  conscience	  must	  be	  expressed	  within	  a	  moral	  consensus.	  These	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  turn	  and	  make	  my	  first	  objections	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  as	   is	  presented	  by	  Catlin.	  	  Objection	  to	  Catlin:	  Misinformed	  of	  the	  facts.	  	  Nurses	   are	   likely	   to	   experience	   an	   erroneous	   conscience	   when	   morally	  distressed	  because	   the	  empirical	   and	  ethical	   grounds	  on	  which	   they	  base	   their	  judgments,	  particularly	  of	  primary	  harm,	  are	  often	  incorrect,	  or	  else	  lack	  broader	  contextual	  understanding.	  	  	  This	  misinformation	  rests	  in	  three	  forms.	  Firstly,	  that	  nurses	  are	  misinformed	  of	  the	  empirical	  facts,	  secondly	  that	  nurses	  are	  psychologically	  inclined	  to	  judge	  the	  intention	  of	  doctors	  more	  harshly	  than	  is	  justified,	  and	  thirdly,	  that	  nurses	  lack	  a	  broad	   ethical	   perspective	   on	   which	   to	   make	   ethical	   judgement	   on	   individual	  cases	  in	  the	  context	  of	  medical	  care	  delivered	  to	  many.	  Each	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  turn.	   	  As	  has	  already	  been	  stated,	  a	  person’s	  conscience	  can	  be	  erroneous	  in	  the	  trivial	  sense	  where	   the	   individual	   is	  misinformed	   of	   the	   facts.	   This	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	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case	   of	   moral	   distress	   in	   nursing.	   Some	   of	   the	   research	   into	   moral	   distress	  indicates	   that	  more	  experienced	  nurses	  suffer	  more	  extreme	  moral	  distress,	  or	  suffer	   it	   more	   frequently.50	   It	   is	   implied	   that	   more	   experienced	   nurses	   have	  greater	  knowledge	  that	  they	  are	  constrained	  from	  applying	  to	  the	  patients	  under	  their	   care	   and	   subsequently	   suffer	  more	   extreme	   distress.	   There	   is	   though,	   no	  evidence	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   such	   nurses	   are	  more	   accurate	   in	   their	   eventual	  accuracy	   in	   the	  prediction	  of	   consequences.	  Although	  such	  nurses	  do	  acquire	  a	  greater	  knowledge	  about	  nursing	  and	  medical	  care,	  perhaps	  the	  moral	  distress	  is	  more	   extreme	   not	   because	   of	   this,	   but	   because	   they	   have	   experienced	   similar	  circumstances	   more	   times;	   they	   too	   suffer	   and	   become	   ‘burned	   out’	   with	   this	  repeated	   exposure,	   that	   is	   particularly	   difficult	   because	   of	   their	   sustained	  proximity	  to	  patients	  and	  their	  suffering	  (Ferral	  and	  Coyle,	  2008,	  pp9-­‐19).	  	  There	  is	  an	  unexpressed	  assumption	  in	  Catlin’s	  work	  that	  nurses	  at	  least	  on	  the	  substantial	  numbers	  of	  occasions	  where	  they	  suffer	  moral	  distress,	  know	  better	  than	  doctors	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  patient	  ought	  to	  be	  aggressively	  treated,	  or	  instead	  their	  symptoms	  palliated.	  In	  agreement	  with	  this	  assumption,	  it	  has	  been	  found	  that	   nurses	   tend	   to	   make	   more	   pessimistic	   and	   accurate	   predictions	   about	  whether	   or	   not	   a	   patient	   will	   die	   under	   ‘futile’	   treatment	   (Frick	   et	   al.,	   2003).	  However,	  contrary	  to	  this,	  they	  are	  not	  accurate	  in	  predicting	  out	  of	  the	  few	  who	  will	  survive,	  which	  patients	  these	  are.	  Indeed,	  medical	  models	  don’t	  yet	  exist	  that	  are	   able	   to	   do	   this	   (Hamrick	   &	   Blackhall,	   2007).	   In	   further	   support	   of	   this	  position,	   it	   has	  been	   found	   that	  when	  doctors	   are	  questioned	  about	   aggressive	  medical	   care,	   that	   they	   cited	   examples	   of	   nurses	  who	   strongly	   disapproved	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  50	  See	  p32.	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aggressive	   medical	   care	   for	   one	   patient,	   only	   to	   find	   later	   that	   that	   the	   same	  patient	  had	  survived	  (Gill,	  2005;	  Gustaitis	  and	  Young,	  1983).	  	  Added	  to	  this,	  some	  empirical	  research	  has	  found	  that	  nurses	  are	  misinformed	  of	  clinical	   facts.	  For	  example,	  Antomarria & Bratton (2008)	   found	   that	  nurses	  were	  distressed	  when	  brain	  dead	  patients	  were	   about	   to	  become	  organ	  donors.	  The	  nurses	  were	   found	  to	  not	  understand	  the	  physiological	   facts	   that	  are	  employed	  to	   justify	   removal	   of	   organs	   from	   a	   living	   body.	   Nurses’	   lack	   of	   biological	  knowledge	   has	   received	   a	   lot	   of	   attention	   in	   nursing	   education	   and	   even	  intensive	   care	   nurses	   have	   been	   found	   not	   to	   apply	   biology	   to	   nursing	   care,	  relying	   instead	   on	   policies	   and	   procedures	   to	   direct	   their	   clinical	   decision-­‐making	  (O’Reilly,	  	  2004;	  McVicar	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  	  De	  Wolf	   Boseck	   (2005)	   further	   supports	   this	   position.	   He	   describes	   an	   ethics	  consultation	   in	   the	   US	   where	   the	   nurse	   phoned	   because	   she	   identified	   that	   a	  doctor	  had	  refused	  to	  give	  pain	  medication	  to	  a	  patient	  in	  ICU.	  She	  was	  advised	  to	  call	   the	   director	   of	   the	   ICU	   and	   having	   done	   this,	   the	   care	   provided	   was	   not	  changed,	  although	  she	  felt	  a	  lot	  better	  afterwards.	  Obviously	  the	  nurse	  was	  right	  to	   pursue	   the	   concern	   she	   had	   about	   pain	  medication,	   but	   in	   this	   instance	   her	  moral	   distress	   was	   misplaced	   because	   as	   Cochran	   (2004)	   pointed	   out	   in	   his	  response	  to	  this	  paper,	  the	  nurse	  had	  failed	  to	  understand	  that	  pain	  medication	  might	  have	  been	  harmful	   to	  her	  patient	  because	   the	  patient	  was	  being	  weaned	  from	   the	   ventilator.	   That	   is,	   doctors	   will	   sometimes	   allow	   for	   immediately	  distressing	  effects	  such	  as	  pain	  to	  meet	  the	  better	  end:	  in	  this	  instance	  no	  longer	  being	  dependent	  on	  a	  ventilator.	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Nurses	  are	  psychologically	  primed	  to	  view	  the	   intentions	  of	  doctors	  as	  morally	  suspect.	  	  	  In	  further	  support	  of	  this	  position,	  psychologists	  have	  found	  that	  when	  negative	  consequences	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  action,	  observers	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   judge	  this	   effect	   as	   intended	   (Jansen	   and	   Fogel	   2009).	   Therefore	   nurses	   are	   perhaps	  more	  likely	  to	  judge	  doctors	  as	  having	  wrong	  intentions	  -­‐	  such	  as	  lack	  of	  care	  to	  offer	  palliative	  care	  -­‐	  when	  they	  see	  one	  after	  the	  other	  patient	  die.	  Supporting	  this	  view,	  Gustaitis	  and	  Young	  (1983)	  report	  in	  their	  journalistic	  exposition	  of	  a	  neonatal	   intensive	  care	  unit	   in	  the	  US	  how	  doctors	  found	  the	  nurses	  frequently	  harsh	   in	   their	   manner	   towards	   them	   when	   such	   decisions	   were	   made.	   The	  evidence	   indicates	   that	  not	  only	  do	  people	   tend	  to	   judge	   ‘bad’	   intentions	   in	   the	  manner	  described,	  but	  also,	  when	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  outcome	  –	  for	  example	  the	  patient	  who	  survives	  seemingly	  against	   the	  odds	  -­‐	  observers	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  judge	   it	   as	   unintentional	   in	   comparison	   to	   negative	   outcome.	   This	   paradoxical	  thinking	   that	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   most	   likely	   is	   congruent	   with	   nurse’s	  experiences	  in	  moral	  distress	  and	  is	  indicitive	  not	  only	  of	  an	  erroneous	  thinking	  but	  also	  must	  compound	  the	  negative	  emotional	  consequences.	   In	  other	  words,	  nurses	  will	  tend	  to	  ascribe	  negative	  intentions	  to	  doctors	  as	  they	  make	  decisions	  to	  treat	  aggressively,	  but	  also,	  even	  when	  the	  patient	  survives,	  nurses	  will	  fail	  to	  see	   this	   as	   a	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	   doctor’s	   good	   initial	   intentions.	   This	  psychological	   effect	   is	   another	   form	   of	   erroneous	   appraisal,	   and	   given	   the	  tendency	  to	  judge	  intention	  paradoxically,	   it	   is	  another	  reason	  to	  challenge	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  of	  nurses	  to	  doctors’	  orders	  in	  ‘futile’	  circumstances	  is	  a	  good	   thing,	   because	   once	   the	   nurse	   has	   observed	   undesired	   consequences	   of	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medical	   decisions,	   she	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   erroneously	   judge	   the	   intentions	   of	  doctors’	  actions	  more	  harshly.	  	  	  Nurses	  have	  a	  particular	  moral	  perspective	  that	  lacks	  broad	  context	  	  Finally,	   nurses	   can	  be	  erroneous	   in	   their	   form	  of	   ethical	   reasoning	  when	   faced	  with	   situations	   that	   cause	   moral	   distress.	   There	   is	   undoubtedly	   an	   ethical	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  suffering	  caused	  by	  aggressive	  medical	   treatment	   is	   worth	   the	   survival	   rate	   of	   patients,	   or	   whether	   all	  aggressive	  medical	  treatments	  ought	  instead	  to	  be	  withheld	  to	  prevent	  suffering,	  whilst	  knowing	  that	  some	  will	  die	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this.	  	  	  As	  has	  been	  stated	  previously,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  on	  moral	  distress	  does	  not	  indicate	   this	   broader	   or	   consequentialist	   perspective,	   but	   rather,	   it	   seems	   that	  nurses	   are	   very	   much	   affected	   by	   the	   single	   patient	   in	   front	   of	   them.	   Indeed	  nurses	  that	  suffer	  moral	  distress	  have	  been	  found	  to	  reason	  by	  an	  ethics	  of	  care	  approach	  more	   than	   other	   frameworks	   such	   as	   justice	   (Nathaniel,	   2006).	   This	  method	   of	   ethical	   analysis	   is	   closely	   associated	   with	   proximity	   and	   emotional	  involvement	   and	   lacks	   principled	   analysis	   (Slote,	   2007).	   For	   example,	   nurses	  frame	  their	  descriptions	  around	  moral	  distress	  as	  one	  of	  intimate	  relationship	  to	  the	   patient	   as	   I	   have	   already	   described	   in	   previous	   chapters.	   The	   alternate	  broader	   perspective	   in	   terms	   of	   numbers	   of	   patients	   and	   a	   projection	   of	   these	  numbers	  into	  the	  future	  is	  lacking	  in	  nurses’	  evaluation	  of	  the	  situations	  they	  are	  faced	  with.	  As	  has	  already	  been	  indicated,	  the	  nurse	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  accurate	  and	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pessimistic	   in	   her	   assessment	   of	   the	   individual	   patient,	   but	   unable	   to	   predict	  which	  ‘futile’	  case	  will	  turn	  out	  well.	  	  It	  has	  been	  found	  that	  the	  proximity	  of	  the	  nurse	  to	  the	  patient	  and	  the	  patient’s	  bedside	  and	  associated	  suffering	  has	  a	  strong	  association	  with	  moral	  distress.51	  The	  nurse	  unlike	  the	  doctor	  or	  indeed	  other	  HCPs	  does	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  leave	  the	  bedside.	  Unless	  one	  has	  been	  a	  nurse	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  appreciate	  the	  degree	  of	  this	  ‘attachment’.	  The	  ward	  or	  intensive	  care	  nurse	  can’t	  make	  a	  visit	  to	  the	   toilet	   or	   take	   a	   break	   until	   she	   has	   assured	   that	   a	   colleague	   covers	   her	  patients.	   There	   is	   no	   set	   pattern	   to	   the	   day	  where	   she	   has	   a	   predictable	   lunch	  break,	   can	   take	   regular	   periods	   of	   time	   for	   short	   alternative	   activities	   such	   as	  attending	  a	  seminar,	  teaching	  session,	  seeing	  previous	  patients	  in	  outpatients	  or	  other	  organisational	  activities	  such	  as	  review	  of	  policies.	  Her	  physical	  immersion	  in	  the	  current	  status	  of	  her	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  patients	  is	  for	  most	  of	  her	  working	  time,	  total.	  This	  results	  in	  a	  narrow	  ethical	  perspective	  that	  fails	  to	  see	  the	  consequential	  justification	  of	  the	  suffering	  of	  many	  to	  save	  the	  few	  and	  as	  has	  been	  shown,	  she	  will	  have	  a	   tendency	   to	   judge	   the	   intention	  of	  doctors	   in	  such	  circumstances	  negatively.	  	  	  It	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis	   to	   consider	   the	   ethical	   arguments	   about	  whether	  or	  not	  aggressive	  medical	  treatment	  ought	  to	  be	  promoted	  and	  funded	  by	  the	  NHS.	  What	  is	  of	  significance	  though	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  consensus	  that	  such	  treatment	   is	   accepted	   and	  promoted	   and	   that	   this	   is	   supportable	  by	   literature.	  Yes	  the	  introduction	  of	  palliative	  care	  into	  the	  acute	  or	  critical	  care	  setting	  ought	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  51	  See	  p26.	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to	  be	  implemented	  (Nelson	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  Mularski	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  Lorenz	  et	  al.	  2008)	  but	  even	  so,	  patients	  will	  still	  undergo	  aggressive	  treatment	  and	  will	  not	  survive	  it;	  until	  reliable	  predictors	  exist	  for	  individual	  cases,	  this	  will	  be	  the	  case	  if	  saving	  of	  lives	  is	  to	  be	  valued.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  supports	  that	  lives	   are	   saved	   under	   aggressive	   conditions.	   For	   example,	   Singer	   et	   al.	   (2010)	  found	   that	   veterans	   treated	   in	   high	   intensity	   intensive	   care	   units,	   where	   the	  nature	  of	  treatment	  would	  be	  highly	  aggressive	  in	  nature,	  had	  a	  mortality	  rate	  of	  twenty	   seven	   percent	   as	   opposed	   to	   forty	   percent	   in	   a	   low	   intensity	   setting.	  Powell	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   likewise	   found	   that	   treatment	   of	   critically	   ill	   HIV	   patients	  with	  retrovirals	  showed	  an	  epidemiological	  shift	  over	  four	  years,	  where	  patient	  survival	   indicators	  were	   found	   to	   be	   on	   the	   increase.	   Van	   Gestal	   et	   al.	   (2010)	  challenges	   readers	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   a	   study	   of	   ventilated	   neurologically	  impaired	   children,	   only	   around	   half	   had	   a	   one	   year	   non	   complicated	   survival	  after	   ventilation.	   However,	   they	   argue	   that	   such	   an	   end	   result	   could	   not	   be	  considered	  futile.	  	  	  Such	  statistics	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  aggressive	  medical	  treatment,	  but	  there	   is	   no	   evidence	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   nurses	  who	   are	  morally	   distressed	   to	  indicate	   that	   nurses	   use	   such	   consequentialist	   reasoning	   to	   help	   alleviate	   the	  sense	  that	  they	  participate	  in	  wrong-­‐doing.	  	  	  Nurses	  are	  not	  ignorant,	  or	  unable	  to	  understand	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  medical	  decisions,	   nor	   unable	   to	   contribute	   to	   medical	   decision	   and	   on	   occasions	   to	  identify	  treatments	  that	  a	  doctor	  has	  not	  thought	  of	  and	  that	  can	  improve	  patient	  outcomes.	  However,	  nurses	  do	  not	  undergo	  medical	  education,	  do	  not	  generally	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attend	  medical	  conferences	  that	  address	  detailed	  information	  about	  new	  medical	  treatments,	   their	   efficacies	   and	   survival	   statistics.	   Their	   understanding	   of	  bioscience	  and	  application	  to	  clinical	  practice	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  weak	  (O’Reilly,	   2004)52.	   This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   nurses	   are	   lacking	   knowledge	   that	  they	  can	  apply	  to	  situations	  based	  on	  experience,	  or	  apply	  protocols.	  However	  it	  does	  mean	  that	   in	  complex	  clinical	  circumstances	  that	  are	  unusual,	   they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  interpret	  complex	  information	  and	  predict	  how	  it	  might	   impact	   on	   physiological	   reactions.	   Although	   nurses	   might	   ethically	  disagree	  with	  doctors	  about	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  suffering	  of	   the	  many	   is	  worth	  the	   saving	   of	   the	   few,	   clinically,	   they	   are	   not	   as	   well	   placed	   to	   use	   empirical	  information	  to	  direct	  patient	  care	  under	  the	  former	  premise.	  	  	  Finally,	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   nurse	   is	   right	   about	   a	   medical	   decision	   under	  conditions	   of	   moral	   distress	   and	   moral	   ambiguity	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   a	  particular	   patient	   ought	   to	   be	   treated	   or	   not,	   when	   nurses	   take	   on	   their	  professional	   role	   they	   concede	   to	   a	   public	   and	   contractual	   consensus	   (and	  associated	   obligations)	   that	   they	   are	   not	   the	   professional	   group	   to	   have	   final	  authority	  and	  medical	  decision-­‐making	  responsibility.	  To	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  doctors’	  orders	  under	  the	  conditions	  described	  by	  Catlin	  would	  in	  effect	  mean	  that	   nurses	   were	   assuming	   this	   responsibility,	   at	   least	   in	   so	   far	   as	   they	   could	  refuse	  to	  participate.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  52	  My	  experience	  of	  a	  teacher	  of	  bioscience	  to	  both	  pre	  and	  post	  registration	  nurses	  supports	  this.	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There	   is	   no	   literature	   that	   evaluates	   what	   non-­‐nurses	   think	   about	   nurses	  conscientiously	  objecting	  to	  carrying	  out	  doctors’	  orders	  under	  these	  conditions.	  Such	  research	  ought	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  and	  may	  bring	  new	  light	  to	  this	  debate.	  For	  now	  though,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  nurses,	  like	  any	  other	  professional,	  are	  expected	  to	   provide	   a	   defined	   service	   to	   others.	   Although	   nurses	   often	   disagree	   with	  doctors,	  and	  conversations	  and	  alterations	  in	  treatment	  often	  result	  from	  this,	  it	  is	  doubtful	   that	   society	  at	   large	  would	  concede	   that	  nurses	  ought	   to	  be	  able	   to	  conscientiously	   object	   to	   medical	   orders,	   specifically	   because	   society	   by	  consensus	  has	  given	  responsibility	  for	  medical	  treatment	  to	  doctors.	  Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  outsiders	  do	  not	  tend	  to	  see	  any	  ethical	  conundrum	  for	  the	  nurse	  who	  follows	  doctors’	  orders	  demonstrates	  that	  this	  view	  is	  prevalent.53	  The	  nurse	  is	  not	   recognised	   as	   a	   healer	   in	   the	   way	   that	   the	   doctor	   is.54	   She	   is	   rather,	   a	  supporter	   of	   the	   doctor	   and	   responsible	   for	   provision	   of	   nursing	   care	   to	   the	  patient,	   independently	  of	  and	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  medical	  care	  she	  receives	  orders	   to	  deliver.	  Such	  a	  view	  runs	   in	  direct	  contradiction	  to	  nursing	   literature	  that	  presents	  the	  nurse	  as	  an	  autonomous	  practitioner	  (Holden	  1991,	  Gagnon	  et	  al.,	   2010,	   Skår,	   R	   2010).55	   In	   so	   far	   as	   medical	   treatments	   go,	   other	   than	   her	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  that	  her	  part	  in	  that	  treatment	  is	  competently	  executed,	  she	   is	   not	   autonomous	   with	   regard	   to	   choosing	   what	   that	   treatment	   will	   be.	  Indeed	   this	   lack	   of	   autonomy	   is	   highlighted	   when	   one	   considers	   the	   mass	   of	  nursing	   literature	   on	   her	   role	   as	   advocate.	   This	   and	   further	   exploration	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  53	  See	  prologue.	  54	  Where	  nurses	  do	  present	  themselves	  as	  healers	  this	  tends	  to	  be	  in	  the	  spiritual	  sense	  rather	  than	  curative.	  (Koerner	  2011,	  Niven	  2008)	  55	  Indeed	  these	  papers	  tend	  to	  confuse	  responsibility	  with	  autonomy:	  the	  nurse	  can	  be	  responsible	  and	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  be	  autonomous.	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nurse’s	  duty	  of	  care	  versus	  her	  right	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  in	  chapter	  six.	  	  	  Conclusion	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	  have	  argued	   that	  nurses	  have	  an	  erroneous	  conscience	  and	   in	  the	  case	  of	   conscientiously	  objecting	   to	  aggressive	  medical	   treatment	   they	   face	  three	  objections	  to	  the	  right	  to	  conscientious	  objection.	  Firstly,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  expert	  medical	  knowledge	  and	  therefore	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  misinformed	  of	  the	  facts.	   Secondly	   they	   are	   in	   close	   proximity	   to	   the	   patient	   and	   tend	   to	   have	   an	  immediate	  and	  particular	  response	  to	  a	  single	  case	  that	  means	  that	  they	  can	  fail	  to	  have	  the	  consequentialist	  perspective	  and	  ethical	  reasoning	  that	  justifies	  such	  care.	   Thirdly	   they	   are	   psychologically	   primed	   to	   judge	   doctors’	   actions	   under	  such	  circumstances	  harshly,	  and	  even	  when	  faced	  with	  good	  outcomes,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  overlook	  the	  original	  benign	  intention	  that	  drives	  many	  doctors’	  work.	  	  Fourthly,	   the	   nurse	   is	   obliged	   to	   follow	   contractual	   and	   public	   consensus	  with	  regard	   to	   her	   responsibilities,	   and	   these	   do	   not	   extend	   to	  making	   autonomous	  decisions	  about	  treatment,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  doctors	  do.	  	  It	   seems	   that	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	   clinical	   arena	   is	   not	   supportable.	  However,	  again	   it	  seems	  pertinent	  to	  observe,	   that	   those	  nurses	  who	  choose	  to	  leave	   the	   profession	   or	   specialty	   due	   to	   their	   disagreement	   with	   aggressive	  medical	   care,	  may	  well	  express	   their	   conscience,	  as	  erroneous	  as	   it	  may	  or	  not	  be,	  in	  a	  supportable	  way	  because	  they	  do	  not	  impose	  their	  views	  on	  the	  patients	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they	   care	   for,	  nor	  do	   they	  oppose	   the	  general	   consensus	  under	  which	   they	  are	  obliged	  to	  work.	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Chapter	  Five:	  Medical	  legislation	  for	  conscientious	  objection.	  	  Introduction	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   a	   review	   of	   health	   care	   law	   and	   conscience	  will	   be	  made.	   Two	  major	  questions	  will	  be	  addressed.	  The	   first	   is	   to	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	   ‘futile’	  care	  is	  deemed	  an	  act	  that	  is	  grave	  enough	  to	  deserve	  legal	  protection	  for	  nurses	  to	   conscientiously	   object	   to	   ‘futile’	   orders.	   Secondly,	   the	   legal	   stance	   on	   the	  relationship	   between	   nursing	   and	  medicine	   will	   be	   considered.	   An	   underlying	  assumption	   is	   that	   law	   is	   an	   important	   source	   from	   which	   to	   find	   guidance,	  because	   it	  provides	   societal	   consensus;	   consensus	  having	  been	   identified	  as	  an	  important	  source	  for	  identifying	  moral	  truth.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen,	  the	  law	  does	  not	  offer	  support	  for	  Catlin’s	  position.	  	  Legal	  sources	  will	  be	  taken	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree,	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  is	  little	  direct	  legal	  evidence	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cases	  for	  nursing	  in	  the	  UK.56	  Although	  US	  law	  serves	  to	  supplement	  the	  relatively	  few	  cases	  that	  specifically	   address	   conscience	   and	   the	   relationship	   of	   nursing	   to	   medicine,	   it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  differences	  between	  American	  and	  UK	  law	  in	  relation	  to	  conscience	   are	   significant	   and	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis,	   and	   therefore	  comparison	  between	  the	  two	  is	  necessarily	  limited.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  given	  to	  nursing	  in	  UK	  law,	  it	   is	  essential	  to	  seek	  some	  guidance	  from	  US	   law,	   to	   gain	   some	   impression	   of	   how	   UK	   law	  might	   view	   nurses	   and	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  56	  This	  has	  resulted	  from	  searches	  in	  Lexis	  and	  Westlaw	  and	  MEDLINE	  and	  CINAHL.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  I	  discussed	  this	  issue	  with	  my	  colleague	  Manian	  (2011)	  a	  Senior	  Lecturer	  who	  specialises	  in	  nursing	  and	  medical	  law.	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desire	   to	   conscientiously	   object	   to	   doctors’	   ‘futile’	   orders.	   Given	   the	   greater	  autonomy	  of	  nursing	  in	  the	  US,	  it	  has	  been	  surmised	  that	  any	  American	  cases	  on	  this	   issue	  will	   tend	   to,	   if	   anything,	   reflect	   this	   autonomy	   or	   in	   other	  words	   be	  more	   liberal	   than	   the	   UK.	   It	   should	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   are	   no	   cases	   that	  address	   nurses	   who	   have	   conscientiously	   objected	   to	   doctors’	   orders.	   Indeed	  nurses	  do	  not	  feature	  very	  highly	  in	  medical	  law	  and	  the	  cases	  brought	  to	  court.	  However,	  some	  cases	  will	  be	  presented	  that	  highlight	  the	  relationship	  of	  nursing	  to	   medicine;	   a	   key	   issue	   in	   whether	   or	   not	   nurses	   ought	   to	   be	   able	   to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  doctor’s	  orders.	  Finally,	  military	  law	  will	  be	  briefly	  re-­‐examined,	  and	  again,	  support	  will	  not	  be	  found	  for	  Catlin’s	  position.	  	  Legal	  support	  for	  conscientious	  objection	  	  That	  the	  sense	  of	  good	  conscience	  is	  a	  value	  worthy	  of	  preservation	  was	  founded	  as	  a	  principle,	  in	  1948,	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  [1948]	  It	  states	  that:	  	   ‘Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  thought,	  conscience	  and	  religion;	   this	   right	   includes	   freedom	   to	   change	   his	   religion	   or	  belief…..in	  public	  or	  private,	  to	  manifest	  his	  religion	  or	  belief	  in	  teaching,	  practice,	  worship	  and	  observance.	  (Article	  18)	  	  This	   definition	   of	   conscience	   as	   a	   freedom	   of	   thought,	   religion	   and	   belief,	   was	  further	   developed	   by	   the	  European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   [1950-­‐1966]	  where	  this	  is	  included.	  However,	  limitations	  to	  this	  right	  are	  specified:	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   ‘Freedom	   to	  manifest	  one's	   religion	  or	  beliefs	   shall	   be	   subject	  only	   to	   such	   limitations	   as	   are	   prescribed	   by	   law	   and	   are	  necessary	   in	   a	   democratic	   society	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   public	  safety,	   for	   the	  protection	  of	  public	   order,	   health	  or	  morals,	   or	  the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   and	   freedoms	   of	   others.’	   (Article	  9,2)	  	  As	   can	   be	   seen,	   this	   article	   reflects	   the	   basis	   for	   much	   of	   the	   debate	   about	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  medical	  practice,	  where	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  professional	  to	   maintain	   a	   sense	   of	   good	   conscience	   are	   pitched	   against	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  patient	  to	  access	  controversial	  treatments	  such	  as	  abortion,57	  or	  indeed	  generally	  uncontroversial	   treatments	   such	   as	   blood	   transfusion58.	   In	   2000	   The	   Human	  
Rights	  Act	  [1998]	  incorporated	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  in	  article	  9(1)	  the	  right	  to	  express	  freedom	  of	  thought,	  conscience	  and	  religion	  was	  legally	  embedded	  in	  English	  law.	  	  	  So	   far,	   it	   seems	   that	   conscientious	   objection	   to	   aggressive	   medical	   treatment	  might	   be	   supported.	  After	   all	   freedom	  of	   conscience	   is	   a	   qualified	   right	   in	   law.	  However,	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Act	   has	   arisen	   from	   a	   long	   road	   of	   international	  collaboration,	   and	   although	   there	   is	   clear	   support	   for	   the	   expression	   of	   one’s	  conscience,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  contextualise	  this.	  Consideration	  for	  and	  protection	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  57	  See	  for	  example,	  the	  winning	  essay	  for	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  by	  April	  (2009)	  where	  competing	  rights	  and	  potential	  for	  harm	  to	  patients	  is	  well	  presented	  and	  argued.	  58	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  GMC	  document	  ‘Personal	  beliefs	  and	  medical	  practice:	  guidance	  for	  doctors.’	  (2008)	  
	   124	  
of	  human	  rights	  has	  arisen	  from	  gross	  acts	  that	  have	  violated	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  human	  person,	  such	  as	  torture,	  holding	  innocent	  people	  in	  police	  custody,	  acts	  of	  violence	   against	   women	   and	   unjustifiable	   killing.	   Such	   acts	   have	   been	  perpetrated	   by	   governments	   (or	   similar)	   (Clark,	   2001).	   Although	   nurses	   and	  doctors	   are	   exposed	   to	   situations	   that	   can	   be	   extremely	   distressing	   and	  sometimes	   traumatic	   to	  observe,	   (Aase	  et	   al.,	   2008)	  under	   legal	   circumstances,	  they	  are	  not	  ordinarily	  the	  equivalent	  to	  these	  kinds	  of	  acts	  of	  intentional	  harm	  that	   have	   originally	   given	   rise	   to	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Act.	   However,	   since	   its	  inception	  the	  act	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  in	  circumstances	  that	  might	  be	  identified	  as	  fairly	   mundane59	   and	   has	   certainly	   offered	   guidance	   for	   medical	   care	   under	  difficult	  circumstances.	  	  The	  law	  	  In	  chapter	  four	  I	  argued	  that	  conscience	  is	  a	  fourfold	  object	  and	  that	  the	  act	  that	  is	   associated	   with	   it	   is	   the	   most	   important	   feature.	   Medical	   law	   supports	   this	  position,	   because	   conscientious	   objection	   is	   only	   legally	   described	   in	  medicine	  for	   acts	   that	   involve	   killing	   or	   the	  manipulation	   of	   a	   human	   life	   in	   an	   artificial	  environment	  in	  the	  form	  of	  in	  vitro	  Fertilisation.60	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  59	  See	  for	  example	  R	  (Begum)	  v	  Head	  teacher	  and	  Governors	  of	  Denbigh	  High	  
School.	  [2006]	  where	  the	  right	  to	  wear	  religiously	  inspired	  dress	  at	  school	  was	  brought	  for	  defence.	  60	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  process	  also	  requires	  killing	  of	  human	  life.	  Although	  at	  the	  cellular	  stage,	  this	  is	  deemed	  an	  atrocious	  act	  by	  some,	  and	  law	  severely	  restricts	  the	  age	  limit	  at	  which	  manipulation	  of	  embryos	  can	  be	  continued	  until,	  because	  of	  the	  ethical	  gravity	  associated	  with	  such	  work.	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In	   the	   UK	   HCPs	   are	   given	   the	   right	   to	   conscientiously	   object	   to	   direct	  involvement	   in	   therapeutic	   abortion	   (Abortion	   Act	   [1967]	   and	   Human	  
Fertilisation	   and	   Embryology	   Act	   [1990]).	   The	   Abortion	   Act	   states	   that	   health	  practitioners	  are	  not	  under	  any	   legal	  or	  contractual	  obligation	   to	  participate	   in	  abortions	  if	  they	  have	  a	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  doing	  so,	  although	  in	  any	  legal	  case,	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   lies	   with	   the	   professional	   who	   has	   to	   prove	   that	   a	  conscientious	  objection	  exists	  (s.1(4)). 
 It	   seems	   perhaps,	   that	   medical	   law	   might	   provide	   a	   basis	   from	   which	   nurses	  could	   claim	   the	   right	   to	   conscientious	   objection	   to	   doctors’	   orders,	   given	   that	  conscience	   is	   respected	   in	  medical	   law.	   	  However,	   it	   should	  also	  be	  noted,	   that	  the	   right	   to	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   abortion	   is	  more	   restricted	   than	   it	   first	  might	   seem.	   The	   right	   is	   removed	   if	   the	   mother’s	   life	   is	   endangered.	  Furthermore,	   although	  not	   generally	   acknowledged	   in	   debates	   or	   literature	   on	  this	  issue,	  it’s	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  this	  caveat	  is	  extended	  beyond	  saving	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mother	  to	  also	  saving	  her	  from	  grave	  physical	  or	  mental	  harm	  (s.4(2)	  ).	  This	   extends	   the	   duty	   of	   the	   health	   care	   practitioner	   beyond	   being	   obliged	   to	  save	   a	   life.	   	   This	  means	   that	   the	   law	   tends	   to	   restrict	   rather	   than	   promote	   or	  support	   conscientious	   objection	   presumably	   because	   the	   duties	   of	   the	   HCP	  outweigh	  personal	  interest.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  some	  examination	  of	  conscience	  and	  the	  law	  outside	  of	  medical	  law	  to	  support	   this	   position,	   because	   it	   demonstrates	   that	   even	   when	   negative	  consequences	   are	   associated	   with	   placing	   restriction	   on	   the	   expression	   of	  conscience,	   that	   restriction	   will	   tend	   to	   be	   exercised;	   that	   is	   article	   9(1)	   is	   a	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qualified	   right	   and	   can	   be	   infringed	   when	   ‘necessary	   and	   proportionate’.	   For	  example,	   in	   the	  Leeds	  based	  Catholic	  Adoption	  Agency	  wanted	  exemption	   from	  the	   The	   Equality	   Act	   (Sexual	   Orientation)	   Regulations	   [2007]	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  religious	   belief	   associated	   with	   homosexuality,	   and	   was	   prohibited	   from	  excluding	  same	  sex	  couples	  from	  the	  adoption	  process.	  Here	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  conscientious	   refusal	   was	   disallowed	   because	   of	   the	   legal	   position	   on	  discrimination	   against	   homosexuals	   (and	   the	   infringement	   of	   their	   rights)	  associated	   with	   such	   an	   act	   (Butt,	   2011).	   Clearly,	   this	   decision	   could	   have	  associated	  with	  it	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  fewer	  adoptions.	  	  Similar	   to	   this	   case,	   but	   in	   this	   instance	   under	   health	   care	   law,	   in	  North	   Coast	  
Womens’	  Care	  Medical	  Group	  v	  Sandiego	  County	  Superior	  Court	  [2008],	  doctors	  in	  the	   US	   refused	   to	   artificially	   inseminate	   female	   couples	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	  religious	  belief	  that	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  life	  under	  this	  condition	  was	   wrong.	   Here	   the	   court	   found	   that	   doctors	   were	   not	   entitled	   to	   claim	  conscientious	  objection	  because	  to	  do	  so,	  was	  to	  harm	  by	  discrimination.61	  	  Despite	   this	  restriction	   it	  could	  perhaps	  be	  argued	  that	   the	  nurse	  might	  have	  a	  right	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  doctors’	  ‘futile’	  orders	  because	  she	  has	  a	  causal	  responsibility	  for	  treatment	  outcomes.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  direct	  involvement	  is	  defined,	  was	  at	   least	  partially	  demarcated	  in	  the	  Janaway	  vs.	  Salford	  HA	  [1989],	  where	  a	  Roman	  Catholic	  secretary	  in	  good	  conscience	  refused	  to	  write	  a	  letter	  of	  referral	  for	  patients	  intending	  to	  have	  an	  abortion.	  She	  was	  dismissed	  from	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  61	  Janaway	  vs.	  Salford	  HA	  [1989]	  is	  another	  example	  of	  the	  restriction	  of	  the	  right	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  in	  professional	  life.	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post	  and	  was	  not	  able	   to	  defend	  her	  position	   in	   law,	  because	   the	  act	  of	  writing	  the	   letter	   was	   seen	   as	   an	   ancillary	   act	   that	   was	   not	   protected	   by	   s	   4.	   In	   this	  instance	   the	   secretary’s	   actions	  were	   found	   to	   be	   too	   remote	   from	   the	   patient	  and	   the	   act	   of	   abortion	   to	   justify	   her	   conscientious	   objection.	   This	   does	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  nurse	  is	  proximal	  to	  the	  patient	  and	  therefore	  any	  acts	  she	  is	  involved	  with	  are	  by	  law,	  acts	  for	  which	  she	  has	  responsibility.	  However,	  this	  does	   not	   equate	   with	   causal	   responsibility,	   or	   to	   put	   it	   differently,	   the	  responsibility	   that	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	   nurse	   in	   law	   is	   not	   equal	   to	   that	   of	   the	  responsibility	   of	   the	   doctor:	   the	   doctor	   carries	   causal	   responsibility	   and	   the	  nurse	  carries	  responsibility	  to	  carry	  out	  legal	  orders	  competently.	  	  	  	  So	   far	   then,	   the	   support	   for	   Catlin’s	   position	   appears	   to	   be	   weak,	   except	   that	  nurses	  do	  have	  causal	  responsibility	   for	   the	  results	  of	   their	  actions.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen	   though,	   this	  becomes	  even	  weaker	  when	  examination	   is	  made	  of	  how	   the	  law	  identifies	  the	  duties	  and	  obligations	  of	  the	  nurse	  and	  her	  responsibilities	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  doctor.	  	  Medical	  law	  and	  futility	  	  Recourse	   to	  human	   rights	   and	   the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	   [1998]	  has	  been	  made	   in	  medical	   law	   and	   the	   determination	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   treatment	   is	   futile,	   for	  example,	  in	  R	  v	  General	  Medical	  Council	  [2004],	  a	  case	  brought	  by	  a	  man	  suffering	  a	   degenerative	   neurological	   condition	   that	   would	   eventually	   lead	   to	   loss	   of	  physical	   capacity	   to	   eat,	   drink	   and	   breathe	   independently.	   This	   case	   originally	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determined	  that	  patients	  could	  require	  reasonable	  treatment,	  even	  if	  the	  doctor	  disagreed	  with	  it	  and	  in	  this	  case,	   it	  would	  be	  because	  the	  doctor	  identified	  the	  treatment	  to	  be	  futile.	  It	  was	  conceded	  that	  medical	  treatment	  could	  constitute	  a	  ‘degrading’	  act,	  as	  is	  specified	  in	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  [2010]	  and	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  was	  deemed	  that	  medical	  treatment	  could	  be	  considered	  degrading,	  if	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  were	  removed	   from	  a	  conscious	  patient	  who	  did	  not	  wish	   for	   this	   to	  occur	   (s.7)	   This	   case	  was	   later	   overruled	   in	   the	   court	   of	   appeal	   in	  R	   v	   General	  
Medical	   Council	   [2005]	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	  would	  not	  be	  removed	  under	  the	  conditions	  originally	  brought	  by	  R.62	  	  The	  court	  of	   appeal	   redressed	   the	   balance	   with	   regard	   to	   patient	   and	   doctor	   autonomy;	  that	  is	  that	  doctors	  are	  required	  to	  respect	  a	  patient’s	  wishes	  for	  treatment,	  but	  that	   they	  are	  not	  obliged	   to	  give	   treatment	  under	  conditions	   that	  have	  become	  unequivocally	   futile.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   initial	   finding	   that	   medical	   treatment	  could	  be	  degrading	  is	  still	  of	  significance	  for	  this	  thesis	  because	  it	  indicates	  that	  nurses	  might	  identify	  degrading	  treatments	  in	  conditions	  of	  moral	  distress.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Airedale	  NHS	  Trust	  v	  Bland	  [1993]	  case	  also	  accesed	  the	  concept	  of	   human	   rights,	   where	   it	   was	   acknowledged	   that	   intensive	   treatment	   that	  prolonged	   life	   could	   be	   intrusive	   of	   privacy	   and	   human	   dignity.	   In	   this	   case	  Bland,	  a	  young	  patient	  in	  continuous	  vegetative	  state	  and	  on	  naso-­‐gastric	  feeding	  was	  eventually	  allowed	   to	  die	  after	  withdrawal	  of	   that	   feeding.	   Interestingly	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  62	  That	  is	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  patient	  that	  doctors	  could	  decide	  to	  withdraw	  artificial	  hydration	  and	  nutrition	  under	  conditions	  where	  the	  patient	  was	  not	  yet	  facing	  imminent	  death	  and	  where	  the	  patient	  wished	  to	  continue	  this	  life	  preserving	  treatment.	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this	  case	  degradation	  was	  not	  specified;	  perhaps	  ‘degradation’	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  taking	  of	  life,	  rather	  than	  its	  preservation.63	  	  	  A	  recent	  case	  W	  v	  M	  [2011]	  is	  also	  worth	  mentioning,	  because	  the	  preservation	  of	   life	   and	   artificial	   feeding	   and	   hydration	   was	   considered	   appropriate	   for	   a	  patient	   in	   persistent	   minimally	   conscious	   state,	   again	   taking	   lead	   from	   the	  
Human	  Rights	  Act.	  Such	  cases	  as	  these,	  and	  the	  fact	   that	  courts	  are	  called	  on	  to	  make	  difficult	  decisions	  in	  end	  of	  life	  care,	  reflect	  the	  difficulties	  that	  nurses	  face	  in	  their	  practice.	  	  
Airedale	  NHS	   Trust	   v	   Bland	   and	  W	  v	  M	   are	   important	   cases	   because	   they	   both	  illustrate	   the	   certainty	   that	   has	   to	   be	   associated	  with	   the	  most	   difficult	   ‘futile’	  medical	  cases	  that	  come	  to	  court.	  Medical	  treatment	  can	  be	  withdrawn	  when	  it	  is	  known	   to	  be	   futile	   as	   in	  Airedale	  Trust	   v	  Bland,	   but	  where	   there	   is	   any	  kind	  of	  hope,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	  W	   v	   M,	   this	   was	   hope	   of	   a	   very	   limited	   life,	   medical	  treatment	   is	   continued.	   Some	   support	   for	  my	   position	   is	   given	   by	   these	   cases	  because	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   law	  will	   err	   on	   the	   side	   of	   caution	  when	   identifying	  futility,	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  life	  is	  its	  first	  objective.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  nurse	  who	  wants	  to	  object	  to	  ‘futile’	  treatment	  of	  a	  patient	  who	  just	  might	  survive	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  supportable	  in	  law.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen,	  once	  the	  status	  of	  nurses	  in	  relation	   to	   medicine	   is	   examined,	   then	   there	   is	   little	   question	   of	   the	   societal	  consensus	  on	  Catlin’s	  position	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  63	  This	  might	  also	  simply	  reflect	  that	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  was	  not	  yet	  part	  of	  law.	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Medical	  law	  and	  the	  nurse	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   four,	   nurses	   have	   seen	   them	   selves	   as	   having	   been	   an	  oppressed	   group	   of	   women,	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   doctors	   who	   were	   largely	  men.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  oppression	  is	  detrimental	  to	  the	  nurse,	  but	  also	  that	   the	   nurse	   is	   a	   voice	   for	   the	   patient	   who	   is	   being	   harmed	   by	   medical	  treatment.	  	  	  	  There	   is	   no	  doubt	   that	   the	  nurse	  might	   be	   faced	  with	   a	   situation	  where	   she	   is	  required	   to	   protect	   the	   patient	   from	   professionally	   and	   legally	   recognisable	  harm,	   and	   indeed	   as	   shall	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   on	   professional	   codes,	  there	  is	  an	  obligation	  for	  nurses	  to	  act	  to	  protect	  patients,	  and	  themselves	  from	  abuse.	   64	   (NMC	   2011)	   However,	   important	   in	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	  conscientious	   objection	  ought	   to	  be	   supported	   for	  nurses	  who	  object	   to	   ‘futile’	  orders	  is	  examination	  of	  where	  the	  nurse	  stands	  in	  relation	  to	  medicine.	  Nurses	  are	  educated	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  autonomous	  practitioners,	  (Wade	  1999)	  but	  in	  law,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  nurse’s	  professional	  role	  is	  limited	  and	  is	  largely	  defined	  by	   her	   relationship	   to	   medicine.	   Such	   limits	   and	   definition,	   as	   shall	   be	   seen,	  serves	   to	   support	   the	   position	   that	   for	   the	   nurse	   to	   conscientiously	   object	   to	  medical	  orders	   is	  not	  supportable	   in	   law	  unless	  those	  orders	  are	   illegal.	  This	   is	  for	   two	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   as	   has	   already	   been	   shown,	   where	   doctors	   decide	   to	  withdraw	   treatment,	   they	   do	   so	   under	   conditions	   of	   certainty,	   or	   at	   least	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  64	  An	  example	  of	  such	  an	  action	  is	  described	  by	  Carmon	  and	  Tabak	  (1997)	  who	  wrote	  a	  paper	  in	  protest	  at	  immoral	  practices	  in	  Isreali	  medical	  practice,	  where	  patients	  were	  being	  allocated	  treatment	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  bribes	  and	  other	  fraudulent	  behaviours.	  Whistle	  blowers	  can	  also	  fall	  into	  this	  category	  (Alford,	  2001).	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certainty	   of	   a	   body	   of	   medical	   professionals,	   that	   the	   treatment	   is	   agreed	   by	  consensus	   to	  be	   futile,	  a	  circumstance	   that	  does	  not	  arise	   in	   instances	  of	  moral	  distress.	  Secondly,	  the	  nurse	  is	  not	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  professional	  with	  medical	  expertise	  equivalent	  to	  a	  doctor	  	  	  This	  demarcation	  between	  responsibility	  and	  authority	   is	  demonstrated	  by	   the	  
Royal	  College	  of	  Nursing	  of	  UK	  v	  DHSS	  [1981]	  where	  the	  Royal	  College	  of	  Nursing	  (RCN)	  declared	  that	  a	  circular	  that	  was	  sent	  out	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Social	   Security	   and	   that	   authorised	   nurses	   to	   administer	   prostaglandins	   to	  induce	   abortions	   was	   unlawful,	   because	   abortions	   could	   only	   be	   legally	  performed	   by	   doctors.	   The	  House	   of	   Lords	   held	   that	   so	   long	   as	   the	   nurse	  was	  acting	   on	   doctors’	   orders,	   then	   the	   nurse	   could	   carry	   out	   the	   prostaglandin	  administration.	   Here	   then,	   it	   becomes	   clear,	   that	   when	   acting	   on	   another’s	  orders,	   the	   line	   between	   what	   one	   might	   feel	   personally	   and	   professionally	  responsible	   for	   and	   what	   one	   is	   judged	   to	   be	   responsible	   for	   is	   open	   to	  disagreement.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  law	  is	  concerned,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  nurse	  is	  to	  carry	   out	   the	   procedure	   competently,	   but	   the	   responsibility	   and	   authority	   to	  decide	   to	   perform	   the	   act	   and	   the	   causal	   nature	   of	   the	   act,	   lies	   with	   another	  professional:	   the	   doctor.	   Where	   the	   nurse	   delivers	   drugs	   and	   treatment	   then,	  although	  she	  has	  responsibility	  and	  a	  causal	  relationship	  to	  events	  that	  occur;	  to	  the	   observer,	   she	   does	   not	   act	   with	   authority	   or	   ‘total	   responsibility’	   for	   that	  action.	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  perhaps	  reflects	  the	  military	  associations	  that	  Catlin	  made.	  The	  soldier	  carries	  out	  acts	  under	  the	  authority	  and	  direction	  of	  a	  senior	  officer	  or	  government.	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This	  view	  is	  supported	  when	  one	  examines	  other	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  directly	  relate	  to	  conscientious	  objection.	  Firstly,	  the	  nurse	  does	  have	  authority	  as	  an	  advocate	  who	   is	   responsible	   for	   monitoring	   and	   detecting	   changes	   in	   a	   patient	   that	  indicate	  that	  a	  doctor’s	  presence	   is	  necessary.	  This	   is	  seen	   in	  Bolitho	  v	  City	  and	  
Hackney	   Health	   Authority	   [1997]	  where	   the	   doctor	   in	   charge	   of	   a	   young	   boy’s	  medical	  care	   failed	   to	  attend	  the	  patient	  after	  receiving	   two	  phone	  calls	   from	  a	  senior	  nurse,	  who	  reported	  significant	   cardio-­‐respiratory	  events.	  The	   failure	  of	  the	  doctor	  to	  attend	  the	  patient	  was	  found	  to	  be	  negligent	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  medical	   information	   communicated	   by	   the	   nurse	   during	   two	   telephone	   calls,	  ought	  to	  have	  alerted	  the	  doctor	  to	  the	  necessity	  that	  she	  attend	  the	  patient.	  This	  case	  establishes	   the	   important	   role	  of	   the	  nurse	   in	  medical	   care.	  However,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	   the	  nurse’s	  medical	   opinion	  was	  not	   sought	   and	  whether	   or	  not	   the	  nurse	   required	   the	  doctor’s	  attendance	  does	  not	   seem	  to	  have	  been	  an	  issue.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   nurse	   demonstrated	   competence	   in	   making	   the	  decision	   to	   bypass	   the	   house	   officer	   and	   to	   phone	   the	   senior	   doctor,	   as	   she	  decided	   to	   do	  when	   the	   patient’s	   condition	   deteriorated.	   But	   she	   did	   not	   have	  authority	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   law,	   to	   require	   the	   doctor	   to	   attend	   the	   patient.	  Whether	   or	   not	   she	   asked	   the	   doctor	   to	   attend	  was	   not	   discussed	   in	   the	   case	  proceedings,	  and	   indeed	  the	  medical	  decision	  about	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  patient	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  intubated,	  did	  not	  include	  the	  clinical	  judgement	  of	  the	  nurse,	  but	  rather	  medical	  practitioners.	  	  This	   tendency	   to	   overlook	   the	   nurse,	   or	   perhaps	   to	   state	   more	   correctly,	   to	  identify	   the	   nurse	   as	   working	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   doctor,	   is	   further	  supported	  when	  one	  examines	  the	  case	  of	  Airedale	  NHS	  Trust	  v	  Bland	  [1993]	  In	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this	  case,	  a	  young	  man,	  Tony	  Bland,	  was	  alive	  and	  under	  intensive	  nursing	  care	  and	  medical	   treatment	   but	  was	   suffering	   from	   persistent	   vegetative	   state.	   The	  case	  centred	  on	  the	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  withdraw	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration,	   and	  much	  of	   the	   judges’	   exploration	   centred	  on	  whether	  or	  not	   this	  was	  a	  medical	  treatment	  or	  provision	  of	  basic	  care.	  The	  judges	  were	  sympathetic	  to	   the	   position	   of	   nurses	   in	   the	   case,	   and	   indeed	   nurses	   were	   included	   as	  witnesses.	   However,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   distinguish	   what	   they	   contributed	   to	   the	  final	  decision,	  because	  only	  doctors	  and	  medical	  opinion	  was	  referred	  to	   in	  the	  presentation	  by	  each	  judge.	  Indeed,	  the	  judges	  persistently	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  no	   distinction	   between	   medical	   and	   nursing	   care.	   That	   is,	   nursing	   care	   was	  identified	  as	  a	  part	  of	  medical	   care.65	  Furthermore	   the	  weight	  of	   responsibility	  for	   the	  decision	  was	   firmly	  placed	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  medical	  profession,	  with	  support	   from	   the	   legal	  profession.	   Lord	  Hoffman,	   in	  his	   statement,	   argued	   that	  the	  hospital	  and	  doctors	  are	  responsible	  for	  medical	  and	  nursing	  care	  of	  patients.	  Lord	   Mustill	   in	   his	   summing	   up	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   he	   appreciated	   that	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  artificial	   feeding	  was	  very	  difficult	   for	  nurses,	  but	   that	  he	  hoped	  that	  they	  would	  understand	  that	  the	  decision	  had	  been	  made	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  patient.	  Again,	  this	  statement	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  nurse	  is	  not	  considered	  party	   to	  medical	   decision-­‐making,	   even	   though	   her	   opinion	   and	   perspective	   is	  considered,	  it	  is	  not	  considered	  as	  a	  voice	  of	  authority	  in	  medical	  cases.	  	  	  Goodman	  (2004)	  came	  to	  a	  similar	  conclusion	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  of	  Ms	  B,	  a	  patient	  who	   requested	  withdrawal	   of	   ventilation	   after	   a	   spinal	   haemorrhage,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  65	  This	  contradicts	  the	  position	  that	  nursing	  is	  distinct	  from	  medicine	  and	  that	  it	  is	  autonomous.	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noting	  that	  the	  perspective	  of	  nurses	  in	  the	  medical	  decision-­‐making	  was	  absent,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  reported.	  	  	  It	   is	   difficult	   to	   find	  medical	   cases	   in	   the	   UK	   that	   specifically	   address	   nursing	  negligence.66	   67	  Most	   cases	   and	   literature	   that	   exist	   are	   found	   in	   the	  US.68	  This	  might	  reflect	  the	  litigious	  nature	  of	  US	  society	  where	  nursing	  negligence	  leading	  to	  outcomes	  such	  as	  pressure	  ulcers	  are	  more	  commonly	  brought	   to	  court	  and	  damages	  sought	  whereas	  in	  England,	  people	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  take	  such	  cases	  to	  court.	  Harris	  (2011)	  might	  support	  this	  claim,	  as	  he	  found	  that	  the	  number	  of	  legal	   claims	   for	   negligence	   brought	   against	   nursing	   homes	   in	   the	   US	   did	   not	  correlate	  with	   the	   level	  of	  care	  provided;	   that	   is	   those	   that	  provided	  good	  care	  were	  sued	   just	  as	   frequently	  as	   those	  with	   low	   level	  care.	   It	  might	   though,	  also	  result	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   cases	   of	   nursing	   negligence	   are	   less	   controversial	  because	   the	   issues	   such	   as	   negligent	   practice	   and	   causation	   are	   less	   open	   to	  debate,	  and	  therefore	  more	  readily	  settled	  outside	  of	  court.	  	  	  A	  case	  from	  the	  US	  further	  supports	  this	  position	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  again,	  the	   position	   of	   nurses	   in	   relation	   to	   doctors.	   In	   Broehm	   v	   Rochester	   [2005]	   a	  patient	   brought	   to	   court	   a	   case	   of	   negligence	   after	   she	   had	   a	   complicated	  recovery	   from	   tracheal	   surgery.	   The	   surgeon	   in	   question	   had	   a	   method	   of	  restraining	  patients	  post	  surgery	  that	   led	  to	  the	  patient	  having	  a	  wound	  on	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  66	  More	  cases	  can	  be	  found	  for	  midwifery	  negligence	  such	  as	  Marjory	  Campbell	  
(A.P.)	  v	  Borders	  Health	  Board	  [2011]	  67	  Miola	  (2009)	  makes	  a	  review	  of	  cases	  relevant	  to	  nursing	  negligence,	  but	  again	  few	  cases	  specifically	  deal	  with	  nurses.	  68	  See	  for	  example	  Pohlman	  (1989),	  Eisenberg	  (2010),	  Meehan	  et	  al.	  (2002),	  Lee	  (2000)	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forehead	   that	   did	   not	   heal	   properly	   and	   left	   scarring.	   The	   case	   was	   initially	  dismissed	   because	   the	   expert	   witness	   brought	   by	   the	   plaintiff	   was	   a	   nurse	  practitioner:	   the	   court	   held	   that	   a	   nurse	   cannot	   provide	   expert	   witness	   for	  medical	  practice.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  doctor	  over	  the	  nurse,	  even	  in	  relation	  to	  nursing	  care	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  Tammelleo	  (1994)	  	  who	  quotes	  the	  case	  of	  Crook	  v.	  Funk	  [1994]	  where	  a	  US	  court	  conceded	  that	  a	  doctor	  could	  act	  as	  expert	  witness	  in	  a	  case	  of	  nursing	  (not	  medical)	  negligence.	  	  	  All	   these	   examples	   support	   the	   argument,	   that	   even	   though	   the	   nurse	   is	  responsible	   for	   delivering	  medical	   care	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   doctor,	   and	  even	  though	  she	  is	  accountable	  for	  this	  practice,	  she	  is	  not	  considered	  qualified	  to	   make	   medical	   decisions,	   and	   of	   course,	   this	   includes	   the	   decision	   about	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  treatment	  is	  futile.	  It	  therefore	  is	  not	  supportable,	  from	  a	  legal	  perspective,	  for	  the	  nurse	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	   ‘futile’	  medical	  orders,	  so	  long	  as	   the	  medical	   orders	   are	   legal,	   because	   she	   is	   a	  nurse.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	   conscientious	   objection	   to	   a	   doctor’s	   orders	   for	   medical	   treatment	   is	  fundamentally	  a	  difference	  in	  medical	  opinion:	  the	  nurse	  believes	  the	  treatment	  to	  be	  futile	  and	  the	  doctor	  does	  not.	  	  Military	  law	  and	  illegal	  orders	  	  As	  has	  been	  highlighted,	  there	  is	  no	  case	  in	  UK	  law	  that	  addresses	  a	  nurse	  who	  refuses	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  doctors’	  orders	  and	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	  supportable	  that	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she	  could	  do	  this	  in	  relation	  to	   ‘futile’	  orders,	   it	   is	   likely	  that	  she	  would	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  following	  an	  illegal	  order.	  	  Military	   law	  offers	  some	  evidence	  for	  this	  position.	  Takemura	  (2006)	  describes	  how	  international	  law	  does	  not	  give	  protection	  for	  soldiers	  to	  commit	  atrocity	  or	  other	  illegal	  acts	  of	  war	  and	  to	  seek	  defence	  in	  superior	  orders.	  Soldiers	  who	  are	  under	   authority	   and	   are	   expected	   to	   follow	   orders,	   are	   not	   expected	   to	   be	  obedient	   to	   those	   orders	   under	   any	   circumstance.	   If	   those	   orders	   contravene	  international	   law,	   there	   is	   an	   expectation	   that	   the	   soldier	  will	   not	   follow	   those	  orders.	   Should	   he	   commit	   an	   illegal	   act,	   he	   is	   not	   guaranteed	   to	   be	   free	   from	  punishment	   because	   he	   is	   under	   higher	   authority.	   Indeed	   illegal	   acts	   such	   as	  genocide	   or	   apartheid	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   acts	   that	   ‘shock	   the	   conscience	   of	  mankind’	  (Takemura,	  2010,	  p.216).69	  	  This	  contradicts	  the	  perception	  of	  soldiers	  as	  being	  blindly	  obedient	  actors	  in	  a	  war.	   Catlin	   does	   not	   include	   this	   legal	   point	   in	   her	   analysis	   on	   conscientious	  objection	  and	   in	   so	  doing	  misses	   an	   important	  perspective:	  moral	  distress	   and	  medical	  orders	  that	  a	  nurse	  disagrees	  with	  are	  one	  thing,	  but	  moral	  outrage	  that	  results	  from	  illegal	  or	  professionally	  unacceptable	  behaviour	  is	  another.	  When	  a	  nurse	  observes	  a	  wrong-­‐doing,	   either	  because	   it	   contravenes	   law	  or	  because	   it	  contravenes	   societal	   and	   professional	   obligations,	   the	   conscientious	   objection	  clause	   for	   morally	   distressed	   nurses	   could	   lead	   to	   the	   nurse’s	   abdication	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  69	  Takemura	  also	  occasionally	  examines	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  law,	  for	  example	  in	  his	  discussion	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  soldiers	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  specific	  wars	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  being	  illegal	  in	  international	  law.	  Recent	  cases	  were	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	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responsibility.	   This	   is	   because	   conscientious	   objection	   might	   disassociate	   one	  from	   actual	   wrong-­‐doing,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   necessarily	   require	   a	   positive	   act	   to	  prevent	  actual	  harm.	  	  	  In	   support	   of	   this	   position,	   Hardingham	   (2004)	   describes	   an	   incident	   that	   she	  experienced	   as	   a	   junior	   nurse	   that	   she	   identified	   as	   moral	   distress.	   Whilst	  working	  in	  the	  emergency	  room	  she	  observed	  a	  difficult	  patient	  who	  was	  bound,	  gagged	  and	   laughed	  at	  by	   co-­‐workers,	  whilst	   they	  provided	   clinical	   care	   to	   the	  patient.	  In	  the	  paper	  she	  concentrates	  on	  the	  personal	  aspects	  of	  moral	  distress	  –	  the	   perception	   of	   wrong-­‐doing,	   the	   emotional	   response	   to	   it	   and	   her	   inaction	  because	  of	  her	  sense	  of	  constraint,	  due	  to	  her	  relatively	  junior	  position.	  She	  did	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  involvement	  with	  the	  act,	  by	  removing	  herself	  from	  the	  situation	  and	  observing	   from	  a	  distance.	  At	   the	   same	   time	  she	   felt	  badly	  about	  not	  doing	  more.	  As	  far	  as	  Catlin	  is	  concerned,	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  would	  be	  enough.	  However,	  because	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  wrong-­‐doing	  is	  not	  properly	  articulated	  in	  moral	   distress,	   there	   is	   no	   distinction	   made	   about	   wrongs	   that	   ought	   to	   be	  tolerated	  and	  wrongs	  that	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  tolerated.	  The	  nurse,	  like	  the	  soldier,	  needs	  to	  distinguish	  between	  moral	  distress	  where	  she	  faces	  difficult	  situations	  that	   are	   morally	   uncertain	   and	   where	   she	   faces	   a	   situation	   where	   wrong	   is	  undoubtedly	  occurring.	  Returning	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  act	  and	  its	  link	  with	  conscience,	  if	  an	  act	  steps	  outside	  of	  moral	  uncertainty,	  into	  moral	  wrong-­‐doing,	  then	  although	  the	  nurse	  is	  justified	  in	  removing	  herself	  from	  performing	  that	  act,	  given	  her	  professional	   relationship	   to	   the	  patient,	   conscientious	  objection	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough,	  and	  indeed,	  if	  conscientious	  objection	  is	  her	  only	  response,	  the	  nurse	  becomes	  complicit	  in	  allowing	  that	  wrong-­‐doing	  to	  continue.	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  Conclusion	  	  The	   law	   is	   reticent	   in	   its	   support	   for	   conscientious	   objection,	   except	   when	   a	  person	  is	  required	  to	  kill.	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  act	  and	  presumably	  the	  harm	  to	  personal	  integrity	  that	  would	  result,	  is	  given	  priority.	  However,	  even	  so,	  this	  is	  still	  restricted	  as	  the	  instance	  of	  abortion	  demonstrates;	  the	  health	  of	  the	   mother	   will	   take	   priority,	   even	   though	   killing	   of	   an	   embryo	   or	   foetus	   is	  required	  to	  achieve	  this	  end.	  	  The	   law	  concedes	   that	  medical	   care	   can	  be	  degrading	  and	   invasive	  of	  personal	  privacy.	  However,	  the	  preservation	  of	  life	  is	  a	  principle	  that	  takes	  priority.	  Even	  if	  the	  nurse	  perceives	  medical	  care	  to	  be	  degrading	  and	  futile,	  her	  role	  is	  one	  of	  advocacy	  and	  provision	  of	  nursing	  care.	  She	  does	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  make	  medical	  decisions,	  and	  ultimately	  authority	  lies	  with	  the	  doctor.	  The	  authority	  of	  the	   doctor	   even	   takes	   precedence	   it	   seems,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   proper	  provision	   of	   nursing	   care,	   because	   in	   law	   this	   is	   seen	   to	   be	   a	   constituent	   of	  medical	  care.	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Chapter	  6:	  Codes	  of	  conduct	  and	  conscientious	  objection.	  	  Introduction	  In	  this	  chapter	  professional	  codes	  will	  be	  examined.	  A	  comparison	  will	  be	  made	  between	   the	   NMC	   code	   of	   conduct	   and	   other	   codes	   of	   conduct.	   Firstly	   the	   UK	  General	  Medical	  Council	  (GMC,	  2006)	  code	  of	  practice	  will	  be	  examined,	  to	  make	  comparison	   between	   nurses’	   and	   doctors’	   professional	   guidance	   on	  conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	   UK;	   it	   seems	   reasonable	   that	   nurses	   in	   the	   UK	  could	  claim	  to	  have	  broadly	  similar	  conscientious	  objection	  rights	  to	  doctors.	   It	  also	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  NMC	  ought	  to	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  GMC,	  because	   one	  would	   assume	   that	  UK	  nurses	   and	  doctors	   approach	   the	   ethics	   of	  personal	   and	   professional	   ethics	   similarly	   Secondly,	   the	   UK	   Nursing	   and	  Midwifery	  Council	  code	  (NMC,	  2008a)	  will	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  American	  Nurses’	  Association	   code	   (ANA,	   2001)	   and	   the	   International	   Council	   of	   Nursing	   (ICN,	  2006)	   code,	   to	   gain	   an	   impression	   of	   how	   UK	   nurses	   compare	   to	   those	   in	   an	  international	  arena.	  The	  prime	  purpose	  of	  this	  comparison	  though,	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  character	  of	  the	  NMC	  code	  in	  relation	  to	  conscience.	  	  	  As	  shall	  be	  seen,	  if	  the	  NMC	  were	  to	  follow	  the	  example	  of	  the	  GMC	  and	  ANA,	  it	  could	  specify	  and	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  conscience	  and	  conscientious	  objection	  for	  UK	  nurses.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  UK	  nurses’	  code	  of	  conduct	  ought	  to	  become	  more	  similar	  to	  their	  UK	  medical	  colleagues	  and	  US	  nursing	  colleagues	  will	  be	  addressed.	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Exclusion	  	  Examination	  of	  pharmacists’	  codes	  have	  been	  excluded	  even	  though	  there	  have	  been	  contentious	   issues	  around	  dispensation	  of	   the	  contraceptive	  and	  morning	  after	  pill	  in	  recent	  times	  (Johnston,	  2001;	  GPC,	  2010)	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	   Firstly	   the	   issues	   around	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   pharmacy	   practice	  specifically	   link	   to	   the	  abortion	  debate	  and	   interpretation	  of	   law	  around	  direct	  involvement	  with	  activities	  that	  could	  be	  associated	  with	  abortive	  practice.	  This	  is	  an	  area	  of	  exploration	  that	   lies	  outside	  of	  the	  parameters	  for	   investigation	  in	  this	   thesis.	   Secondly,	   pharmacists	   are	   qualitatively	   different	   than	   nurses	   and	  doctors.	   Their	   role	   with	   patients	   is	   less	   intimate,	   and	   they	   provide	   a	   specific	  scientific	   role	  over	  a	   short	  period	  of	   time	  without	  prolonged	   involvement	  with	  the	   patient	   and	   their	   role	   is	   less	   ambiguous	   than	   that	   of	   the	   nurse;	   the	  pharmacist	  has	  a	  clearly	  defined	  role	  and	  the	  lines	  of	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  are	  clearly	  delineated	  between	  the	  pharmacist	  and	  doctor.	  	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  provide	  a	  critique	  of	  nursing	  	  or	  medical	  codes	  per	  se,	  there	  are	  many	  papers	  that	  provide	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  such	  codes	  (Fullbrook,	  2006;	  Kirkland,	  2008;	  Gill	  &	  Griffin,	  2010;	  Pattison	  &	  Wainwright,	  2010).	   Instead	   it	   seeks	   to	  examine	  how	  conscience	  is	  framed	  in	  codes	  of	  conduct.	  However,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  codes	  and	   conscientious	   objection	   there	   is	   little	   literature.	   A	   MEDLINE	   and	   CINAHL	  search	  only	  brought	  up	  one	  letter	  on	  the	  GMC	  and	  personal	  beliefs	  (Breen,	  2008)	  and	   none	   for	   the	  NMC.	   Pattison	  &	  Wainwright	   point	   out	   in	   their	   paper	   on	   the	  new	   NMC	   code	   (NMC,	   2008)	   that	   there	   is	   no	  mention	   of	   conscience	   or	   broad	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ethical	  guidance	  on	  how	  practitioners	  are	  expected	  to	  reason	  in	  practice	  and	  this	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   this	   chapter.	   One	   paper	  was	   found	   that	   called	   for	   nursing	  leaders	  to	  consider	  the	  organisational	  changes	  required	  to	  support	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	  Canadian	  Nurses	  Association	  code	  which	  is	  broadly	  similar	  to	  the	  ANA	  code	  (Ford	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  but	  besides	  this,	  no	  critiques	  of	  the	  codes	  and	  conscientious	  objection	  per	  se	  were	  found.	  	  GMC	  code	  of	  conduct.	  	  Catlin	   does	   not	   explore	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	   GMC	   medical	   code	   of	  conduct,	  (GMC,	  2008)	  but	  had	  she	  done	  so,	  she	  might	  have	  found	  support	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  nursing	  codes.70	  This	  is	  because	  the	  GMC	  medical	   code	   of	   conduct,	   when	   examined	   in	   the	   light	   of	   guidance	   on	   personal	  beliefs,	  gives	  a	  surprisingly	  broad	  support	   for	  doctors	   to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  certain	  treatments.	  	  In	   2008	   the	   GMC	   published	   guidance	   for	   doctors,	   on	   balancing	   their	   personal	  beliefs	   with	   medical	   practice.	   As	   would	   be	   expected,	   this	   guidance	   requires	  doctors	   to	  respect	   their	  patients’	  personal	  beliefs,	  and	  not	   to	   impose	   their	  own	  beliefs	  on	  them,	  nor	  to	  challenge	  these	  beliefs.	  It	  is	  stated	  that	  where	  a	  doctor	  has	  a	   personal	   issue	  with	   a	   form	   of	   treatment	   he	   is	   obliged	   to	   refer	   onto	   another	  doctor	   and	   to	   assist	   in	   this	   referral	   if	   the	   patient	   requires	   help	   (s.17-­‐29).	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  70	  The	  advice	  in	  professional	  medical	  literature	  is	  variable.	  For	  example,	  the	  American	  College	  of	  Obstetricians	  and	  Gynaecologists’	  ethics	  committee	  frames	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  a	  right	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  strictly	  limited,	  presumably	  because	  of	  the	  controversial	  issues	  that	  have	  arisen	  from	  contraception,	  sterilisation	  and	  abortion	  in	  the	  US.	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evidential	   support	   cited	   for	   this	   section	   is	   the	   Abortion	   Act	   (1967).	   However,	  later	  in	  the	  document,	  specific	  examples	  are	  given	  that	  lie	  outside	  of	  this	  Act.	  The	  guidance	   is	   it	   seems	  deliberately	   left	   rather	   open	   to	   interpretation	   about	  what	  procedures	  a	  doctor	  might	  conscientiously	  object	  to,	  but	  some	  explicit	  examples	  are	  given.	  	  	  Firstly,	   male	   circumcision	   on	   religious	   or	   cultural	   grounds	   is	   specified.	   The	  doctor	  is	  referred	  to	  the	  conscientious	  objection	  procedure	  if	  he	  has	  an	  objection	  to	   circumcision	   other	   than	   in	   cases	   where	   clinical	   need	   is	   indicated.	   On	   the	  contrary,	   those	   doctors	   with	   a	   religious	   objection	   to	   cremation,	   are	   explicitly	  excluded	  from	  the	  right	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  the	   filling	   in	  of	  cremation	  forms,	  because	  their	  refusal	  to	  do	  so	  could	  result	  in	  the	  remains	  of	  patients	  being	  sent	  to	  the	  coroner	  and	  an	  associated	  post	  mortem.	  	  	  Presumably	  these	  examples	  are	  given	  because	  each	  demonstrates	  how	  personal	  values	  on	  the	  part	  of	  patient	  or	  doctor	  might	  be	  a	  source	  of	  conflict	  and	  perhaps	  the	  cases	  are	  designed	  to	  show	  when	  conscientious	  objection	  is	  most	  justifiable	  (in	  the	  case	  if	  circumscision)	  and	  not	  justifiable	  (cremation).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  cases	   lead	   one	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   doctor	   is	   not	   obliged	   to	   carry	   out	   clinical	  procedures	  that	  are	  requested	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  religious	  belief	  or	  cultural	  norms,	  but	  that	  likewise,	  the	  doctor’s	  own	  religious	  beliefs	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  extend	  so	  far	   as	   to	   cause	   serious	   psychological	   harm,	   nor	   to	   intrude	   on	   strongly	   held	  societal	   consensus	  about	  disposal	  of	  bodies.	  However,	   the	   code	  does	   state	   that	  just	   as	   the	   Abortion	   Act	   supports	   doctors	   to	   conscientiously	   object	   to	   direct	  involvement	  in	  abortion:	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   ‘The	   same	   principle	   applies	   to	   the	   care	   of	   patients	   before	   or	  following	  any	  other	  procedure	  from	  which	  you	  have	  withdrawn	  because	  of	  your	  beliefs.’	  (s.26)	  	  Of	   significance	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  GMC	  guidance	  explicitly	  offers	  doctors	   some	  protection	  to	  act	  or	  not	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  personal	  values	  so	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  impose	  these	  values	  on	  their	  patients	  and	  offer	  referral	  to	  another	  doctor.	  	  There	   is	   some	   confusion	   in	   the	   doctors’	   code	   of	   practice.	   True	   the	   doctor	   is	  granted	  leeway	  to	  agree	  to	  perform	  or	  to	  refrain	  from	  performing	  specific	  clinical	  acts.	  	  However,	  the	  decision	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  circumcision	  might	  be	   more	   correctly	   identified	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   clinical	   judgement;	   in	   deciding	  whether	  or	  not	   to	   carry	  out	   an	   invasive	  procedure,	   the	  doctor	  needs	   to	  decide	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   risks	   are	   worth	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   procedure	   in	   question	  (Shaw,	   2009).	   Should	   he	   disagree	   that	   a	   new	   born	   ought	   to	   receive	   a	  circumcision,	   with	   its	   inherent	   risks,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   parental	   preferences,	   it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  allow	  the	  doctor	  to	  refuse	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  procedure,	  as	  any	  negative	   consequences	   will	   be	   directly	   his	   own	   responsibility	   and	   any	   blame	  associated	  with	  it.	   71	  Furthermore,	  his	  patient	   is	  unable	  to	  consent.	  This	  then	  is	  not	  really	  a	  matter	  of	  conscience,	  but	  one	  of	  an	  assessment	  of	  professional	  values	  and	  calculations	  around	  consent	  and	  risk.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  71	  There	  are	  conflicting	  sources	  of	  evidence	  on	  the	  risks	  and	  benefits	  of	  non-­‐therapeutic	  infant	  circumcision.	  See	  for	  example	  Sanson	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  Conroy,	  (2011)	  Dettmeyer	  et	  al.	  (2011).	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  Here	  doctors	  have	  an	  advantage	  over	  nurses,	  because	  their	  clinical	  decisions	  and	  acts	  fall	  under	  their	  own	  realm	  of	  responsibility	  and	  authority.	  The	  nurse	  has	  the	  same	  autonomy	  with	   regard	   to	  purely	  nursing	  actions,72	  but	  unlike	   the	  doctor,	  she	  is	  obliged	  to	  carry	  out	  actions	  that	  are	  outside	  of	  her	  own	  clinical	  authority.	  	  The	  GMC	  does	  not	  give	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  issues	  that	  might	  arise	  within	  the	  breadth	  of	  situations	  where	  conscientious	  objection	  is	  possible,	  but	  the	  Canadian	  Nurses’	  Association	  (CNA,	  2008),	  which	  is	  similarly	  liberal	  does	  specify	  blood	   transfusion	  and	   this	  could	  presumably	  also	  be	   included,	  given	   its	  strong	  link	  with	  Jehova’s	  Witnesses,	  although	  it	   is	  most	  commonly	  discussed	  in	  relation	   to	   non	   consenting	   patients,	   rather	   than	   HCPs	   who	   are	   Jehova’s	  Witnesses	  (Banja	  2009;	  Doyle,	  2002).	  Perhaps	  blood	  transfusion	  and	  transplant	  opposed	  to	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  conscience	  offer	  insight	  into	  the	  broader	  range	  of	  procedures	  the	  doctor	  might	  wish	  to	  make	  a	  conscientious	  objection	  to.	  	  	  In	   this	   instance	   it	   is	   a	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   the	   true	   sense	   of	   the	   word,	  because	  it	  arises	  from	  deeply	  held	  personal	  and	  religious	  belief.	  Perhaps	  the	  GMC	  does	   not	   list	   such	   matters	   explicitly,	   because	   it	   does	   not	   wish	   to	   encourage	  conscientious	  objection	  on	  these	  grounds,	  but	  also	  because	  bringing	  such	  issues	  to	   light	   in	   the	   public	   realm	   could	   cause	   outrage.	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	  conscientious	  objection	  for	  these	  reasons	  would	  be	  contentious,	  but	  presumably,	  the	  code,	   like	  the	  Abortion	  Act,	  would	  expect	  doctors	  to	  carry	  out	  treatments	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  72	  Although	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five,	  legally	  she	  might	  not.	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which	  they	  have	  a	  conscientious	  objection	  should	  no	  one	  else	  be	  available,	  or	  if	  patients	  are	  put	  in	  danger.73	  	  	  Despite	   the	   differing	   views	   in	   ethical	   analyses	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   doctors	  ought	   to	   be	   able	   to	   conscientiously	   object	   to	   treatments	   that	   conflict	   with	  personal	   values74,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   GMC	   offers	   significant	   leeway	   for	  conscientious	   objection;	   a	   freedom	   to	   express	   personal	   autonomy	   that	   is	  distinctly	   absent	   in	   medical	   law,	   with	   regard	   to	   conscience	   at	   least.	   The	  assessment	   of	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   act	   –which	   I	   have	   argued	   is	   the	  most	   important	   question	   to	   answer	   in	   professional	   and	   societal	   cases	   of	  conscientious	  objection	  -­‐	  is	  absent	  from	  the	  professional	  body’s	  perspective;	  that	  is,	   the	   right	   to	   conscientious	   objection	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   grave	   acts	   that	   involve	  killing.	  	  	  NMC,	  ANA	  and	  ICN	  codes	  	  The	   Nursing	   and	  Midwifery	   Council	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   (NMC,	   2008a)	  makes	   no	  reference	  to	  conscience	  or	  conscientious	  objection.	  Nor	  does	  it	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  nurse’s	  personal	  beliefs	  or	  values.	  Unlike	   the	  GMC	  and	  as	  shall	  be	  seen,	   the	  ANA,	  there	  is	  no	  equivalent	  document	  that	  advises	  or	  gives	  leeway	  for	  nurses	  to	  make	  decisions	   to	  act	  or	  not	  act	   in	   relation	   to	   their	  own	  personal	  values	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  73	  Wicclair	  (2011,	  pp87-­‐134)	  gives	  a	  good	  review	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  limit	  conscientious	  objection	  for	  HCPs.	  74	  There	  are	  numerous	  papers	  on	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  medicine	  that	  give	  the	  standard	  arguments	  that	  support	  it	  or	  not.	  Wicclair	  (2011)	  gives	  a	  good	  review	  of	  the	  ethical	  issues,	  but	  see	  also	  Wicclair	  (2000)	  Saulescu	  (2006)	  Dickens	  (2009)	  Gillon	  (1985)	  Gronlund	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  April	  (2009)	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than	   to	  reiterate	   the	   legal	  boundaries	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  specified	   in	  the	  1967	  Abortion	  Act	  (NMC,	  2008b).	  	  	  However,	   there	   is	   advice	   on	   duty	   of	   care,	   which	   gives	   explicit	   circumstances	  where	  the	  nurse	  might	  be	  justified	  in	  withdrawing	  her	  care.	  The	  NMC	  guidance	  states	   that	   the	   nurse	   can	   withdraw	   her	   care	   only	   when	   she	   fears	   physical	  violence,	  where	  there	  are	  environmental	  health	  and	  safety	  hazards,	  or	  where	  the	  nurse	  is	  experiencing	  sexual	  or	  racial	  harassment	  (NMC,	  2008c).	  Such	  instances	  are	  not	  described	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  conscience	  presumably	  because	  the	  decision	  to	  withdraw	   is	   one	   of	   preserving	   physical	   safety,	   rather	   than	   the	   more	   esoteric	  preservation	   of	   a	   sense	   of	   integrity	   that	   exists	  when	   one	  withdraws	   for	  moral	  reasons.	  What	  is	  striking	  about	  these	  examples	  is	  that	  although	  the	  NMC	  does	  not	  speak	  of	  conscientious	  objection,	  other	  than	  in	  relation	  to	  abortion	  law;	  by	  giving	  examples	  of	  when	   the	  nurse	   can	  withdraw	  care,	   the	  withdrawal	  of	   care	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  conscience	  is	  clearly	  omitted.	  	  	  Further	  to	  this,	  there	  is	  only	  a	  short	  mention	  of	  integrity	  in	  the	  code	  of	  conduct	  where	   it	   is	   framed	   in	  relation	  to	   issues	  such	  as	  being	   law	  abiding	  and	  having	  a	  commitment	  to	  diversity	  and	  equality	  (p7).	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  reasons	  for	  withdrawal	  of	  care,	  these	  are	  generally	  accepted	  norms	  that	  do	  not	  express	  the	  individuality	   promoted	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   conscience.	   No	   reference	   is	  made	   to	  integrity	   in	   the	   ‘higher	   order’	   sense	   of	   congruence	   between	   personal	   and	  professional	  values	  and	  actions.	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The	  International	  Council	  for	  code	  of	  ethics	  (ICN,	  2006)	  is	  intended	  for	  all	  nurses	  as	   a	   guide	   to	   excellent	   practice	   and	   gives	   a	   global	   framework	   for	   nursing	  practice.	  Like	  the	  NMC	  code,	  no	  mention	  of	  conscience	  or	  conscientious	  objection	  is	   made	   in	   the	   code,	   or	   elsewhere	   in	   their	   guidance	   literature,	   although	   in	   it,	  there	   is	   reference	   made	   to	   harm	   being	   done	   to	   patients	   by	   other	   health	   care	  practitioners.	  Practitioners	  and	  managers	  are	  required	  to	   ‘Develop	  mechanisms	  to	  safeguard	  the	  individual,	  family	  or	  community	  when	  their	  care	  is	  endangered	  by	   health	   care	   personnel’	  whilst	   educators	   are	   required	   to	   instill	   this	   value	   in	  learners,	   and	   nursing	   associations	   are	   required	   to	   develop	   guidelines	   and	  position	   statements	   with	   regard	   to	   dealing	   with	   such	   situations (p.8). No	  mention	   is	   made	   of	   the	   behaviours	   expected	   from	   nurses	   in	   relation	   to	   such	  circumstances,	   but	   the	   word	   ‘endangered’	   implies	   intentionally	   harmful	  behaviours	  rather	  than	  disagreement	  about	  treatment	  options	  as	  occur	  in	  moral	  distress.	  	  	  Guidance	   is	   not	   specified	   in	   the	  NMC	   code	   and	   so	   far,	   the	  NMC	  has	   responded	  reactively	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  safeguarding	  patients,	  with	  guidance	  on	  these	  matters	  having	   been	   formalised	   after	   a	   Panaroma	   BBC	   documentary	   that	   resulted	   in	   a	  nurse	  being	  struck	  off	   the	  register	   for	  undercover	  non	  consensual	   filming	  (BBC	  2009;	   Cunningham,	   2008).	   The	   nurse	   in	   question	   filmed	   patients	   in	   the	   Royal	  Sussex	   Hospital	   because	   she	   observed	   that	   care	   standards	   were	   below	  acceptable	   limits,	   and	   she	   wanted	   to	   prevent	   such	   circumstances	   from	  continuing,	   and	  became	  a	   ‘whistle	  blower.’	  The	  guidance	  provided	   to	  nurses	   in	  ‘Raising	   and	   Escalating	   Concerns:	   Guidance	   for	   Nurses	   and	   Midwives’	   (NMC	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2010)	  has	   set	   out	   clear	   instructions	   about	  how	  professionals	   ought	   to	   react	   to	  circumstances	  where	  patients	  under	  their	  care	  are	  exposed	  to:	  	   ‘abuse,	   which	   is	   defined	   as	   “a	   violation	   of	   an	   individual’s	  human	   and	   civil	   rights	   by	   any	   other	   person	   or	   persons”	   (No	  Secrets	  (2000)	  Department	  of	  Health).	  Abuse	  may	  occur	  as	  the	  result	   of	   deliberate	   intent,	   negligence	   or	   ignorance,	   and	  includes	   (but	   is	   not	   limited	   to)	   physical,	   psychological	   or	  sexual	  abuse;	   financial	  or	  material	   abuse;	  neglect	  and	  acts	  of	  omission	  or	  institutional	  abuse.’	  	  (p.	  2)	  	  Of	  interest	  in	  this	  document	  is	  that	  ‘doing	  nothing	  and	  failing	  to	  report	  concerns	  is	   not	   acceptable’	   (p.	   4).	   This	   supports	   the	   stance	   that	   conscientious	   objection	  could	   actually	   be	   an	   abdication	   of	   responsibility	   for	   the	   vulnerable	   patient.	  Indeed,	   this	   clause	   was	   added	   to	   the	   guidance	   document	   after	   a	   focus	   group	  consultation	   in	   early	  2010	   (NMC,	  2010b)	   led	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	  non	  action	  was	   not	   an	   ethical	   option	   under	   such	   circumstances.	   Furthermore,	   contrary	   to	  Catlin’s	   proposal	   that	   conscientious	   objection	   could	   only	   be	   enacted	   after	   a	  prolonged	   time	   where	   the	   position	   of	   the	   nurse	   had	   not	   changed,	   the	   UK	  guidelines,	   stipulate	   that	  under	  some	  circumstances	   immediate	  action	  needs	   to	  be	   taken	   in	  order	   to	  cease	   incidents	  of	  unsafe	  or	  unacceptable	  care.	  Within	   the	  guidance	   	   ‘Safeguarding	   update’,	   (NMC,	   2011b)	   the	   NMC	   makes	   it	   clear	   that	  abuse	  of	  patients	  could	  be	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  doctors	  who	  prescribe	  inappropriate	  treatment,	   but	   again,	   under	   such	   circumstances,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   nurse	   is	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expected	  to	  act,	  and	  this	  action	  is	  not	  one	  of	  conscientious	  objection,	  presumably	  because	  prevention	  of	  abuse	  requires	  the	  nurse	  to	  act	  as	  the	  patient’s	  advocate.	  	  It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   these	  circumstances	  –	   those	  stipulated	  by	  both	   the	   ICN	  and	  NMC	  -­‐	  are	  more	  akin	  to	  the	  analysis	  I	  made	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  where	  I	  argued	   that	   in	   instances	   of	   definite	   wrong-­‐doing,	   that	   is	   incidents	   that	   more	  correctly	   apply	   to	   a	   sense	   of	   moral	   outrage	   than	   moral	   distress,	   ought	   to	   be	  responded	   to	   in	   a	   strong	   and	   definite	  manner	   that	   goes	   beyond	   conscientious	  objection.	   Indeed,	   Catlin’s	   proposal	   that	   the	   code	   of	   conduct	   contain	   a	  conscientious	   objection	   clause	   in	   relation	   to	   over	   treatment	   of	   patients	   does	  nothing	   to	   safeguard	   patients	   who	   might	   indeed	   benefit	   from	   less	   treatment.	  However	  Birchley’s	   (2011)	  suggestion	   that	   conscientious	  objection	  ought	   to	  be	  institutionally	   recognised	   with	   the	   opportunity	   for	   HCPs	   to	   attend	   a	   formal	  setting	  such	  as	  a	  tribunal	  to	  express	  concerns,	  could	  offer	  protection	  to	  patients	  because	  conscientious	  objection	  under	  these	  conditions	  becomes	  an	  action	  with	  transparent	  and	  accountable	  actions	  associated	  with	  it.	  	  Interestingly	  the	  ANA	  code	  is	  more	  similar	  to	  the	  GMC	  code	  than	  to	  the	  NMC	  or	  ICN	   code.	   This	   might	   reflect	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   nursing	   in	   the	   US,	  which	   has,	   as	   has	   already	   been	   discussed,	   followed	   a	   strongly	   feminist	  interpretation	   of	   nursing	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   medicine.	   It	   is	   a	   far	   more	  detailed	  document	   than	   either	   the	  NMC	  or	   ICN	   codes.	   The	  ANA	   states	   that	   the	  nurse’s	   prime	   responsibility	   is	   to	   the	   individual	   patient,	   and	   that	   the	   patient’s	  interests	   take	   priority	   over	   other	   health	   professionals	   or	   members	   of	   that	  patient’s	   family	   (Provision	   2.1	   and	   2.1).	   Although	   the	   NMC	   code	   also	   has	   the	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individual	  patient	  as	  its	  prime	  concern,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  relation	  to	  potential	  contenders	  for	  this	  focus	  of	  nursing	  activity,	  stating	  only	  that:	  	   ‘You	  must	  treat	  people	  as	  individuals	  and	  respect	  their	  dignity’	  	  	  The	  more	   detailed	  ANA	   code	   perhaps	   reflects	   the	   large	   body	   of	   seminal	  work	  done	  in	  the	  US	  where	  the	  role	  of	  nurse	  as	  patient	  advocate	  was	  first	  theorised75.	  Interestingly,	   the	   nurse	   advocate	   is	   seen	   to	   be	   the	   professional	  who	   takes	   the	  side	   of	   the	   patient	   in	   opposition	   to	   other	   HCPs,	   and	   particularly	   the	   doctor	  (McGrath	   and	   Phillips,	   2009;	   Hanks,	   2010;	   Martin,	   1998a	   &1998b;	   Kendrick,	  1994).	  76	  	  	  The	   NMC	   code	   emphasises	   working	   co	   operatively	   with	   other	   team	  members	  including	  the	  statement:	  	   ‘You	  must	  work	  cooperatively	  within	  teams	  and	  respect	  the	  skills,	  expertise	  and	  contributions	  of	  your	  colleagues’	  (point	  24)	  	  The	  ANA	  has	  a	  much	  longer	  statement	  that	  seems	  to	  reflect	  an	  adversarial	  sense	  of	   relationship	   that	   I	  have	  alluded	   to	  above.	  Rather	   than	  stating	   that	   the	  nurse	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  75	  Mallik	  (1997)	  offers	  a	  good	  review	  of	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  advocacy	  in	  nursing.	  76	  The	  adversarial	  nature	  that	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  ANA	  code	  isn’t	  limited	  to	  the	  doctor,	  but	  can	  also	  be	  associated	  with	  other	  powerful	  influences	  such	  as	  racism	  (Harrison	  and	  Falco,	  2005).	  Of	  interest	  here	  is	  that	  the	  doctor	  is	  identified	  as	  potentially	  as	  wrong	  as	  the	  person	  who	  is	  racist.	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ought	   to	  work	   co	  operatively	  with	  other	  HCPs,	   the	  ANA	  sets	  down	   the	   form	  of	  communication	   that	  ought	  be	  present	   in	  multidisciplinary	  care,	  and	  although	   it	  isn’t	   stated	   as	   such,	   it	   seems	   to	   be	  more	   of	   a	   statement	   about	   how	   the	   nurse	  ought	   to	   be	   communicated	   with,	   than	   how	   she	   ought	   to	   communicate.	   After	  stating	  that	  health	  care	  is	  a	  multidisciplinary	  activity,	  the	  code	  states:	  	   ‘Within	   this	   context,	   nursing’s	   unique	   contribution…..and	  relationship	   with	   other	   professionals	   needs	   to	   be	   clearly	  articulated,	   represented	   and	   preserved.	   By	   very	   definition	  collaboration	  requires	  mutual	  trust,	  recognition	  and	  respect	  among	   the	   health	   care	   team,	   shared	   decision-­‐making	   about	  patient	   care	  and	  open	  dialogue	  among	  all	  parties	  who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  and	  concern	  for	  health	  outcomes.’	  (2.3)	  	  Conflicts	   of	   interest	   are	   also	   identified	   as	   subject	   to	   the	   code	   and	   are	   best	  described	  by	  quoting	  another	  section	  of	  the	  code:	  	   ‘Nurses	  are	  frequently	  put	  in	  situations	  of	  conflict	  arising	  from	  competing	   loyalties	   in	   the	   workplace,	   including	   situations	   of	  conflicting	   expectations	   of	   patients,	   families,	   physicians,	  colleagues,	   and	   in	   many	   cases	   health	   care	   organisations	   and	  health	   plans.	   Nurses	   must	   examine	   the	   conflicts	   arising	  between	  their	  own	  personal	  and	  professional	  values	  the	  values	  and	   interests	   of	   others	   who	   are	   also	   responsible	   for	   patient	  care	   and	   health	   care	   decisions	   as	   well	   as	   those	   of	   patients.	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Nurses	   strive	   to	   resolve	   such	   conflicts	   in	   ways	   that	   ensure	  patient	   safety,	   guard	   the	  patient’s	   best	   interests	   and	  preserve	  the	  professional	  integrity	  of	  the	  nurse.’	  (2.2)	  	  Like	   the	  NMC,	   the	   ANA	   has	   guidance	   about	   reporting	   and	   escalating	   concerns,	  although	  in	  this	  instance	  it	  is	  termed	  ‘addressing	  impaired	  practice’	  (3.6)	  and	  is	  contained	  within	  the	  code	  itself,	  rather	  than	  in	  an	  extra	  document	  as	  is	  the	  case	  for	  the	  NMC.	  The	  need	  for	  formal	  procedures	  for	  raising	  concerns	  are	  stipulated	  and	   again	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   NMC.	   With	   regard	   to	   safeguarding	   and	   impaired	  practice	   I	  am	   in	  agreement	  with	   the	  nursing	  codes	  described.	  The	  requirement	  for	   the	   nurse	   to	   act	   is	   clearly	   described	   as	   an	   essential	   element	   of	   nursing	  responsibility.	   These	   situations	   are	   clearly	   examples	   of	   wrong-­‐doing	   that	   lie	  outside	  of	   the	  uncertainties	   and	   conflicting	  perspectives	   associated	  with	  moral	  distress	  in	  ‘futile’	  care.	  	  	  The	  ANA	  though,	  unlike	  the	  NMC	  and	  ICN	  but	  similarly	  to	  the	  GMC,	  has	  a	  section	  that	  addresses	  the	  personal	  and	  professional	  integrity	  of	  the	  nurse	  (Provision	  5).	  Nurses	  are	  required	  to	  have	   ‘moral	  self	   respect’,	  and	  to	  maintain	   ‘wholeness	  of	  character	   and	   personal	   integrity’.	   The	   code	   states	   that	   nurses	   merge	   both	  personal	  and	  professional	  values	  whilst	  becoming	  a	  professional	  and	  that	  these	  two	  can’t	  be	  separated.	  The	  nurse	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  express	  her	  moral	  concerns	  even	  when	  they	  differ	  to	  those	  around	  her.	  The	  preservation	  of	  integrity	  is	  described	  as	  a	  primarily	  ‘self–concern’	  of	  the	  individual	  nurse.	  Specific	  threats	  to	  integrity	  are	  listed	  such	  as	  receiving	  abuse	  from	  patients	  or	  co	  -­‐	  workers,	  or	  being	  asked	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  a	  direct	  contradiction	  of	  the	  code	  of	  ethics	  or	  legality.	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So	   far	   this	   does	   not	   differ	   substantially	   from	   the	   NMC	   code,	   although	   the	  terminology	   is	   very	   different.	   However,	   nurses	   are	   required	   to	   preserve	   their	  sense	   of	   both	   personal	   and	   professional	   integrity,	   and	   to	   engage	   in	   ‘integrity	  preserving	  compromise	  only	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  it	  remains	  an	  integrity	  preserving	  compromise’	  (5.4)	  Nurses	  who	  are	  in	  situations	  	   ‘Where	   a	   particular	   treatment,	   intervention	   or	   activity,	   	   or	  practice	   is	   morally	   objectionable	   to	   the	   nurse,	   whether	  intrinsically	   so	   or	   because	   it	   is	   inappropriate	   for	   the	   specific	  patient,	   or	  where	   it	  may	   jeoprardise	  both	  patients	   and	  nursing	  practice,	  the	  nurse	  is	  justified	  in	  refusing	  to	  participate	  on	  moral	  grounds.	   Conscientious	   objection	   may	   not	   insulate	   the	   nurse	  from	  formal	  and	  informal	  penalty.’	  (5.4)	  	  This	  statement	  involves	  some	  broad	  use	  of	  language	  that	  gives	  the	  nurse	  leeway	  for	   conscientious	   objection	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   not	   permitted	   in	   the	   NMC	   or	   ICN	  codes;	  they	  limit	  self-­‐preservation	  or	  patient	  preservation	  to	  acts	  of	  actual	  harm	  such	   as	   abuse,	   or	   illegal	   practice.	   Of	   particular	   breadth	   is	   the	   statement	   that	   a	  treatment	   that	   is	   ‘intrinsically’	   objectionable	   to	   the	   nurse	   can	   be	   objected	   to.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  legal	  case	  of	  abortion,	  but	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  case	  of	  conscientious	  objection	   to	   war,	   the	   statement	   ends	   with	   the	   requirement	   that	   the	   nurse	   is	  obliged	  to	  provide	  for	  patient	  safety	  and	  to	  ensure	  alternative	  sources	  of	  nursing	  care	  are	  provided	  for	  the	  patient	  and	  to	  avoid	  patient	  abandonment	  under	  such	  circumstances.	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Although	  there	  is	  not	  a	  specific	  mention	  of	  moral	  distress	  and	  the	  harm	  of	  ‘futile’	  treatment	  within	  the	  code	  as	  Catlin	  argues	  ought	  to	  be	  done,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	   already	   scope	   for	   nurses	   to	   do	   as	   Catlin	   suggests.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   nurse	  who	   feels	   that	   to	   treat	   a	   patient	   aggressively	   rather	   than	  palliatively	   is	  wrong,	  can	  already	  conscientiously	  object	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  an	  intrinsic	  sense	  that	  that	  act	  is	  morally	  objectionable	  or	  because	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  specific	  patient.	  	  	  However,	   perhaps	   it	   is	   more	   correct,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   disagreement	   with	   the	  doctor’s	   plan	   of	   care,	   to	   describe	   this	   issue	   as	   one	   of	   the	   nurse’s	   clinical	  judgement	   rather	   than	   conscience,	   similarly	   to	   the	   argument	   made	   for	   male	  circumcision.	   If	   this	   is	  accepted,	   then	   it	   leads	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  nurses	  ought	  to	  be	  given	  leeway	  to	  object	  to	  involvement	  in	  care	  of	  a	  patient,	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  conscience,	  but	  rather,	  because	  of	  clinical	  disagreement.	  In	  other	  words,	   where	   the	   doctor	   decides	   that	   he	   does	   not	   wish	   to	   carry	   out	   a	  circumcision	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   professional	   judgments	   about	   consent	   and	   risk,	  perhaps	   equally	   so,	   the	   nurse	   ought	   to	   be	   able	   to	  make	   her	   own	   professional	  judgments	  about	  suffering	  and	  the	  personal	  risk	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  take	  in	  relation	  to	  living	  with	  the	  self	  blame	  that	  she	  will	  experience	  after	  negative	  consequences	  in	   her	   patient’s	   journey.	   However,	   the	   chapters	   on	   law	   and	   the	   nurse	   and	  erroneous	  conscience,	  would	  solidly	  refute	  the	  position	  that	   the	  nurse	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  this	  objection,	  under	  legal	  orders.	  Furthermore	  perhaps	  Olsen’s	  (2007)	  position	  as	  argued	  in	  his	  editorial	  on	  conscientious	  objection,	  ought	  to	  be	  remembered,	  that	  is	  that	  nurses	  should	  have	  the	  vision	  to	  avoid	  working	  to	  the	  lower	   standard	   of	   duty	   that	   the	   doctor	   employs	   when	   he	   objects	   to	   medical	  provision.	  	  
	   155	  
	  So	   far	   then,	   there	   is	  at	   least	  some	  support	   for	  Catlin’s	  position.	  Firstly	   the	  ANA	  code	   of	   conduct	   actively	   supports	   conscientious	   objection,	   and	   although	  objection	   to	   aggressive	  medical	   treatment	   is	   not	   specified,	   there	   is	   no	   obvious	  reason	  to	  exclude	  it;	  it	  is	  either	  already	  a	  component	  of	  the	  code	  or	  else	  should	  it	  be	  deemed	  appropriate	   to	  make	   it	   a	   special	   case,	   it	   could	  be	   specified	  as	   such.	  Secondly	   the	  UK	  code	  could	  be	  redesigned	  to	  be	  more	  similar	   to	   the	  GMC	  code	  and	   ANA	   code	   of	   conduct,	   if	   a	   movement	   towards	   conscientious	   objection	   is	  accepted	   to	   be	   a	   positive	   change,	   although	   problems	   with	   this	   approach	   have	  already	  been	  identified.	  In	  any	  case,	  if	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  ‘futile’	  orders	  is	  to	  be	  accepted,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  who	  benefits	  from	  this	  change.	  Afterall,	  the	  NMC	  purports	   that	   its	  role	   is	   to	   ‘safeguard	  the	  health	  and	  well	  being	  of	   the	  public’	   (NMC,	   2011a).	   In	   the	   next	   section	   the	   arguments	   that	   object	   to	   this	  position	  will	  be	  presented.	  	  Opposition	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  the	  NMC	  code.	  	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   the	   UK	   code	   of	   conduct	   for	   nurses	   is	   primarily	  constructed	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   safeguarding	   patients	   and	   ensuring	   that	   nurses	  behave	  legally,	  whereas	  the	  directions	  in	  provision	  5	  of	  the	  ANA	  code	  make	  the	  nurse’s	  sense	  of	  integrity	  the	  focus	  of	  concern.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  ANA	  code	  is	  very	  much	  one	  that	  takes	  the	  concept	  of	  conscience	  as	  its	  prime	  focus.	  Conscience	  and	  conscientious	   objection,	   is	   primarily	   a	   self-­‐concern.	   Given	   that	   the	   nurse	   is	   a	  professional	  who	  has	   the	   care	  of	  patients	   as	  her	   first	   focus,	   one	  must	  question	  under	  what	  circumstances	  it	  is	  right	  for	  her	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  patient.	  This	  is	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particularly	   important	   for	   nurses,	   perhaps	  more	   than	   for	   other	   HCPs,	   because	  proximity	  to	  the	  patient	  is	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  nurse	  and	  be	  nursed	  (Schluter	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Boyd	   and	   Munhall	   1989;	   Giger	   &	   Davidhizar,	   1990).	  Proximity	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  role	  of	  advocacy	  and	  the	  role	  of	  caring.	  (Gustafsson	  et	   al.,	   2009;	   Brown,	   2011;	   Thomas,	   2011)	   Indeed,	   the	   loss	   of	   proximity	   to	   the	  patient	  that	  has	  become	  an	  increasing	  trend	  in	  nursing,	  may	  well	  be	  a	  key	  factor	  in	   the	   recent	   attention	   given	   to	   poor	   NHS	   nursing	   care	   in	   the	   British	   press	  (Beckford,	  2011;	  Martin,	  2010;	  Smith,	  2009)	  and	  earlier	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  Patient’s	   Association	   about	   poor	   standards	   of	   basic	   nursing	   (Patients	  Association,	  2009).	  	  Although	   Catlin	   states	   that	   the	   nurse	   must	   not	   abandon	   her	   patient	   if	   she	  disagrees	  with	  aggressive	  medical	  care,	  this	  fails	  to	  recognise	  the	  importance	  of	  the	   unique	   nurse–patient	   relationship	   that	   is	   so	   connected	   to	   proximity.	  Vouzavali	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  carried	  out	  a	  study	  on	  critical	  care	  nurses	  to	  find	  out	  how	  this	  relationship	  could	  exist	  with	  patients	  who	  are	  critically	  ill	  and	  unconscious.	  They	  found	  that	  the	  nurses	  had	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  relationship	  with	  their	  patients	  through	  the	  repeated	  close	  contact	  with	  and	  care	  of	   their	  patient’s	  bodies.	  This	  close	   contact	   evoked	   strong	   feelings	   of	   love	   empathy	   and	   care.	   Indeed,	   this	  experience	   was	   described	   by	   nurses	   as	   being	   mutually	   dependent.77	   78	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  77	  An	  interesting	  connection	  might	  be	  found	  in	  this	  reliance	  on	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  As	  nurses	  have	  been	  increasingly	  removed	  from	  direct	  care	  activities	  for	  their	  patients,	  the	  feelings	  of	  love,	  empathy	  and	  care	  that	  are	  so	  essential	  to	  good	  nursing	  might	  well	  be	  diminished	  and	  contribute	  to	  poor	  nursing	  standards	  in	  hospitals.	  	  78	  Metcalf	  (2009)	  provides	  an	  insightful	  analysis	  of	  Michael	  Ondaatje’s	  ‘English	  Patient’;	  one	  of	  the	  few	  novels	  to	  explore	  the	  nurse	  patient	  relationship	  in	  depth	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Halldorsdottir	   (2008)	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   nurse	   being	   with	   the	  patient	   and	   reminds	   the	   reader	   of	   the	   impact	   that	   relationship	   can	   have	   on	  improving	   a	   person’s	   immune	   function	   and	   the	   detrimental	   effects	   of	   negative	  emotion	  on	  physical	  health.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  nurse-­‐patient	  relationship,	  that	  he	  sees	  as	  a	  primarily	  spiritual	  connection,	   is	  essential	   to	  good	  nursing,	  so	   long	  as	  the	  nurse	  is	  also	  competent,	  having	  professional	  wisdom	  and	  is	  genuinely	  caring.	  He	  found	  that	  the	  excellent	  nurse	  is	  described	  by	  patients	  as	  ‘life	  giving’.	  (p651)	  	  Given	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	   the	  close	  physical	  and	  emotional	  relationship	  that	  exists	  in	  excellent	  nursing	  care,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  exactly	  when	  the	  nurse	  is	  justified	  in	  breaking	  this	  bond;	  conscientious	  objection,	  will	  under	  many,	  if	  not	  all	   circumstances,	  break	   this	  bond.	  This	  will	  be	  examined	   in	   two	  stages.	  Firstly	  consideration	   will	   be	   given	   to	   conscientious	   objection	   understood	   as	   a	  disagreement	   in	   clinical	   treatment.	   Secondly,	   consideration	   will	   be	   given	   to	  conscientious	  objection	   in	   the	   truer	  sense	  of	   the	  word.	  These	  are	   two	  different	  lenses	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  gain	  a	  full	  perspective	  on	  the	  single	  proposition	  that	  Catlin	  makes,	  that	  is	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  aggressive	  medical	  care	  that	  is	  active	  rather	  than	  palliative	  in	  nature.	  	  The	  Nature	  of	  Conscientious	  Objection	  to	  Doctors’	  Orders	  	  Wicclair	  (2011)	  argues	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  its	  truest	  sense,	  connects	  with	  deeply	  held	  personal	  values	  and	  not	  professional	  values.	  He	  argues	  that	  it	  is	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  sensual,	  compassionate	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  of	  excellent	  nursing	  as	  it	  is	  described	  by	  empirical	  researchers.	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incorrect	  to	  consider	  professional	  values	  as	  a	  source	  for	  conscientious	  objection.	  Although	  he	  has	  a	  philosophical	  point,	  this	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  professional	  practice	  and	  authors	  such	  as	  Koehn	  (1998,	  p11)	  argue	   that	   the	   division	   of	   personal	   and	   public	   that	   is	   commonly	   made	   in	  philosophical	  writing	  is	  psychologically	  and	  ‘morally	  suspect’.	  	  	  That	   this	   distinction	   is	   not	   necessarily	   correct	   is	   further	   evidenced	   when	   one	  remembers	  how	  nurses	  describe	  their	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress,	  where	  they	  perceive	  that	  they	  flog	  or	  torture	  a	  patient.	  Under	  such	  circumstances,	  were	  they	  identified	   as	   objcectively	   (although	   not	   literally)	   true,	   then	   conscientious	  objection	  might	  be	  justified.	  Clearly	  there	  is	  an	  overlap	  between	  the	  professional	  circumstance	  the	  nurse	  finds	  herself	  in	  and	  the	  personal	  and	  grave	  nature	  of	  the	  act	  she	  perceives	  herself	  to	  be	  involved	  in.	  	  One	  need	  only	  consider	  how	  nurses	  describe	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  patient	  –	  caring,	  compassionate,	   loving	  –	  to	  see	  that	  the	  professional	  values	  that	  nurses	  hold	  may	  well	  be	  congruent	  with	  their	  personal	  values.	  Indeed	  much	  of	  what	  drives	  a	  person	  to	  become	  a	  nurse	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  those	  personal	  values.	  Support	   for	   this	   stance	  can	  be	   found	   from	  Michal-­‐Rasin	   (2008	  and	   2010)	   who	   carried	   out	   empirical	   research	   to	   find	   what	   personal	   and	  professional	   values	   were	   carried	   by	   nurses	   and	   student	   nurses,	   (respective	  dates)	   both	   of	   these	   having	   been	   identified	   as	   important	   for	   well	   motivated	  nursing	   practice.	   	   So	   then,	   although	   distinction	   might	   be	   made	   between	  professional	   and	   personal	   values,	   and	   this	   might	   undermine	   Catlin’s	   position	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because	   conscience	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   deeply	   held	   personal	   values,	   I	   will	   not	  take	  this	  as	  an	  acceptable	  argument	  because	  of	  the	  reasons	  given	  above.	  	  In	  conclusion	  this	  means	  that	  although	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  objection	  to	  circumcision	  or	  objection	  to	  a	  doctor’s	  plan	  of	  care	  and	  objection	  to	  abortion	  or	  blood	  transfusion:	  the	  first	  is	  a	  professional	  or	  clinical	  objection	  and	  the	  second	  is	  an	  objection	  based	  on	  religious	  grounds,	  it	   is	  defendable	  to	  accept	  them	  both	  as	  examples	  of	   ‘conscientious	  objection’.	  However,	   it	  would	  be	  more	  correct	   to	  describe	   Catlin’s	   position	   as	   one	   ‘professional	   objection’	   or	   ‘clinical	   objection’.	  This	   form	   of	   objection	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   a	   subcategory	   of	   ‘conscientious	  objection’,	   and	   has	   specific	   issues	   associated	   with	   it,	   that	   do	   not	   necessarily	  overlap	  with	   ‘personal	  conscientious	  objection’,	   in	   its	  narrower	  sense.	  The	   idea	  that	   what	   Catlin	   describes	   as	   conscientious	   objection,	   is	   rather	   a	   clinical	  objection,	   brings	   into	   sharp	   focus	   the	   power	   difference	   that	   exists	   between	  nurses	   and	   doctors,	   that	   is	   so	   influential	   on	   the	   experience	   of	   moral	   distress.	  Added	   to	   this,	   although	  what	  Catlin	  proposes	   is	   really	  a	  professional	  objection,	  one	  must	   not	   fail	   to	   recognise	   the	   difficulty	   of	   continuing	   to	   care	   for	   a	   patient	  when	  one	   is	  emotionally	  disturbed,	  having	   the	  sense	   that	   the	  actions	  one	  does,	  are	  more	   akin	   to	   torture	   than	   care.	  Under	   these	   circumstances,	   the	  nurse	  who	  stays	  with	  her	  patient	   can	  hardly	  be	  a	   ‘life	   giving’	   (Halldorsdottir,	  2008,	  p650)	  source	  where	  a	  sense	  of	  spiritual	  connection	  can	  be	  maintained.	  But	  worse	  than	  this	   is	   to	   conscientiously	  object	  and	  step	  away	   from	   the	  patient	  and	  sever	   that	  relationship.	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In	  chapter	  seven,	  exploration	  will	  be	  made	  into	  how	  the	  nurse	  can	  be	  cared	  for	  in	  such	   a	   way	   that	   her	  moral	   distress	   is	   lessened	   or	   removed,	   but	   for	   now,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   see	   how	   conscientiously	   objecting	   to	   doctors’	   ‘futile’	   orders	   can	   be	  justified	  once	  the	  arguments	   in	  previous	  chapters	  are	  added	  to	  the	  detrimental	  effect	   on	   the	   patient	   should	   the	   nurse	   withdraw	   her	   care.	   The	   nurse	   is	   often	  working	   with	   limited	   empirical	   information,	   in	   law	   and	   in	   institutional	  constructs	  she	  is	  identified	  as	  a	  professional	  who	  is	  accountable	  and	  responsible	  for	  her	  practice,	  but	  in	  the	  medical	  sphere	  she	  works	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  doctor.	  Finally,	  although	  Catlin	  states	  that	  the	  nurse	  who	  conscientiously	  objects	  must	   not	   abandon	   her	   patient,	   given	   the	   intimate	   nature	   of	   the	   nurse-­‐patient	  relationship,	   this	   is	   exactly	   what	   she	   does	   when	   she	   seeks	   to	   pass	   on	   care	   to	  someone	   else.	   The	   patient	   will	   still	   receive	   the	   medical	   care	   he	   has	   been	  prescribed,	  and	  assuming	  that	  this	  is	  legal	  treatment,	  there	  is	  no	  resultant	  benefit	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  Added	   to	   this	   is	   the	   worrying	   self-­‐interest	   that	   is	   a	   fundamental	   feature	   of	  conscientious	  objection,	  after	  all	  codes	  already	  have	   in	  place	  guidance	  on	   frank	  abuse	  of	   patients,	  which	  may	  well	   include	   abuse	  by	   the	  doctor.	   The	  NMC	   code	  currently	  has	  the	  patient	  as	  its	  primary	  focus,	  but	  the	  ANA	  has	  a	  definite	  flavour	  of	  professional	  self-­‐interest.	  As	  has	  been	  already	  noted,	  to	  specifically	  articulate	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  carrying	  out	  a	  doctor’s	  orders	  as	  proposed	  by	  Catlin,	  reflects	  a	  fundamentally	  adversarial	  relationship	  between	  the	  nurse	  and	  doctor:	  the	  nurse	  conscientiously	  objects	  to	  the	  doctor’s	  orders,	  and	  it	  is	  him	  with	  whom	  the	   conflict	   exists.	   Furthermore,	   it	   seems	   that	   this	   act	   does	   not	   only	   affect	   a	  preservation	  of	  integrity	  but	  is	  also	  an	  assertion	  of	  autonomy	  or	  power	  that	  the	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nurse	  makes	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  doctor.	   Indeed	  Abbott	   (1988)	  describes	   the	   fact	  that	  nurses	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  accountable	  to	  doctors	  for	  the	  medical	  treatments	  they	   perform	   as	   being	   intricately	   linked	  with	   ‘professional	   power,	   jurisdiction	  and	   subordination’	   (1988,	   p.73)	   and	   as	   McGann	   (2004)	   has	   pointed	   out,	   the	  development	   of	   the	   nursing	   profession	   was	   a	   time	   of	   professionalisation	   for	  women	  everywhere	   after	   the	   growth	  of	   the	  women’s	  movement	   in	   the	  US	   and	  the	  suffrage	  campaign	  in	  Britain.	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  to	   doctors’	   orders	   could	   in	   fact	   be	   more	   about	   releasing	   nurses	   from	   this	  perceived	  subordination	  to	  doctors	  than	  about	  improving	  patients’	  lives.	  	  The	  perception	  of	  professional	  inequality	  is	  certainly	  an	  erroneous	  source	  from	  which	   to	   justify	  conscientious	  objection.	  Firstly,	   it	  wrongly	   includes	  and	  affects	  the	  patient.	  Should	  there	  be	  battles	  to	  be	  made	  about	  this	  inequality,	  then	  nurses	  ought	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   close	   bond	   that	   exists	   between	   nurse	   and	   patient	   in	  excellent	  care	   is	  not	  compromised.	  Such	  battles	  should	  be	  made	  away	  from	  the	  bed-­‐side.	  	  However,	   secondly,	   it	   is	   a	  misunderstanding	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  nurse	  and	   doctor.	   To	   place	   conscientious	   objection	   under	   Catlin’s	   position	   in	   the	  professional	   code	   of	   conduct,	   brings	   with	   it	   an	   associated	   responsibility	   or	  professional	   duty;	   that	   is	   the	   responsibility	   of	   medical	   decision-­‐making.	   This	  effectively	  confers	  onto	  the	  nurse,	  responsibility	  for	  something	  for	  which	  in	  fact,	  she	  does	  not	  have	  responsibility.	  To	   imply	  to	  nurses	  that	  medical	  decisions	  are	  something	   for	  which	   they	   are	   responsible	  means	   that	  medical	   decisions	  might	  become	  too	  much	  of	  a	  focus	  for	  the	  nurse.	  Although	  nurses	  do	  have	  to	  consider,	  
	   162	  
evaluate	  and	  advocate	   for	  patients	   in	   response	   to	  medical	  decisions,	   the	  prime	  focus	  ought	  always	  to	  be	  nursing	  the	  patient.	  The	  promotion	  of	  the	  nurse	  as	  an	  ‘autonomous	   practitioner’	   since	   the	   1970s,	   that	   can	   perhaps	   have	   associated	  with	  it	  an	  inflated	  sense	  of	  responsibility,	  could	  well	  be	  a	  contributory	  factor	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress.	  Despite	  what	  nurses	  think	  of	  themselves,	  if	  they	  expect	   to	  have	   the	  authority	   to	  make	  medical	  decisions,	   they	  will	   inevitably	  be	  frustrated.	  	  	  Conclusion	  	  In	  the	  preceding	  two	  chapters	  and	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  doctors’	  orders	  as	  defined	  by	  Catlin	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  UK	   code	   of	   conduct	   despite	   its	   inclusion	   in	   the	   GMC	   code	   and	   the	   ANA	   code.	  Firstly,	   for	   the	  nurse	   to	   conscientiously	  object	   to	  doctors’	   ‘futile’	   orders	   can	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  clinical	  objection,	  and	  nurses	  do	  not	  carry	  authority	  to	  make	  this	  objection.	  As	  well,	   for	   the	  nurse	   to	   remain	  with	   the	  patient	   is	   the	  primary	  goal	  of	  nursing.	  Proximity	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  nurse	  emotionally	  responding	  to	  the	  patient	   and	   sustaining	   that	   patient	   physically,	   psychologically	   and	   spiritually	  through	   poor	   health.	   Doctors	   do	   not	   share	   this	   professional	   goal	   and	   the	   ANA	  code	  undermines	   the	  patient	  as	   focus	  because	   it	  gives	   too	  much	  priority	   to	   the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  the	  individual	  nurse	  or	  nursing	  profession.	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Chapter	  Seven:	  Defence	  of	  the	  position	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  is	  
unsupportable	  in	  ‘futile’	  orders	  and	  alternative	  resolutions.	  	  	  Introduction	  	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  thesis,	  moral	  distress	  was	  accepted	  to	  be	  a	  valid	  nursing	  experience,	  especially	  when	  caring	  for	  very	  ill	  patients	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  die	  and	  who	   are	   given	   ‘futile’	   medical	   treatment.	   Emotions	   were	   accepted	   to	   be	   valid	  sources	   of	   emotional	   judgment	   so	   long	   as	   they	   withstood	   reasoned	   analysis.	  Conscience	   was	   accepted	   as	   being	   closely	   associated	   with	   moral	   distress	   and	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  doctors’	  orders	  in	  ‘futile’	  circumstances	  was	  accepted	  as	  a	  reasonable	  response	  to	  moral	  distress	  and	  worthy	  of	  examination.	  However,	  reasoned	   analysis	   did	   not	   support	   the	   proposition	   that	   the	   nursing	   code	   of	  conduct	  ought	  to	  be	  altered	  so	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  doctors’	  orders	  be	  included,	  as	  per	  Catlin’s	  suggestion.	  	  This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  achieve	  two	  aims.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  objection	  to	  the	  position	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis.	  That	  is	  that	  nurses	  who	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  conscientious	   objection	   under	   Catlin’s	   conditions,	   might	   lose	   a	   sense	   of	  autonomy	  and	  responsibility	  for	  their	  actions.	  Such	  a	  loss	  could	  reduce	  the	  nurse	  to	  a	  professional	  who	  thoughtlessly	  follows	  orders.	  At	  its	  worst	  this	  could	  mean	  that	  nurses	  engage	  in	  harm	  to	  patients;	  harm	  that	  could	  be	  as	  bad	  as	  atrocity.	  	  Secondly,	   an	   analysis	   of	   literature	   in	   the	   ethics	   of	   care	   and	   spirituality	  will	   be	  made	   in	   order	   to	   offer	   some	   resolutions	   to	   moral	   distress	   that	   add	   to	   the	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literature	  that	  already	  exists	  on	  this	  topic.	  These	  resolutions	  will	  concentrate	  on	  ethical	  reasoning	  more	  than	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  these	  reasons.	  This	  is	  in	  keeping	   with	   Solomon’s	   (2003)	   model	   of	   emotional	   judgement	   that	   requires	  reason	   to	   supplement	   emotion.	   In	   order	   to	   reach	   this	   end,	   the	   nature	   of	   harm	  that	   consistently	   appears	   in	   moral	   distress	   and	   that	   has	   been	   consistently	  identified	   through	   the	   reasoned	   analysis	   in	   this	   thesis,	   and	   that	   requires	  resolution	  will	  be	  identified.	  	  Lack	  of	  a	  right	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  might	  undermine	  conscience	  	  It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   if	   nurses	   are	   not	   offered	   the	   right	   to	   conscientious	  objection	  as	  proposed	  by	  Catlin,	   they	  might	  not	  have	  a	   sense	  of	   autonomy	  and	  responsibility	   for	   their	  actions.	  Should	   this	  claim	  stand	  up	   to	  analysis,	   it	  would	  effectively	  disassemble	  my	  position.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  would	  remove	  a	  sense	  of	  good	   conscience	   from	   the	   nurse;	   conscience	   having	   been	   accepted	   as	   an	  important	  feature	  of	  human	  and	  professional	  morality.79	  It	  would	  undermine	  the	  fourfold	  object	  that	  was	  identified	  to	  make	  up	  conscience80.	  Firstly,	  the	  sense	  of	  responsibility	   that	   is	   an	   essential	   feature	   of	   individual	   nursing	   practice	   (and	  nursing	  as	  a	  professional	  body)	  would	  be	  lost	  because	  nurses	  could	  be	  forced	  to	  detach	   themselves	   from	   a	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   for	   their	   actions.81	   Secondly,	  associated	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  responsibility,	  would	  be	  the	  loss	  of	  autonomy	  that	  has	  been	   so	   valued	   as	   nursing	   has	  moved	   from	   a	   ‘subservient’	   past.82	   Thirdly,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  79	  Chapter	  two.	  80	  Ibid	  81	  See	  p100-­‐102.	  82	  Ibid	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most	   worryingly,	   this	   could	   mean	   that	   primary	   harm	   might	   be	   caused	   to	  	  patients.	  These	  wrong	  actions	  could	  be	  as	  wrongful	  as	  the	  committing	  of	  atrocity,	  as	  has	  already	  happened	  in	  Nazi	  Germany.	  Finally,	  and	  more	  nebulously,	  nurses	  could	  lose	  a	  sense	  of	  meaning	  and	  purpose	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  work	  of	  caring	  (Meiers	  &	  Brauer,	  2008;	  Gustafsson	  2009).	  	  	  All	  of	  these	  factors	  could	  reduce	  the	  quality	  of	  care	  of	  patients,	  but	  the	  latter	  two	  effects	  are	  the	  most	  important.	  That	  is,	  patients	  need	  to	  be	  protected	  and	  cared	  for	   and	   nurses	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   care.	   Although	   these	   are	   mutually	  interdependent	  states,	   it	   is	  essential	   that	  nursing	  does	  not	   lose	  sight	  of	   the	   fact	  that	  patients	  ought	  always	  to	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  professional	  concerns.	  	  Nurses	  who	  carry	  out	  actions	  that	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  wrong	  will	  thereafter	  lose	  a	  sense	   of	   responsibility,	   with	   a	   risk	   that	   they	   might	   subsequently	   carry	   out	  atrocities	  or	  wrongful	  acts.	  	  Articles	  were	  written	  about	  the	  nurse	  as	  ‘technician’	  in	  earlier	  decades,	  and	  the	  nurse	   as	   ‘technician’	   is	   a	   still	   a	   derogatory	   term	   when	   referred	   to	   in	   nursing	  circles.	   When	   used	   in	   a	   perjorative	   sense,	   it	   describes	   a	   nurse	   who	   is	   a	  professional	  with	  technical	  expertise	  who	  carries	  out	  actions	  obediently	  without	  	  consideration	  of	  a	  broader	  personal,	  ethical	  and	  clinical	  perspective;	  the	  task	  or	  the	  machine	   is	   the	   focus	   of	   activity,	   not	   the	   patient	   (Pickles,	   1999;	   Parlapiano,	  1972).	  When	  the	  ideas	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  thesis	  were	  suggested	  at	  the	  meeting	  on	  moral	   distress	   and	   conscientious	   objection	   (Yale	  University,	   2009)	  many	  of	  the	   attendees	   used	   this	   term	   in	   response.	   To	   exclude	   conscientious	   objection	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from	  the	  nurses’	  repertoire	  of	  potential	  responses	  to	  moral	  distress,	  was	  seen	  to	  reduce	   her	   to	   ‘merely	   a	   technician’.	   Subsequent	   discussion	   was	   a	   little	   more	  tortuous	   both	   in	   its	   trajectory	   and	   in	   its	   final	   destination,	   but	   led	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  surely	  once	  one	  abdicates	  oneself	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	   one’s	   actions,	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   that	   at	   some	   point	   one	   could	   be	   complicit	   in	  atrocious	  acts,	   such	  as	   those	  who	  participated	  and	  supported	  Nazi	  atrocities	   in	  World	  War	  One.	  	  The	  evidence	  for	  irresponsible	  care	  leading	  to	  atrocity.	  	  In	  the	  history	  of	  nursing,	  authors	  have	  highlighted	  the	  tendency	  of	  nurses	  in	  the	  past	   to	   be	   blindly	   obedient	   to	   doctors.	   	   Often	   negative	   associations	   are	   made	  between	   nurses	   of	   the	   past	   and	   such	   feminine	   qualities	   as	   submissiveness,	  powerlessness	  and	  so	  on.	  83	  	  Reich	   (2001)	   discusses	   how	   nurses	   in	   Nazi	   Germany	   gave	   lethal	   injections	   to	  patients	   whilst	   encouraging	   them	   to	   receive	   the	   ‘treatment’.	   This	   included	  participation	   in	   the	  killing	  of	  over	   five	   thousand	  disabled	  German	  children	  and	  seventy	  thousand	  handicapped	  adults	  (Benedict	  and	  Kuhla,	  1999).	  He	  points	  out	  that	  under	  Nazism	  there	  was	  a	  manipulation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  care,	  where	  care	  of	  the	  individual	  was	  usurped	  by	  ‘care’	  of	  the	  whole	  society.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  83	  Rafferty	  et	  al.	  (1997,	  for	  example	  pp	  23-­‐24,	  p101)	  and	  Rafferty	  (1996)	  offer	  a	  substantial	  nursing	  history,	  with	  description	  of	  the	  feminist	  stance	  and	  fight	  against	  subservience	  to	  medicine	  frequently	  referred	  to.	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Steppe	  (1997a,	  1997b,	  1997c)	   in	  her	  investigation	  into	  the	  reasons	  why	  nurses	  committed	   these	   acts,	   frames	   the	   complicity	   of	   nurses	   with	   Nazi	   atrocity	   and	  prejudice	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  the	  obedient/self	  sacrificing	  ideology	  of	  nursing	  at	  the	  time.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  some	  carried	  out	  their	  orders	  with	  what	  could	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   professionalism	   and	   empathic	   care.	   For	  example	  one	  nurse	  stated	  that	  	  	  	   ‘Patients	  who	  were	   strong	   enough	   sat	   themselves	  up	   in	   bed;	  we	  laid	  an	  extra	  pillow	  under	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  others	   in	  order	  to	   lift	  them	   up	   a	   little.	   In	   giving	   them	   the	   dissolved	   substance,	   I	  proceeded	  with	  great	   compassion.	   I	  had	   told	   the	  patients	  earlier	  that	  they	  had	  to	  have	  a	  little	  treatment.	  Obviously,	  I	  could	  only	  tell	  this	   little	   tale	   to	   those	   patients	   who	   were	   conscious	   enough	   to	  understand.	  In	  giving	  them	  the	  drink,	  I	  took	  them	  in	  my	  arms	  and	  caressed	   them.	   If	   they	   did	   not	   empty	   the	   glass,	   for	   example,	  because	  it	  tasted	  so	  bitter,	  then	  I	  encouraged	  them	  by	  saying	  they	  had	  drunk	  so	  much	  of	  it,	  they	  should	  drink	  the	  rest	  of	  it,	  because	  otherwise	   the	   treatment	   would	   not	   be	   complete.	   Some	   of	   them	  were	   so	   persuaded	  by	  my	   encouragement	   that	   they	   finished	   the	  glass	  completely.	  With	  others,	  we	  fed	  them	  by	  spoonfuls.	  As	  I	  said	  before,	   the	   way	   we	   proceeded	   was	   determined	   by	   the	   patient’s	  behaviour	  and	  condition.’(p21)	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Some	   other	   nurses	   made	   the	   decision	   to	   carry	   out	   these	   orders	   because	   they	  believed	   in	   the	   underlying	   political	   cause.	   Steppe	   ends	   (p25)	   her	   analysis	   by	  questioning	   whether	   it	   would	   be	   good	   to	   question	   worldwide	   ‘the	   degree	   to	  which	  obedience	  and	  adaptation	  are	  still	  characteristic	  of	  good	  nursing	  and	  how	  far	  we	  have	   really	   come	  with	   our	   demands	   for	   professional	   independence	   and	  self	  determination’.	  	  	  Other	   researchers	   support	   Steppe’s	   position.	   For	   example,	   McFarland-­‐Icke	  (1999)	  found	  that	  nurses	  disassociated	  themselves	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  their	  actions	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  doctor	  to	  excuse	  complicity	  in	  atrocities.	   Bauman	   (1993)	   has	   also	   described	   how	   a	   lack	   of	   responsibility	   can	  lead	   to	   always	   assuming	   someone	   else	   is	   responsible.	   Such	   a	   sense	   leads	   to	  complicity	   in	   wrong-­‐doing	   such	   as	   nurses	   helping	   to	   transport	   patients	   to	  execution,	  whilst	   feeling	  no	  responsibility	   for	  the	  outcome.	  Staub	  (2003)	   in	  her	  work	  on	  bystanders	  who	  watched	  atrocities	  such	  as	  the	  Rwandan	  massacres	  has	  also	  discovered	  this	  lack	  of	  sense	  of	  responsibility.	  	  The	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   conscientious	   objection	   to	   a	   doctor’s	   orders	  increases	  the	  nurse’s	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  and	  therefore	  might	  protect	  patients	  from	  future	  wrongs	  such	  as	  those	  incurred	  in	  Nazi	  Germany,	  must	  be	  asked.	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The	   reasons	  why	  conscientious	  objection	  does	  not	   reduce	   the	   risk	  of	   atrocities	  being	  committed	  by	  nurses.	  	  Nursing	  historians	  such	  as	  Steppe	  have	  sought	  to	  understand	  nursing	  atrocities	  under	  the	  paradigm	  of	  feminist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  history	  of	  nursing.	  Such	  an	  interpretation	   has	   a	   narrow	  perspective	   that	   seeks	   to	   reconfirm	  prejudgments	  such	  as	  that	  nurses	  were	  subservient.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  has	   a	   self-­‐serving	   interest;	   that	   is	   to	   further	   promote	   nurse	   autonomy	   and	  independence	   from	   medicine.	   This	   fight	   for	   independence	   from	   medicine	   can	  almost	   become	   the	   identifying	   feature	   of	   nursing	   history.	   Perhaps	   this	   reflects	  the	  difficulty	   in	  defining	  nursing	  as	  a	  professional	  activity.	  This	   is	  evidenced	  by	  many	  scholarly	  works84	  that	  seek	  to	  define	  nursing	  and	  establish	  a	  discipline	  of	  scholarly	  work	  which	  is	  nursing	  and	  nothing	  else,	  but	  that	  never	  seem	  to	  achieve	  this	   goal	   (Milton,	   2008).	   Such	   a	   negative	   view	   of	   nursing	   history	   is	   no	   doubt	  detrimental	  to	  nursing.	  For	  example	  Ferrell	  and	  Coyle	  (2008)	  in	  their	  work	  into	  suffering	  and	  palliative	  care	  began	  their	  book	  by	  expressing	  surprise	  that	  much	  of	   what	   makes	   for	   good	   palliative	   care	   was	   found	   in	   nursing	   texts	   from	   the	  1900s.	  Indeed,	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  vocation	  and	  appreciation	  for	  one’s	  professional	  traditions	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  a	   feature	  of	  exceptionally	  creative	  people	  who	  are	   excellent	   examples	   of	   their	   field	   of	  work	   (Csikszentmihalyi	   and	  Nakamura,	  2007).	   Sadly,	   nursing	   history	   seems	   to	   fail	   to	   offer	   a	   tradition	   that	   we	   can	   be	  proud	  of	  and	  in	  a	  culturally	  updated	  form,	  emulate.	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This	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  nursing	  history,	  leads	  to	  poor	  evaluation	  of	  wider	  causes	  of	  events	  such	  as	  the	  atrocities	  committed	  under	  Nazism.	  Although	  nurses	  might	   have	   used	   a	   sense	   of	   lack	   of	   responsibility	   for	   their	   actions	   to	   justify	  wrong-­‐doing,	  there	  were	  other	  features	  that	  allowed	  them	  to	  behave	  as	  they	  did.	  After	  all,	  it	  wasn’t	  just	  nurses	  who	  were	  complicit	  in	  such	  acts.	  Doctors	  were	  also	  complicit	   and	   can’t	   be	   considered	   as	   obedient	   and	   self	   sacrificing	   in	   the	   same	  way	   –	   they	   weren’t	   taking	   direct	   orders	   from	   a	   nurse,	   and	   the	   self	   sacrificing	  virtue	   is	   not	   one	   associated	   with	   men	   and	   doctors.	   Furthermore	   offenders	  included	  other	  professional	  groups,	  workers	  and	  society	  in	  general.	  	  Essential	   to	   this	   event	   was	   the	   deep	   rooted	   and	   widespread	   anti-­‐Semitism	  (Goldhagan,	   1996).	   	   Indeed,	   it	   was	   not	   so	   much	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   sense	   of	  responsibility	  that	  allowed	  these	  events	  to	  happen,	  but	  rather	  the	  elimination	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  conscience,	  or	  ‘overlain	  conscience’,	  as	  has	  been	  described	  by	  Kolnai.	  That	  is,	  those	  who	  participated	  in	  wrong-­‐doing	  no	  longer	  had	  a	  conscience	  that	  was	  informed	  by	  longstanding	  consensus	  and	  that	  has	  at	  its	  heart	  an	  aversion	  to	  killing.	  Instead,	  conscience	  had	  become	  overlain,	  moral	  absolutes	  no	  longer	  being	  respected	   and	   adhered	   to,	   but	   rather	   replaced	   by	   aberrant	   ideologies	   and	  political	   systems.	  Lagerway	   (2004)	   supports	   this	  position,	   and	  argues	   that	   it	   is	  essential	   to	   recognise	   and	   cease	   dangerous	   propensities	   such	   as	   the	  marginalisation,	   dehumanisation	   and	   isolation	   of	   the	   others	   that	   are	   common	  features	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  proper	  morality.	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So	  then,	  although	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  is	  important,85	  of	  more	  importantance	  than	   this	   are	   the	   ethical	   principles	   that	   guide	   society	   and	  within	   this,	   nursing	  practice.	  The	  most	  significant	  change	  in	  Nazi	  Germany	  was	  the	  political	  ideology	  that	   became	  an	   accepted	  norm.	  Once	   this	  happens,	   then	   any	   act	   sanctioned	  by	  the	   political	   ideology	   becomes	   justifiable.	   If	   this	   argument	   about	   overlain	  conscience	  being	   the	   true	  villain	  of	  nursing’s	  Nazi	  history	   is	  accepted,	   then	   the	  nursing	  code	  of	  conduct	  as	  it	  stands	  prevents	  atrocity,	  because	  patients	  are	  to	  be	  cared	   for,	   safeguarded	   from	  abuse	  and	  nursed	  with	   competence.	  Conscientious	  objection	   as	   described	   by	   Catlin,	   or	   as	   is	   promoted	   by	   the	   American	   Nurses’	  Association	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  addition	  to	  make	  sure	  of	  this.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  responsibility	  is	  unimportant.	  But	  there	  is	  more	  to	  grapple	  with	  on	  this	  issue	  because	  responsibility	  isn’t	  so	  easily	  defined.	  As	  the	  section	  on	  moral	   responsibility	   in	   the	   Stanford	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Philosophy	   (2009)	   points	  out,	  philosophers	  are	  not	  always	  in	  agreement	  about	  what	  responsibility	  means.	  To	  begin	  with,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  can	  in	  itself	  also	  be	  an	  abdication	  of	  responsibility.	  	  Conscientious	  objection	  can	  be	  an	  abdication	  of	  responsibility.	  	  Before	  continuing,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  reiterate	  an	  earlier	  point.	  There	  is	  a	  risk	  in	  responding	   to	   these	   propositions,	   that	   a	   ‘straw	  man’	   could	   be	   introduced	   and	  therefore	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  the	  position	  of	  this	  thesis.	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  85	  As	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  my	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  not	  lead	  to	  improper	  loss	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility,	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suggest	   that	   conscientious	   objection	   is	   wrong	   under	   all	   circumstances.	   On	   the	  contrary,	   my	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   nursing	   code	   of	   conduct	   ought	   not	   have	   a	  clause	  that	  directs	  nurses	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  as	  a	  choice	  or	  responsibility	  when	   they	   are	   ordered	   to	   participate	   in	   ‘futile’	   care.	   The	   law	   already	   offers	  protection	   for	   nurses	   to	   avoid	   participation	   in	   abortion.	   Under	   particular	  conditions,	   individual	   nurses	   might	   refuse	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   doctor’s	   order.	  However,	   this	   ought	   to	   be	   an	   individual	   decision	   where	   the	   nurse	   faces	  consequences	   as	   an	   individual.	   The	   NMC	   already	   sanctions	   that	   nurses	   can	  withdraw	   care	   under	   abusive	   conditions,	   and	   this	   includes	   illegal	   acts.	   That	   is,	  the	   nurse	   can	   refuse	   to	   carry	   out	   orders	   under	   extreme	   circumstances.	   The	  situations	   that	   cause	   moral	   distress	   that	   have	   been	   addressed	   by	   Catlin,	   also	  expose	  the	  nurse	  to	  extreme	  conditions	  in	  so	  far	  as	  she	  is	  exposed	  to	  trauma	  and	  suffering,	  but	   this	   is	  not	  equivalent	   to	   the	  act	  of	  killing,	   and	  despite	   the	  ethical	  uncertainty	  around	  this	  type	  of	  care,	  for	  now	  society	  has	  by	  consensus	  deemed	  it	  to	  be	  right.	  	  To	   return	   to	   conscientious	   objection	   then,	   seemingly	   supporting	   Steppe’s	  position	  on	  obedience,	  Staub	  (2003)	  carried	  out	  empirical	  research	  to	  determine	  the	  factors	  that	  influence	  a	  person	  who	  witnesses	  atrocity.	  She	  wanted	  to	  identify	  why	  some	  people	  passively	  stand	  by	  and	  watch	  an	  atrocity	  occur	  such	  as	  mass	  killings	  in	  Rwanda,	  and	  why	  others	  intervene	  to	  stop	  such	  occurrences.	  	  She	   observed	   that	   bystanders,	   who	   do	   not	   become	   involved,	   fail	   to	   influence	  events	  in	  a	  positive	  direction,	  and	  thereafter	  tend	  to	  end	  up	  becoming	  more	  like	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the	   perpetrators;	   they	   lose	   a	   sense	   of	   concern	   for	   the	   victims	   and	   can	   even	  become	  actively	  involved	  with	  the	  perpetrators.	  	  Like	   Steppe,	   she	   observed	   that	   overly	   strong	   respect	   for	   authority	   with	   a	  predominant	  tendency	  to	  obey	  authority,	  was	  a	  feature	  of	  bystanders.	  However,	  as	  was	  argued	  in	  relation	  to	  Nazism,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  respect	  of	  authority	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  legal	  clinical	  practice	  where	  individual	  decisions	  are	  made	  and	  care	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  professional	  and	  transparent	  manner.	  Rather,	  as	  already	  has	  been	  discussed,	  this	  was	  respect	  for	  a	  political	  authority	  that	  exists	  in	   a	   monolithic	   culture.	   It	   also	   tends	   to	   coincide	   with	   a	   sense	   of	   superiority	  where	  the	  other	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  somehow	  inferior	  to	  the	  perpetrator	  or	  bystander.	  	  	  Staub’s	  work	  points	  out	  an	  important	  feature.	  Bystanders	  who	  observe	  atrocity	  are	  not	  necessarily	  actively	  or	  intentionally	  causing	  harm.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  of	  these	  bystanders	  could	  be	  silently	  encouraging	  the	  continuation	  of	  harm	  and	  lack	  the	  ‘courage’	  to	  participate	  themselves.	  However,	  some	  of	  these	  bystanders	  must	  also	  be	  conscientious	  objectors:	  they	  judge	  the	  acts	  as	  harmful,	  they	  choose	  not	  to	  participate	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  protect	  their	  sense	  of	  integrity	  and	  autonomy.	  As	  hard	   as	   it	   is	   to	   consider	   that	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   one	   must	   remember	   that	  conscientious	  objection	  has	  as	  its	  central	  tenet,	  the	  protection	  of	  self.	  Whether	  or	  not	   the	   bystander	   disapproves	   of	   or	   doesn’t	   disapprove	   of	   the	   actions	   they	  observe,	  each	  only	  serves	  to	  allow	  atrocities	   to	  continue.	   It	   is	  perhaps	   ironic	   to	  note	   that	   the	   emotional	   detachment	   from	   victims	   that	   tends	   to	   follow	   seems	  similar	   to	   responses	   in	   moral	   distress,	   where	   the	   nurse	   detaches	   from	   her	  patient	  either	  emotionally,	  physically	  or	  both.	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  This	  perspective	  shows	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  can	  in	  itself	  be	  an	  abdication	  of	   responsibility	   and	   this	   perhaps	   is	   the	  most	   serious	  negative	   consequence	  of	  Catlin’s	   position.	   The	   nurse	   who	   is	   morally	   distressed	   can	   choose	   to	  conscientiously	   object	   to	   either	   medical	   treatment	   that	   is	   justifiable	   to	   the	  patient	  or	  else	  it	  could	  be	  that	  she	  conscientiously	  objects	  to	  medical	  treatment	  that	  is	  unjustifiable.	  Conscientious	  objection	  under	  Catlin’s	  conditions	  is	  so	  self-­‐	  focused,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  consideration	  of	  what	  the	  nurse	  is	  to	  do	  in	  actual	  harm,	  and	   indeed	  no	  guidance	   is	  given	  as	   to	  how	  she	   is	   to	  distinguish	  between	   these	  two	   states.	   By	   conceding	   to	   constraints	   such	   as	   lack	   of	   authority,	   emotional	  disturbance	  and	  risk	  of	  censure,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  nurse	  will	  not	  fulfill	  her	  obligations	   to	   patients	   under	   harmful	   conditions.	   It	   seems	   then	   that	  conscientious	  objection	  on	  its	  own	  is	  not	  good	  enough	  under	  such	  circumstances.	  There	   is	   a	   requirement	   for	   nurses	   to	   act	   and	   conscientious	   objection	   is	  essentially	  a	  passive	  response.	  	  	  To	  explore	  in	  depth	  the	  actions	  that	  the	  nurse	  is	  obliged	  to	  take	  once	  real	  harm	  is	  identified	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis.	   However,	   the	   nurse	   under	   such	  conditions	   ought	   not	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   doctor’s	   order.	   This	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	  conscientious	   objection.	   It	   is	   rather	   an	   act	   of	   disobedience	   that	   is	   required	   to	  protect	  the	  patient.	  Support	  for	  this	  position	  can	  be	  found	  in	  military	  law	  where	  soldiers	   are	   not	   protected	   from	   blame	   should	   they	   follow	   illegal	   orders.86	  Essential	  to	  this	  framing	  of	  disobedience	  rather	  than	  conscientious	  objection,	   is	  that	   it	   is	   not	   a	   reflection	   of	   individual	   perspective,	   but	   rather,	   takes	   legal	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  86	  See	  chapter	  three.	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professional	   sources	  as	   the	  standard	  by	  which	   to	   judge.	   It	   is	  not	   the	   individual	  nurse	  who	  would	   take	   this	   stance,	   but	   the	   nurse	   as	  member	   of	   a	   professional	  body	  who	  acts	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  other	  reasonable	  professionals	  would	  also	  act.	  It	  confers	  on	  the	  professional	  a	  responsibility	  that	  extends	  beyond	  one’s	  self	  and	  that	   does	   not	   allow	   the	   professional	   to	   excuse	   themselves	   from	   this	  responsibility.	   Childress	   (1985)	   has	   argued	   for	   the	   rightness	   of	   disobedience	  under	   illegal	   or	   frankly	   immoral	   circumstances	   and	   of	   course,	   the	   aim	   of	  disobedience	   is	   not	   self	   preservation	   but	   change	   of	   the	   circumstance	   to	  which	  one	  disobeys.	  	  When	   the	   nurse	   perceives	   harm	   that	   does	   not	   reach	   this	   level	   of	   certainty,	   as	  when	  doctors	  continue	  to	  treat	  patients	  who	  the	  nurse	  believes	  to	  be	  better	  off	  dead,	   her	   responsibility	   and	   obligation	   is	   to	   accept	   medical	   orders	   but	   to	  continue	  to	  assess	  and	  advocate	  for	  the	  patient,	  to	  carry	  out	  clinical	  procedures	  competently	  and	   to	  emotionally	  and	  physically	  engage	  with	   the	  patient	   to	  ease	  suffering.	   These	   obligations	   have	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   important	   to	   patients	  (Halldorsdottir,	   2008;	   Liu	   et	   al.	   2005)	   and	   nursing	   professionals	   (de	   Araujo	  &	  Zoboli,	  2010)	  	  	  The	  nature	  of	  harm	  in	  moral	  distress	  and	  how	  it	  is	  to	  be	  resolved.	  	  At	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   thesis	   I	   set	   out	   to	   identify	   the	   nature	   of	   harm	   that	   is	  inherent	   in	  moral	  distress	  when	  nurses	   are	   faced	  with	  medical	   ‘futility’.	   It	  was	  essential	   to	   identify	   if	   nurses	   were	   failing	   to	   address	   a	   primary	   harm	   to	   the	  patient,	  as	  empirical	  work	  seemed	  to	  insinuate	  but	  did	  not	  address	  in	  normative	  
	   176	  
resolutions.	   It	   is	   understandable	   that	   nurses	   experience	   moral	   distress	   when	  faced	   with	   these	   cases	   because	   they	   are	   not	   morally	   certain.	   As	   has	   been	  acknowledged,	  moral	  truth	  is	  not	  so	  easily	  accessible,	  and	  moral	  agents	  can	  only	  do	  their	  best	  to	  reach	  and	  respond	  to	  this	  truth.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  acknowledged	  that	   although	   consensus	   is	   important	   in	   identifying	   right	   action	   in	   medical	  ‘futility’,	   and	   the	  nurse	   is	   an	   important	  voice	   in	   this	  activity,	   the	  doctor	   carries	  authority	  for	  final	  decision-­‐making.	   	  Given	  that	  direct	  harm	  to	  the	  patient87	  has	  not	  been	  identified,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  any	  form	  of	  harm	  in	  moral	  distress	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  	  As	   Austin	   et	   al.	   (2005a)	   have	   indicated,	   resolutions	   to	   moral	   distress	   require	  both	  institutional	  and	  educational	  input.	  However	  it	  also	  requires	  recognition	  of	  the	  form	  of	  wrong-­‐doing	  that	  happens	  in	  moral	  distress.	  It	  seems	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  wrong	  done	  to	  patients,	  but	  is	  rather,	  wrong	  done	  by	  the	  doctor	  to	  the	  nurse.	   Other	   than	   that,	   harm	   is	   done	   to	   nurses	   as	   a	   direct	   result	   from	   their	  proximate	  exposure	  to	  traumatic	  circumstances.	  Such	  events	  are	  no-­‐one’s	   fault,	  but	   they	   are	   inherent	   in	   the	   business	   of	   living	   and	   dying	   and	   can’t	   all	   be	  alleviated	  by	  human	  endeavour:	  by	  nursing	  or	  in	  medicine.	  	  	  This	   conclusion	   is	   in	   some	   respects	   rather	   surprising,	   but	   is	   supported	   by	   the	  empirical	   evidence	   and	   indeed	   it	   is	   supported	   by	   some	   current	   changes	   in	  military	  training.	  The	  nurse	  who	  identifies	  her	  actions	  performed	  under	  orders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  87	  Here	  I	  do	  not	  include	  the	  harm	  such	  as	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  nurse	  or	  nurse	  turnover,	  because	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  has	  shown	  that	  nurses	  also	  can	  make	  more	  effort	  in	  their	  care,	  thus	  benefitting	  patients.	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as	   torture,	  or	   ‘futile’,	  or	  unjustifiable	   is	  harmed	  when	  she	  continues	  to	  perform	  those	   actions.	   It	   also	   has	   to	   be	   understood	   that	   the	   nurse	   who	   carries	   out	  doctors’	  orders	  to	  a	  degree	  loses	  time	  and	  attention	  from	  doing	  the	  basic	  caring	  tasks	   that	   are	   also	   essential	   to	   good	   patient	   care.88	   Her	   sense	   of	   personal	   and	  professional	   integrity	   is	   damaged	   and	   contributes	   to	   significant	   harmful	  emotional	  reactions	  such	  as	  burnout	  and	  compassion	   fatigue.	  Although	  authors	  imply	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   authority	   and	   constraint	   that	   the	   nurse	   experiences	   in	  moral	  distress	  is	  a	  form	  of	  harm89,	  in	  fact,	  it	  is	  not	  this	  that	  is	  wrong,	  but	  rather	  the	  lack	  of	  acknowledgement	  that	  this	  power	  difference	  exists	  and	  that	  therefore	  requires	   proper	   management.	   In	   order	   for	   this	   to	   happen	   both	   nurses	   and	  doctors	  need	  to	  change.	  It	  is	  improper	  management	  of	  the	  power	  difference	  that	  is	  the	  harm	  in	  moral	  distress	  and	  ‘futile’	  orders.	  	  Resolutions	   to	   moral	   distress	   have	   been	   presented	   and	   discussed	   in	   nursing	  literature.	  Education	  and	  inclusive	  interdisciplinary	  decision-­‐making	  are	  seen	  as	  key	  factors	  in	  this.	  The	  fact	  that	  wrong	  is	  not	  done	  to	  patients	  in	  cases	  of	  moral	  distress,	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  good	  communication	  between	  doctors	  and	  nurses	   and	   opportunities	   for	   ethical	   discussions	   significantly	   reduce	   moral	  distress	  or	  else	  are	  suggested	  as	  essential	  to	  its	  reduction	  (Erlin,	  2001;	  Austin	  et	  al.,	   2005b;	   Schwezner	   and	   Wang	   2006;	   Catlin	   2008;	   Breslin,	   2008;).90	   	   The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  details	  of	  how	  this	  communication	  ought	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  is	  not	  specified	  (Hamrick	  and	  Blackhall,	  2007)	  and	  details	  about	  what	  kind	  ethical	  reasoning	   ought	   to	   be	   included	   in	   education	   are	   also	   not	   specified.	   Perhaps	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  88	  See	  p25	  for	  evidence	  that	  shows	  nurses’	  frustration	  at	  this	  circumstance.	  89	  This	  was	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one.	  90	  There	  was	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  papers	  in	  chapter	  one.	  
	   178	  
because	  of	   the	   current	   learning	  objectives,	   at	   least	   some	  workshops	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  ineffectual	  in	  lowering	  moral	  distress	  even	  though	  attendees	  might	  enjoy	   them	   (Kalvemark	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   Less	   well	   described	   or	   intervened	   is	   the	  spiritual	  dimension	  of	  moral	  distress,	  but	  again	  evidence	  for	  its	  causal	  element	  to	  the	   experience	  of	  moral	  distress	   can	  be	   found	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  meaninglessness	  that	  accompanies	  the	  experience	  (Ewing	  &	  Carter,	  2004;	  Ferral,	  2006).91	  	  	  For	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	   chapter	   some	   interpersonal	   and	   educational	  resolutions	   will	   be	   offered	   that	   give	   explicit	   and	   specific	   guidance	   that	  contributes	   ideas	   to	   how	   moral	   distress	   might	   be	   resolved.	   Firstly,	   some	  consideration	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  will	  be	  made.	  Two	  authors	  on	  the	  subject	  offer	  perspectives	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  change	  inter-­‐professional	  communication,	  but	  it	  will	   also	  be	   argued	   that	   each	   falls	   short	  because	  of	   the	   lack	  of	   acceptance	  of	  consequentialist	   reasoning.	   It	  will	   be	   argued	   that	   consequentialist	   reasoning	   is	  an	   important	  way	   for	  nurses	   to	   frame	   their	   ethical	   reasoning	   and	   reduce	   their	  sense	  of	  distress.	  Secondly,	  the	  moral	  luck	  paradox	  that	  has	  already	  been	  applied	  to	   medicine	   by	   Dickenson	   (2003)	   as	   a	   method	   for	   reducing	   an	   overburdened	  sense	   of	   responsibility	   for	   doctors,	   will	   be	   shown	   to	   have	   some	   purpose	   for	  nurses	   too.	   All	   of	   these	   have	   educational	   significance.	   And	   finally,	   some	  consideration	  will	  be	  given	  to	  the	  spiritual	  aspect	  of	  moral	  distress.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  91	  Resolutions	  to	  moral	  distress	  as	  described	  in	  empirical	  papers	  were	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one.	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  Justification	  for	  the	  use	  of	  ethics	  of	  care	  	  In	   previous	   chapters	   the	   proximity	   to	   the	   patient,	   emotional	   involvement	  with	  the	  patient	  and	  a	   frustrated	  need	  to	  ease	  suffering	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  key	  element	  in	  moral	  distress.	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  examine	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  because	  it	  is	   a	   form	  of	   ethics	   that	   takes	  a	  partialistic	   stance,	   that	   emphasises	   relationship	  and	   in	   Slote’s	   (2007)	   view,	   takes	   empathy	   –	   an	   emotional	   and	   not	   necessarily	  rational	   faculty	   –	   as	   its	   foundation.	   This	   validation	   of	   the	   role	   of	   emotion	   in	  morality	   echoes	  my	   earlier	   interest	   in	   Solomon’s	  writings.	   Further	   to	   this,	   the	  ethics	  of	  care	  has	  received	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  in	  nursing	  academia92	  and	  has	  been	  promoted	  by	  some	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  ethical	  framework	  to	  inform	  nursing	  (Chambon	   &	   Irving,	   2003).	   Slote	   (2007)	   and	   Koehn	   (1998)	   both	   offer	  interpretations	   of	   the	   ethics	   of	   care	   that	   are,	   it	   will	   be	   argued,	   helpful	   to	   the	  resolution	  of	  the	  harm	  moral	  distress	  exposes.	  	  The	  ethics	  of	  care	  	  Gilligan	  (1982)	  carried	  out	  research	  that	  showed	  that	  girls	  and	  boys	  approached	  moral	   problems	   differently.	   Whereas	   boys	   had	   a	   tendency	   to	   approach	   such	  problems	  with	  a	  universalist	  paradigm	  such	  as	  deontology	  or	  consequentialism,	  girls	  tended	  to	  take	  into	  account	  aspects	  of	  these	  problems	  that	  were	  overlooked	  by	  boys	   and	   that	  were	  dependent	  on	  particular	   circumstance	   and	   relationship.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  92	  Although	  some	  care	  ethicists	  might	  be	  inclined	  to	  disassociate	  professional	  nursing	  care	  from	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  (Koehn,	  1998).	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She	  proposed	  that	  a	  female	  ethics	  was	  distinct	  from	  the	  ‘top	  down’	  approach	  by	  the	  predominantly	  male	  philosophers	  who	  had	  dominated	  the	  field.	  Researchers	  have	  developed	   the	   ideas	  of	  Gilligan.93	  Slote	   (2007)	  argues	   that	   this	  partialistic	  and	  sentimental	  (that	  is	  involving	  feeling	  and	  relationship)	  ethics	  was	  begun	  by	  Hume.	   Nordvedt	   (2011)	   following	   a	   nursing	   conference	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	   care	  summarised	  it	  as	  an	  approach	  to	  ethics	  that	  perceives	  humans	  as	  interdependent	  and	   that	   this	   interdependency	  makes	   us	   vulnerable.	   Indeed,	   Cronqvist	   (2004)	  points	   out	   that	   nurses	   are	  made	   vulnerable	   similarly	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  patient	  is	  vulnerable	  and	  need	  emotional	  support.	  	  The	  ethics	  of	  care	  is	  not	  without	  controversy	  and	  some	  question	  its	  validity	  as	  a	  complete	  framework	  for	  ethical	  decision-­‐making	  (Edwards,	  2011;).	  However,	  for	  this	   work,	   it	   will	   be	   assumed	   that	   there	   are	   authors	   who	   have	   made	   good	  analyses	   of	   the	   ethics	   of	   care	   and	   its	   usefulness	   in	   nursing	   (Nortvedt,	   1998;	  Edwards,	  2009;	  Sawatzky,	  2009,	  Nortvedt	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Nortvedt,	  2011;	  Vanlaere	  &	   Gastmans,	   2011)	   and	   my	   aim	   is	   to	   show	   how	   the	   two	   chosen	   authors	  perspectives	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  moral	  distress:	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  is	  useful	   because	   it	   helps	   in	   this	   domain.	   Furthermore,	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   that	  nurses	  who	  apply	  ethics	  of	  care	  style	  reasoning	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  suffer	  moral	  distress	  than	  those	  who	  do	  not	  (Nathaniel,	  2006).	  Therefore	  identifying	  possible	  gaps	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  is	  essential	  to	  helping	  nurses	  to	  resolve	  their	  distresss.	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  Noddings	  (2003)	  has	  also	  been	  an	  early	  influential	  writer	  in	  this	  field	  and	  has	  applied	  theory	  to	  subjects	  such	  as	  education.	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Slote	   defends	   the	   idea	   that	  morality	   and	  moral	   reasoning	   can	   be	   based	   on	   the	  concept	  that	  empathy	  could	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  source	  of	  our	  moral	  frameworks	  and	  norms.	  His	  work	  echoes	  the	  conclusions	  that	  were	  reached	  in	  chapters	  one	  and	  two	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  emotion	  in	  morality.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  he	  also	  gives	  some	  explanation	  about	  the	  existential	  challenges	  that	  nurse’s	  face	  in	  their	  care,	  although	   he	   did	   not	   have	   this	   as	   a	   intention	   in	   his	   work.	   He	   argues	   that	  deontology	  can	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  ethics	  of	  care	   to	  avoid	  a	  relativist	   foundation,	  but	  he	  rejects	  the	  inclusion	  of	  consequentialism.94	  	  	  Koehn	   offers	   some	   practical	   resolutions	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   moral	   distress	   as	   she	  argues	  for	  a	  care	  ethic	  based	  on	  principles	  that	  again	  might	  offer	  some	  resolution	  to	  moral	  distress.	  However,	   she	   like	  Slote,	  avoids	  any	  consideration	  of	   the	  part	  that	  consequentialism	  might	  play	  in	  health	  care.	  	  Slote’s	  (2007)	  ethic	  of	  care.	  	  Slote	  accepts	  that	  an	  ethic	  of	  care	  involves	  the	  identification	  of	  moral	  actions	  on	  the	  basis	   that	  an	  act	   is	  permissible	   if	   it	   exhibits	   caring	  on	   the	  part	  of	   its	  agent.	  	  (p10)	  He	  aims	  to	  demonstrate	   that	   the	  building	  and	  sustaining	  of	  relationships	  involves	  an	  ethical	  principle	  that	  ‘takes	  us	  beyond	  the	  usual	  distinction	  between	  egoism	  and	  altruism	  and	  thus	  transcends	  what	  is	  strictly	  moral’	  (p12)	  He	  argues	  that	   empathy	   is	   the	  basis	  of	  morality	   –	   that	   it	   is	   this	   rather	   than	   reason	  alone,	  that	   offers	   at	   least	   our	   intuitive	   grasp	   of	   right	   and	   wrong,	   and	   that	   in	  combination	  with	   reason,	   it	   is	   at	   the	  base	   for	  moral	  understanding.	  He	  defines	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  94	  Slote	  has	  already	  had	  some	  attention	  in	  nursing	  literature	  (van	  Hooft,	  2011).	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empathy	  as	   ‘feeling	  someone’s	  pain	  rather	   than	   feeling	   for	  someone	  as	   in	  pain’	  (p13)	  He	   accepts	  Hoffman’s	   position	   that	   the	   feelings	   or	   thoughts	   of	   the	   agent	  seem	  more	  associated	  with	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  person	  empathised	  with	  than	  to	  the	  agent	  who	  is	  empathising.	  He	  describes	  his	  ethic	  as	   ‘empathic	  caring’	  (p16)	  He	  argues	  that	  he	  sees	  that	  ethical	  debate	  can	  rest	  on	  empathising	  with	  a	  player	  in	   a	   situation	   and	   then	  defending	   this	  player	  by	  making	  him	  visible	   (p	  17).	  He	  relates	  this	  idea	  to	  abortion,	  but	  this	  could	  alternatively	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  role	  of	  advocacy	  in	  nursing95.	  The	  proximity	  to	  the	  patient	  means	  that	  the	  caring	  nurse	  is	  likely	  to	  empathise	  with	  a	  patient’s	  reality	  more	  than	  the	  doctor	  or	  other	  HCPs.	  	  	  He	  notes	  that	  spatial	  distance	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  empathy.	  His	  interest	  in	  this	  issue	  is	  in	  the	  exploration	  of	  ethical	  issues	  around	  helping	  or	  harming	  those	  who	  are	  at	  a	  distance	  and	  not	  necessarily	  in	  direct	  perception	  of	  the	  moral	  agent.	  However,	  this	   idea	   of	   spatial	   closeness	   and	   empathy,	   echoes	   the	   findings	   I	   discussed	   in	  chapter	  one,	  where	   it	  was	   found	   that	   the	  proximity	  of	   the	  nurse	   to	   the	  patient	  increased	  her	   sense	  of	  moral	  distress.	   Perhaps	   Slote’s	   idea	   further	   informs	   the	  problem	  of	  moral	  distress	  because	  he	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  nurse’s	  perception	  of	  moral	   reality	   is	  going	   to	  be	  heavily	   influenced	  by	   the	  greater	  empathy	   that	  she	  has	  with	  the	  patient.	  Where	  others	  have	  stated	  that	  the	  nurse	  differs	  because	  the	  nurse	   sees	   the	   suffering	   of	   the	   many	   and	   the	   doctor	   the	   saving	   of	   the	   few,	  perhaps	   this	   could	   be	   taken	   further,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   the	   nurse	   experiences	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  95	  The	  nurse	  as	  patients’	  advocate	  has	  been	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  central	  role	  of	  nursing	  and	  has	  had	  attention	  in	  nursing	  literature,	  sometimes	  in	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  profession,	  (MalliK,	  1996)	  and	  has	  largely	  been	  individual	  patient	  focused,	  (Hanks,	  2010)	  although	  recently	  Paquin	  (2011)	  has	  suggested	  that	  nurses	  ought	  to	  extend	  beyond	  the	  individual	  to	  social	  justice.	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suffering	   of	   the	   many,	   and	   because	   she	   is	   closer	   to	   this	   suffering,	   exists	   in	   a	  different	  moral	  realm	  to	  the	  doctor,	  beyond	  a	  simple	  calculation	  as	  above.	  	  	  The	  ethics	  of	  care	  is	  usually	  lacking	  in	  universal	  principles	  and	  Slote	  argues	  that	  empathy	  and	  care,	  to	  be	  released	  from	  the	  potential	  harm	  of	  relativism,	  need	  to	  be	   constrained	   within	   a	   broader	   and	   universal	   ethical	   code,	   and	   expresses	   a	  preference	   for	   deontological	   constraints	   on	   action.	   He	   argues	   that	   empathic	  intuitions	  are	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  norms	  such	  as	  do	  not	  kill.	  	  I	  agree	  that	  universal	  codes	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  morality,	  as	  has	  been	  previously	   discussed.	   	   Deontology	   offers	   a	   good	   explanation	   of	   this,	   because	   it	  ensures	  that	  some	  actions	  will	  never	  be	  performed	  because	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  they	  are	  wrong.	  Presumably	  this	  protects	  people	  from	  atrocity	  being	  performed	  under	  seemingly	  caring	  intent	  and	  behaviour,	  as	  was	  described	  earlier	  in	  relation	  to	  nurses	  who	  euthanised	  patients	  under	  Nazism.	  	  	  Indeed,	  as	  has	  been	  shown,	  once	  the	  nurse	  is	  sure	  that	  a	  medical	  order	  does	  not	  contravene	   laws	  and	   is	  an	  action	   that	   is	  by	  consensus	  agreed	   to	  be	  acceptable,	  the	  reverse	  also	  becomes	  possible;	  she	  can	  continue	  to	  approach	  the	  patient	  with	  caring	  intent	  and	  behaviour	  even	  though	  she	  is	  unsure	  about	  the	  rightness	  of	  a	  medical	  decision.	  This	  perhaps	  can	  be	  one	  resolution	  to	  a	  difficult	  psychological	  state	  that	  is	  moral	  distress	  	  Slote	   then	  validates	   the	  concept	  of	  moral	  distress,	   if	   it	   is	   to	  be	  understood	  as	   I	  think	   it	   ought	   to	   be,	   as	   largely	   an	   empathic	   response	   to	   a	   patient	   under	   one’s	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care.	   Indeed	  he	  points	  out	  that	   ‘perceptual	  and	  temporal	   immediacy’	  (p27)	  will	  result	  in	  a	  stronger	  empathic	  response	  to	  an	  individual	  in	  need	  than	  if	  one	  does	  not	  directly	  observe	  the	  suffering	  of	  such	  an	   individual.	   Interestingly	  he	  argues	  that	   such	   closeness	   offers	   good	   reason	   for	   partialistic	   responses	   to	   moral	  problems	  so	  that	  those	  who	  are	  near	  (and	  dear)	  are	  more	  deserving	  of	  our	  sense	  of	  obligation	  and	  helping	  actions	  than	  those	  who	  are	  not	  so	  near	  (and	  dear).	  This	  argument	  supports	  and	  perhaps	  gives	  reason	  for	  the	  empirical	  reports	  that	  were	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  where	  it	  has	  been	  found	  that	  the	  proximity	  of	  nurses	  to	  patients	   increases	   their	   sense	   of	  moral	   distress.	  Nurses,	   and	  particularly	   those	  that	  are	  empathic	  carers,	  are	  going	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  medical	  care	  at	  much	  closer	  proximity	  and	  over	  a	  greater	   time,	   than	  are	   the	  doctors	  who	  prescribe	  medical	  care	  and	  then	  move	  onto	  the	  next	  patient,	  ward	  or	  meeting.	  	  Koehn’s	  (1998)	  ethics	  of	  care.	  	  Koehn	  (1998)	  as	  would	  be	  expected	  describes	  the	  ethics	  of	  care,	  actually	  feminist	  ethics,	  as	  an	  ethics	  that	  takes	  the	  self	  to	  be	  relational	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  individual.	  As	  with	  Slote,	  she	  points	  out	  that	  it	  rejects	  universal	  principles	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  situations	  in	  a	  personally	  detached	  way.	  In	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  rather,	  there	  is	  an	  acceptance	  of	  differences	  between	  people	  and	  life	  histories	  It	  is	  active	  and	  seeks	  to	  make	  a	  caring	  and	  trusting	  world	  by	  being	  caring	  and	  trusting	  (p5-­‐9)	  	  	  Similarly	   to	  Slote	   in	  so	   far	  as	  she	  wishes	   to	  ground	   the	  ethics	  of	  care	   in	  a	  non-­‐relativist	   paradigm,	   she	   argues	   that	   the	   various	   models	   of	   ethics	   of	   care	   -­‐
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empathy	   ethics	   and	   trust	   -­‐	   lack	   guiding	   principles	   and	   can	   end	   up	   in	   self	  righteousness,	  or	  can	  be	  manipulative	  or	  harmful	  to	  the	  carer,	  or	  to	  the	  person	  who	  receives	  the	  same.	  She	  argues	  that	  they	  lack	  any	  vision	  of	  the	  human	  good	  that	  make	  us	  capable	  of	  organising	  our	  lives	  into	  a	  meaningful	  whole	  (p15).	  She	  points	  out	  that	  an	  overwhelming	  and	  constant	  caring	  open	  attitude	  has	  no	  way	  of	  reacting	   to	   violence	   or	   imposing	   law	   on	   others.	   She	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   an	  ethic	  is	   ‘a	  reflection	  upon	  the	  conditions	  for	  shared	  and	  satisfying	  human	  living	  in	   a	   community	   in	   which	   human	   beings	   have	   differing	   perspectives	   on	   what	  qualifies	  as	  a	  good	  and	  satisfying	  life’	  (p27)	  and	  as	  such	  believes	  that	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  does	  offer	  something	  unique.	  This	  stance	  further	  supports	  the	  necessity	  for	  nurses	   to	   take	   legality	   and	   proper	   professional	   practice	   as	   the	   fundamental	  principle	  from	  which	  they	  make	  decisions	  about	  medical	  care.	  	  Interestingly	  she	  points	  out	  that	  it	  bases	  itself	  upon	  the	  subjective	  desires,	  whims	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  cared-­‐for	  and	  care	  giver	  (p40-­‐41).	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  Crisp’s	  (2008)	   discussion	   about	   nature	   of	   compassion,	   where	   he	   points	   out	   that	  compassion	  might	  be	  felt	  for	  a	  person	  in	  the	  right	  way	  and	  at	  the	  right	  time,	  but	  not	   to	   the	   end	   of	   sharing	   and	   alleviating	   suffering	   of	   the	   other,	   but	   rather,	  through	  the	  ‘self	  satisfaction	  one	  achieves	  through	  reflection	  on	  how	  kind	  one	  is	  being’	  (p242).	  Such	  a	  response	  argues	  Koehn,	  can	  tend	  not	  to	  open	  itself	  to	  self	  suspicion;	  that	  there	  is	  no	  Socratic	  daimon	  nor	  any	  warning	  regarding	  pride	  and	  
hubris.	  This	  illuminates	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  nursing	  academia	  where	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  nurse	  as	  autonomous	  practitioner	  could	  be	  accused	  of	  being	  a	  vice	   such	   as	   pride.	   Pride	   could	   also	   be	   the	   source	   of	  moral	   distress	  where	   for	  example,	   the	   nurse	   strongly	   believes	   she	   knows	   the	   right	   thing	   to	   do,	   even	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though	  she	  won’t	  carry	  full	  responsibility	  and	  potential	  for	  blame	  that	  doing	  that	  action	  might	  bring.	  In	  addressing	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  carer	  can	  be	  abused	  or	  faced	  with	  manipulative	  wrong-­‐doing	  she	  states	  that	  she	  wishes	  to	  reclaim	  autonomy	  and	  ‘selfishness’	  (p44)	  from	  the	  relational	  aspect	  of	  caring.	  This	  reclamation	  and	  feminist	  stance	   in	   the	  ethics	  of	  care	  has,	  as	   I	  have	  previously	  discussed,	  been	  a	  strong	  influence	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  nursing	  profession.	  	  She	   describes	   the	   ethics	   of	   care	   as	   primarily	   as	   an	   ethics	   of	   listening	   to	   the	  perspective	  of	  another.	  Again	  this	  echoes	  Slote’s	  view,	  although	  he	  goes	  further	  in	   the	   identification	   of	   empathy,	   which	   does	   not	   just	   listen,	   but	   shares	  experiences	  and	  emotion	  with	  the	  person	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  care.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  ground	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  in	  a	  more	  principled	  way	  she	  argues	  for	  a	  ‘dialogical	  ethic’	  where	  the	  starting	  point	  is	  to	  admit	  that	  all	  people	  are	  prone	  to	  making	   errors	   and	   that	   through	   dialogue	   we	   are	   capable	   of	   using	   dialogue	   to	  better	   identify	   truth	   and	  distinguish	   it	   from	  error.	   She	  proposes	   that	   this	   does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  no	  truth	  or	  that	  we	  are	  always	  in	  error	  but	  rather,	  that	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  using	   the	   truth	   to	   identify	  error.	   	  She	  wishes	   to	  step	  beyond	  the	  totally	  partialistic	  stance	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  as	  originally	  conceived,	  where	  the	  ethics	   of	   care	   had	   not	   identified	   the	   good	   beyond	   expressing	   actions	   that	   are	  	  
motivated	  (my	  italics)	  by	  care	  (p27).	  It	  is	  not	  necessarily	  convincing	  that	  one	  can	  arrive	   at	   moral	   truth	   by	   dialogue,	   but	   Koehn	   believes	   that	   this	   truth	   can	   be	  identified	  via	  a	  dialogue	  where	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  some	  points	  of	  view	  are	  more	  valid	  than	  others.	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Koehn’s	   dialogical	   ethic	   concentrates	   on	   active	   listening	   but	   again	   similarly	   to	  Slote	   she	  makes	   a	   point	   to	   reject	   consequences	   from	   her	   ethic.	   She	   wishes	   to	  balance	   the	   human	   reality	   of	   ethical	   decision-­‐making	   and	   wishes	   to	   avoid	   a	  ‘God’s	   eye’	   application	   of	   principles	   (p100)	   However,	   she	   wants	   to	   conserve	  	  principles	   that	   avoid	   this	   kind	   of	   certainty,	   that	   avoid	   the	   problems	   that	   arise	  with	  relativism,	  and	  that	  assist	  with	  ethical	  decision-­‐making	  within	  context.	  She	  promotes	  the	  search	  for	  truth	  through	  active	  listening.	  	  	  Koehn	  presents	   four	  new	  principles	   that	  act	  as	  a	   foundation	   for	  dialogue.	  They	  are	   she	   believes	   more	   ‘supple’	   than	   those	   in	   deontological	   or	   consequential	  paradigms.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  recognise	  that	  some	  reasons	  are	  better	  than	  others.	  She	  argues	   that	  people	  ought	   to	  be	   thoughtful	   doers	   and	   thus	   subsequently	   argues	  for	  the	  rightness	  of	  debate.	  Within	  this	  best	  reasons	  for	  acting	  are	  established.	  It	  is	   teleological	   because	   she	   proposes	   that	  we	   should	   live	   the	   examined	   life	   and	  this	  means	   that	  within	   ethical	   decision-­‐making,	   all	   people	   ought	   to	   be	   open	   to	  challenge,	  questions	  and	  fulfill	  the	  obligation	  to	  justify	  their	  actions.	  	  Within	  this	  principle	  it	  is	  important	  for	  moral	  agents	  to	  admit	  that	  they	  might	  be	  wrong.	  The	  second	  and	  third	  principles	  are	  to	  act	  justly	  and	  to	  obey	  laws	  that	  a	  community	  has	  agreed	  to	  obey.	  Finally,	  she	  argues	  that	  the	  moral	  agent	  or	  community	  ought	  to	  remain	  open	  to	  questioning	  and	  ensure	  that	  they	  have	  truly	  met	  principles	  one	  to	  three	  (pp100-­‐149).	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The	  Ethics	  of	  Care	  and	  how	  it	  helps	  to	  resolve	  moral	  distress	  	  Both	   of	   these	   authors	   offer	   an	   ethical	   perspective	   that	   when	   combined	   offers	  some	  help	  in	  finding	  a	  resolution	  to	  moral	  distress	  that	  allows	  the	  nurse	  to	  carry	  out	  medical	  orders	  that	  she	  might	  initially	  disagree	  with,	  with	  a	  clear	  conscience	  and	  whilst	  remaining	  close	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  	  Firstly,	   Slote	   makes	   it	   clear	   how	   important	   proximity	   is	   to	   creation	   of	   an	  empathic	  response	  to	  persons,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  nurses,	  to	  the	  patient.	   Indeed,	  without	  proximity,	  empathic	  response	  might	  be	  more	  difficult	   to	  sustain,	  and	   if	  empathy	   and	   the	   care	   that	   stems	   from	   it	   is	   to	   be	   a	   valued	   characteristic	   of	  nursing,	  then	  the	  doctor	  has	  a	  responsibility	  in	  ensuring	  that	  this	  facet	  of	  nursing	  is	   preserved	   as	   much	   as	   possible,	   by	   not	   removing	   her	   from	   caring	   activities	  unless	  it	  is	  justifiable	  and	  of	  course	  by	  giving	  her	  justification	  for	  actions.	  	  	  To	  acknowledge	  this	  responsibility	  of	  the	  doctor	  requires	  two	  things.	  Firstly	  the	  doctor	   has	   to	   recognise	   and	   respond	   to	   this	   responsibility.	   But	   secondly,	   and	  prior	  to	  this,	   the	   leadership	  role	  of	  the	  doctor	  has	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  both	  the	  nurse	  and	  doctor.	  The	  fact	  that	  doctors	  have	  authority	  to	  direct	  nurses’	  actions	  is	  not	   readily	   acknowledged	   in	   nursing	   literature,	   and	   although	   it	   seems	   that	  doctors,	  lawyers	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  acknowledge	  this	  to	  be	  true,	  doctors	  and	  nurses	   seem	   to	   keep	   silent	   about	   it.	   For	   example	   Cohen	   and	   Erickson	   (2006)	  discuss	  how	   the	  nurse	  has	  moved	   from	   the	  group	  of	   	   ‘women	  who	   carried	  out	  basic	  tasks	  for	  the	  sick	  and	  the	  ailing’	  to	  the	  professional	  who	  has	  the	  education	  and	  responsibility	  to	  make	  complex	  clinical	  decisions	  who	  :	  
	   189	  
	   ‘Although	  they	  may	  function	  independently…..nurses	  also	  collaborate	  with	  many	  other	  members	  of	  the	  multidisciplinary	  team’	  (p775.)	  	  Although	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  collaboration	  is	  an	  unimportant	  facet	  of	  nursing	  and	  medical	  care,	  the	  identification	  of	  collaboration	  also	  falsely	  implies	  a	  relationship	   of	   equal	   authority.	   Indeed	   when	   considering	   medical	   care	   that	  requires	  a	   lot	  of	  nursing	   input,	   and	   this	   care	  often	   involves	  aggressive	  medical	  treatment	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life,	  the	  relationship	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  tripartite:	  doctor:	   nurse	   :	   patient.	   In	   the	   medical	   ethics	   literature	   the	   doctor	   :	   patient	  relationship	   is	   almost	   exclusively	   referred	   to,	   and	   the	   nurse	   is	   often	   absent96	  Peter	  and	  Liashenko	  (2004)	  point	  out	  that	  that	  proximity	  is	  an	  important	  feature	  of	   moral	   distress,	   but	   this	   proximity	   is	   also	   to	   the	   doctor.	   In	   the	   words	   of	  Liashenko	  (1994)	  this	  proximity	  is	  so	  close	  that	  the	  nurse	  is	  the	  eyes	  and	  ears	  of	  the	  physician.	  This	  dependence	  of	  doctors	  on	  nurses	  is	  absent	  from	  all	  the	  papers	  that	  discuss	  the	  doctor	  -­‐	  patient	  relationship.	  	  	  There	   have	   been	   moves	   over	   recent	   years	   for	   doctors	   and	   nurses	   to	   come	  together	  in	  inter-­‐professional	  education	  and	  this	  is	  a	  good	  thing,	  (Barrow	  et	  al.,	  2011;)	  97	  	  As	  has	  already	  been	  discussed,	  good	  inter-­‐professional	  communication	  is	  important	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  moral	  distress,	  and	  empirical	  research	  confirms	  that	  this	  is	  essential	  to	  good	  patient	  care	  and	  outcomes,	  but	  even	  now	  still	  does	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  96	  Nursing	  ethics	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  frequently	  has	  reference	  to	  the	  doctor,	  but	  again	  analysis	  is	  made	  of	  the	  nurse:	  patient	  relationship.	  97	  But	  it	  is	  not	  without	  its	  problems,	  such	  as	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  nurses	  in	  comparison	  to	  doctors.	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not	  work	  as	  well	  as	  it	  should	  and	  leadership	  can	  be	  lacking	  (Weller	  et	  al.,	  2011).98	  How	  then	  is	  the	  dynamic	  between	  doctor	  and	  nurse	  to	  be	  nurtured	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  reduce	  moral	  distress	  thus	  allowing	  the	  nurse	  to	  continue	  to	  care?	  	  Koehn’s	  theory	  makes	  clear	  the	  importance	  of	  dialogue	  in	  coming	  to	  moral	  truth	  and	   from	   a	   medical	   perspective,	   in	   making	   patient	   care	   decisions.	   Most	  important	  in	  her	  thesis	  is	  that	  in	  dialogue,	  in	  order	  to	  truly	  listen	  to	  one	  another,	  agents	  must	  approach	  the	  ‘truth’	  with	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	  one’s	  own	  view	  might	  be	  wrong	  –	  this	   is	  a	   form	  of	  humility	  that	   is	  beneficial	   to	  HCPs.	   It	  echoes	  Kolnai’s	  work	  on	  the	  erroneous	  nature	  of	  conscience	  and	  his	  statement	  that:	  	   ‘Conscience	  that	  cannot	  hope	  to	  be	  correct	  ,	  and	  ....cannot	  fear	  to	  be	  erroneous,	  is	  not	  Conscience’(p179)	  	  	  It	  also	  reflects	  the	  stand	  taken	  by	  Murray	  (2010)	  who	  argues	  that	  nurses	  need	  to	  be	  morally	  courageous	  whilst	  avoiding	  the	  error	  of	  moral	  arrogance	  or	  certitude.	  	  	  Moral	  arrogance	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  one’s	  own	  point	  of	  view	  is	  the	  only	  right	  view	  in	   situations	   that	   are	   morally	   controversial	   and	   where	   others	   might	   hold	  different	   moral	   opinions	   (Gert,	   et	   al.,	   2006)	   whereas	   morally	   arrogant	  individuals	  are	  condescending	  and	  dismissive	  of	  the	  thoughts	  of	  others,	  with	  an	  interest	   that	  does	  not	   go	  beyond	   the	   self	   (Baylis,	   2007).	  The	  nurse	  who	   thinks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  98	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  sometimes	  the	  properly	  trained	  nurse	  might	  offer	  better	  leadership	  of	  medical	  procedures	  under	  specific	  conditions	  than	  a	  junior	  doctor.	  (Gilligan	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  But	  in	  moral	  distress,	  the	  nurse	  necessarily	  doesn’t	  have	  this	  authority	  to	  lead.	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she	   knows	   what	   is	   best	   to	   be	   done,	   even	   though	   she	   doesn’t	   carry	   full	  responsibility	  for	  that	  act	  is	  like	  the	  doctor	  who	  thinks	  he	  knows	  best	  and	  refuses	  to	  see	  the	  perspectives	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  nurse	  who	  allows	  him	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  act	  that	  she	  does	  not	  have	  authority	  for,	  but	  shares	  responsibility	  for.	  Both	  could	  be	  accused	  of	  moral	  arrogance	  and	  lack	  of	  humility	  which	  is	  the	  opposite.	  	  	  Humility	  is	  not	  commonly	  spoken	  about	  in	  nursing	  or	  indeed	  medicine,	  but	  may	  have	  a	  part	  to	  play	  in	  proper	  communication.	  The	  doctor	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  listen	   to	   the	   nurse,	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   his	   view	  might	   not	   be	   the	   best	   view.	  Likewise,	  the	  nurse	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  doctor,	  and	  eventually,	  in	  legal	  circumstances	  where	  gross	  misconduct	  is	  not	  occurring,	  she	  can	  be	  free	  to	  accept	  his	  decision	  as	  right.	  This	  freedom	  to	  accept	  the	  doctor’s	  final	  decision	  as	  right	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  nurse’s	  ability	  to	  continue	  to	  nurse	  her	  patient;	  that	  is	  to	  deliver	   the	   medical	   orders	   but	   also	   to	   deliver	   the	   basic	   cares	   that	   are	   so	  important	  to	  nursing	  practice.	  So	  long	  as	  this	  dialogue	  is	  ongoing,	  then	  the	  nurse	  is	   also	   free	   to	   continue	   to	   act	   as	  patient	   advocate,	   to	   assess	   changes	   in	  patient	  status	  and	  perhaps	  influence	  decisions	  at	  a	  later	  point.	  	  Within	  this	  dialogue	  and	  in	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  doctor	  over	  the	  nurse,	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  the	  doctor	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  justification	  of	  his	   decision;	   as	   Koehn	   argues	   this	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   dialogue.	   Further	  support	  of	  the	  success	  of	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  found	  if	  recent	  trends	  in	  military	  training	  are	  examined.	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In	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  Marshall	  (1947)	  observed	  that	  many	  soldiers	  did	  not	  fire	  their	  guns	  when	  faced	  with	  situations	  where	  they	  had	  to	  defend	  themselves,	  but	  where	  this	  defence	  would	  result	  in	  killing.	  This	  demonstrated	  how	  difficult	  it	  is	  for	  soldiers	  to	  kill	  and	  how	  deeply	  the	  moral	  sense	  of	  wrong-­‐doing	  extends	  in	  the	  human	  psyche.	  Military	  training	  has	  tended	  to	  encourage	  dehumanisation	  of	  the	   enemy,	   so	   that	   the	   act	   of	   killing	   can	   become	   more	   acceptable,	   because	  soldiers	  could	   identify	   their	  actions	  as	  being	  directed	  towards	  sub	  humans	  and	  therefore	   more	   permissible.	   However,	   as	   Evans	   (2011)	   discussed	   in	   a	  programme	   broadcast	   on	  Radio	   4,	  many	  military	   centres	   in	   the	  UK	   and	  US	   no	  longer	   dehumanise	   the	   enemy,	   but	   rather,	   provide	   the	   soldier	   with	   proper	  justification	  for	  going	  to	  war	  and	  killing.	  Such	  justification	  is	  designed	  to	  justify	  actions,	   but	   in	   so	   doing	   protects	   the	   solder	   from	   breakdown	   of	   a	   sense	   of	  integrity	  and	  moral	  identity	  that	  can	  be	  extreme.99	  	  Doctors	  can	  perhaps	  benefit	  from	  consideration	  of	  this	  form	  of	  training	  and	  how	  it	  reflects	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  nurse	  who	  is	  asked	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  order	  that	  she	  believes	  to	  be	  harmful	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  she	  identifies	  as	  wrong.	  Although	  killing	  is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   aggressive	   treatment,	   if	   the	   nurse	   perceives	   herself	   to	   be	  ‘torturing’	  or	  ‘flogging’	  a	  patient	  the	  difference	  is	  perhaps	  not	  as	  great	  as	  it	  first	  seems.	  This	  requirement	  for	  listening	  to	  and	  justification	  of	  orders	  already	  exists	  in	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association’s	  (AMA,	  1994)	  code	  of	  ethics:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  99	  Kilner	  (2011)	  was	  a	  soldier	  ethicist	  who	  contributed	  to	  the	  programme	  and	  keeps	  a	  blog	  that	  details	  discussion	  on	  this	  and	  other	  issues.	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‘One	  of	  the	  duties	  in	  providing	  reasonable	  care	  is	  fulfilled	  by	  a	   nurse	   who	   carries	   out	   the	   orders	   of	   the	   attending	  physician.	  Where	  orders	  appear	  to	  the	  nurse	  to	  be	  in	  error	  or	  contrary	   to	   customary	   medical	   and	   nursing	   practice,	   the	  physician	   has	   an	   ethical	   obligation	   to	   hear	   the	   nurse’s	  concern	  and	  explain	  those	  orders	  to	  the	  nurse	  involved.	  The	  ethical	  physician	  should	  neither	  expect	  nor	  insist	  that	  nurses	  follow	   orders	   contrary	   to	   standards	   of	   good	   medical	   and	  nursing	  practice.’	  (Opinion	  3.02	  Nurses)	  	  but	   is	   not	   present	   in	   the	   GMC	   code	   or	   in	   nursing	   codes.	   Furthermore,	   an	  individual	  approach	  to	  listening	  and	  justifiying	  action,	  although	  essential,	   is	  not	  sufficient.	  Medical	  policy	  decisions	  in	  individual	  institutions	  also	  ought	  to	  involve	  nurses;	  listening	  to	  the	  nursing	  perspective	  when	  policies	  such	  as	  early	  neonatal	  treatments	  or	  other	  crucial	  policies	  such	  as	   the	  character	  of	   ‘do	  not	  resuscitate	  orders’	   must	   also	   include	   nurses.	   Indeed,	   perhaps	   it	   is	   time	   for	   nurses	   and	  doctors	   to	   be	   guided	   by	   a	   single	   code	   of	   conduct	   to	   ensure	   that	   this	  communication	   is	   inherent	   in	   each	   profession	   from	   the	   start.	   Pattison	   (2001)	  provides	  some	  support	  for	  this	  stance	  and	  argues	  that	  universal	  principles	  could	  be	   identified	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	   all	   health	   care	   codes	   of	   conduct	   in	   order	   to	  provide	   coherence	  of	   professional	  duties	   and	  expectations.	   Further	   to	   this	   it	   is	  interesting	  to	   find	  that	   the	  allied	  health	  professions	   in	  Australia	  already	  have	  a	  
	   194	  
body	   of	   universal	   standards	   from	   which	   each	   individual	   profession	   develops	  standards	  specific	  to	  their	  profession.100	  101	  (ACT	  Health,	  2004)	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  nurses	  are	  asked	  to	  carry	  out	  orders	  that	  are	  consistent	  for	  similar	  patients	  no	  matter	  who	  the	  physician	  is.	  For	  example.	  Seale	   (2010)	   found	   that	   doctors	   of	   faith	   gave	   less	  deep	   terminal	   sedation	   than	  doctors	   of	   non	   faith.	   Beckstrand	   and	   Kirchhoff	   (2005)	   found	   that	   nurses	  identified	  inconsistency	  between	  doctors,	  as	  a	  significant	  obstacle	  to	  good	  end	  of	  life	  care.	  It	  is	  difficult	  for	  nurses	  to	  justify	  care	  if	  different	  consultants	  approach	  similar	   cases	   differently,	   and	   doctors	   ought	   to	   work	   to	   gain	  more	   consistency	  because	   this	   is	   also	  an	   important	   form	  of	  dialogue	  and	   facet	  of	   justification	   for	  orders.	  	  	  Finally,	   the	   closeness	   that	   is	   essential	   to	   empathy	   and	   that	   is	   fundamental	   to	  Slote’s	   understanding	   of	   care,	   is	   a	   feature	   of	   nursing	   practice	   that	   deserves	  greater	  attention.	  The	  suffering	  of	  patients	  and	  proximity	   to	   that	   suffering	  also	  causes	   suffering	   for	  HCPs	   (Sulmasy,	   2006)	   and	  perhaps	   particularly	   the	   nurse.	  Indeed	  Maeve	  (1998)	  describes	  how	  nurses	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  go	  beyond	  empathy	  to	  a	   state	   of	   embodiment,	  where	   nurses	   don’t	   just	   imagine	   the	   experience	   of	   the	  other,	  but	  directly	  share	  it,	  to	  a	  degree	  at	  least.	  This	  embodiment	  is	  a	  significant	  aspect	  of	  being	  with	  the	  other,	  that	  is	  a	  central	  meaning	  of	  nursing.	  Doctors	  also	  are	  vulnerable	  and	  suffer	  as	  a	  result	  of	  medical	  care	  of	  patients	  (Aase	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  100	  The	  allied	  health	  professions	  include,	  among	  others,	  dentists,	  veterinary	  surgeons,	  physiotherapists,	  chiropractors	  and	  dental	  hygienists.	  	  	  101	  In	  the	  UK	  allied	  health	  professionals	  are	  members	  of	  the	  Allied	  Health	  Professionals	  Federation,	  that	  exists	  to	  promote	  interprofessional	  working,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  set	  generic	  standards.	  (ACPF,	  2011)	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but	  Agledahl	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  have	  found	  that	  a	  feature	  of	  medical	  practice	  is	  that	  it	  tends	   to	   remove	   doctors	   from	   consideration	   of	   the	   existential	   challenges	   of	  patients.	  	  	  	  From	  this	  it	  is	  surely	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  this	  lack	  of	  existential	  curiosity	  extends	  to	  the	  nurses	  who	  carry	  out	  so	  much	  care	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  doctor.	  Mutual	  care	  for	  and	  consideration	  of	  colleagues	  is	  another	  way	  in	  which	  moral	  distress	  could	  be	  relieved.	  Indeed,	  for	  the	  nurse	  who	  is	  too	  worn	  out	  to	  continue	  to	  care	  for	   her	   patient,	   rather	   than	   conscientious	   objection,	   the	   care	   of	   another	   nurse	  who	  offers	  to	  step	  in	  and	  to	  care	  for	  that	  patient	  is	  surely	  a	  better	  way	  forward	  in	  cases	   of	  moral	   distress.	   Or	   the	   nurse	  who	   feels	   too	   exhausted	   to	   give	   the	   next	  antibiotic	  or	  suction	  to	   the	  critically	   ill	  patient,	  perhaps	   for	  a	  period	  the	  doctor	  can	  offer	  to	  stay	  and	  give	  some	  of	  this	  care,	  or	  help	  the	  nurse	  with	  another	  task.	  Such	   mutual	   care	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   between	   members	   of	   the	   same	  professional	   group	   (Aase,	   2008)	   but	   perhaps	   more	   support	   could	   happen	  between	  professionals	  of	  different	  groups.	  	  	  So	  far	  then,	  Slote	  and	  Koehn	  help	  to	  provide	  some	  explicit	  reasons	  and	  methods	  of	  communication	  and	  behaviour	  that	  ought	  to	  exist	  between	  doctor	  and	  nurse,	  and	   that	   ought	   to	   allow	   the	   nurse	   to	   continue	   her	   work	  without	   being	   overly	  burdened.	  However	  both	  theories	  fall	  short	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  recognise	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  consequentialist	  stance	  in	  offering	  further	  rational	  responses	  to	  ‘futile’	  medical	  cases	  and	  moral	  distress.	  Although	  some	  of	  what	  has	  been	  written	  already	   in	   this	   chapter	   involves	   spiritual	   understanding	   of	   moral	   distress,	   it	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seems	  that	  consequentialism	  and	  spirituality	  might	  together	  offer	  some	  sense	  of	  distance	  from	  the	  immediacy	  of	  moral	  distress	  and	  that	  might	  help	  the	  nurse.	  	  The	  necessity	  for	  consequentialist	  and	  spiritual	  understanding	  in	  the	  resolution	  of	  moral	  distress.	  	  Medical	   decision-­‐making	   relies	   on	   universal	   concepts	   and	   rules.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  clinical	  medicine,	  prescribed	  care	  relies	  upon	  previous	  research	  and	  predictions	  based	  on	  this	  research.	  Likewise	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ethical	  decision-­‐making	  rules	  and	  principles	  also	  need	  to	  be	  followed.	  Although	  medical	  ethics	  includes	  discussion	  of	  many	  ethical	  modes	  of	   thought	  such	  as	  consequentialism	  and	  deontology,	   in	  practice,	  the	  professional	  codes	  of	  conduct	  tend	  to	  offer	  a	  deontological	  approach	  to	   care.	   Nurses	   are	   required	   to	   do	   no	   harm,	   to	   act	   in	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	  patient	   (Beauchamp	   &	   Childress,	   2001),	   to	   promote	   the	   dignity	   of	   patients	  (Jackson	   &	   Irwin,	   2011;	   Condon&	   Hegge,	   2011;	   Mathiews,	   2010;	   Kalb,	   &	  O'Conner-­‐Von,	   2007;	   Castledine,	   2006)	   to	   be	   compassionate	   (Georges,	   2011;	  Davison	  and	  Williams,	  2009;	  Hem	  &	  Heggan,	  2004).	  Sometimes	  the	  practice	  that	  addresses	  such	  valued	  forms	  of	  care	  can	  be	  easily	  identified,	  such	  as	  treating	  all	  patients	   equally	   (Lin	   &	   Tsai,	   2011)	   However,	   to	   define	   each	   of	   these	   can	   be	  difficult	   in	  themselves	  and	  in	  ethically	  challenging	  situations,	  (Manthorpe	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  Milton,	   2008;	  Wainwright	   and	   Gallagher,	   2008;	   Haddock,	   1996;	   van	   der	  Cingel,	   2009),	   and	  where	   the	   definition	   of	  what	   action	   ought	   to	   be	   performed	  requires	  some	  prediction	  of	  consequences	  of	  actions.	  This	  is	  further	  problematic	  given	   that	   we	   cannot	   predict	   the	   consequences	   of	   actions	   for	   each	   individual	  patient,	  as	  research	  data	  deals	  with	  populations.	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  For	   example,	   Chambers	   and	   Ryder’s	   (2009)	   work	   on	   compassion	   and	   caring	  describe	   caring	   and	   compassionate	   attitudes,	   but	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   quantify	  what	  this	  means	  in	  one	  case	  and	  then	  the	  next.	  So	  for	  example,	  the	  patient	  who	  is	  acknowledged	   to	   be	   dying	   has	   their	   dignity	   preserved	   by	   good	   palliative	   care.	  The	   same	   patient	   who	   is	   not	   acknowledged	   to	   be	   dying	   has	   their	   dignity	  preserved	  by	  attempts	  to	  save	  life.	  Perspectives	  of	  doctors	  and	  nurses	  on	  these	  cases	  will	  differ,	  and	  if	  the	  nurse	  is	  to	  find	  any	  solace	  in	  facing	  one	  failed	  case	  of	  medicine	  after	  the	  other,	  the	  only	  way	  she	  can	  achieve	  this	  is	  by	  consequentialist	  reasoning.	  	  	  The	   empirical	   work	   that	  medicine	   is	   grounded	   in	   and	   that	   justifies	   aggressive	  medical	   treatment	  was	  discussed	   in	  chapter	   four.	   It	   is	  essential	   that	  nurses	  are	  given	  access	  to	  such	  information	  so	  that	  they	  can	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  justification	  for	  their	  actions.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  nurse	  can	  know	  that	  some	  patient	  somewhere	  is	  being	   saved	   by	   the	   treatment	   she	   observes	   as	   failing,	   gives	   her	   a	   broader	  perspective	  that	  proximity	  and	  involvement	  with	  the	  patient	  in	  front	  of	  her	  does	  not	   allow	   for.	   How	   this	   knowledge	   is	   given	   is	   open	   to	   interpretation.	   It	   could	  mean	  being	  invited	  to	  institutional	  clinical	  meetings,	  it	  could	  mean	  that	  the	  nurse	  occasionally	   leaves	   one	   ward	   or	   unit	   to	   visit	   another	   where	   her	   surviving	  patients	   have	   been	   discharged	   to.	   It	   might	   mean	   that	   doctors	   offer	   follow	   up	  information	   to	   nurses	   weeks	   after	   a	   patient	   has	   left	   and	   has	   attended	   out	  patients.	   This	   position	   is	   supported	   by	   Hamrick	   &	   Blackhall	   (2007)	   who	  suggested	   that	   nurses	   observed	   higher	   frequency	   of	   ‘futile’	   situations	   than	  doctors	  because	  doctors	  left	  ICU	  and	  had	  more	  varied	  activities.	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  Dickenson’s	   (2003)	   exploration	   of	   moral	   luck	   might	   also	   offer	   the	   morally	  distressed	   nurse	   some	   solace.	   She	   describes	   the	   difficulty	   in	   making	   moral	  choices	  because	  predicting	  outcomes	  of	   acts	   cannot	  be	  achieved	  with	   certainty	  because	  all	   events	  are	  affected	  by	   luck	   (pp46-­‐64).	  As	  was	  discussed	   in	   chapter	  four,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   predict	  with	   certainty	  who	  will	   die	   and	  who	  will	   not	  under	  conditions	  of	  aggressive	  medical	  care.	  The	  nurse	  who	  accepts	  that	  she	   is	  not	   able	   to	   predict	   with	   certainty	   the	   outcome	   for	   an	   individual	   patient,	   even	  though	  her	  fears	  might	  be	  realised,	  can	  let	  go	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  blame	  and	  regret.	  This	  acceptance	  that	  she	  does	  not	  have	  a	  God	  like	  ability	  to	  predict	  the	  future,	  can	  also	  alleviate	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  another	  form	  of	  humility.	  Dickenson	  does	  not	  link	  her	  examination	  of	  luck	  and	  consequences	  to	  spirituality	  but	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   there	   is	   overlap,	   if	   concepts	   such	   as	   humility	   and	  forgiveness	  are	  accepted	  as	  spiritual	  acts	  and	  relevant	  to	  this	  letting	  go	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  total	  control.	  	  Forgiveness	  has	  not	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  field	  of	  moral	  distress	  but	  is	  perhaps	  another	  activity	   that	  ought	   to	  be	  considered	   in	  health	  care	  practice	  and	   indeed	  has	   been	   shown	   to	   increase	   well	   being	   in	   patients	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   to	  have	   effectiveness..102103	   The	   nurse	   who	   sees	   the	   patient	   who	   dies	   after	  aggressive	  and	  what	  in	  retrospect	  could	  be	  described	  as	  futile	  care,	  needs	  to	  let	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  102	  Griswold	  (2007)	  has	  made	  a	  philosophical	  exploration	  of	  forgiveness	  that	  offers	  in	  depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  nature	  of	  forgiveness.	  	  103	  Forgiveness	  has	  attention	  as	  a	  clinical	  intervention	  in	  psychiatric	  care,	  but	  not	  as	  an	  intervention	  for	  HCPs	  to	  better	  cope	  with	  emotional	  difficulties	  such	  as	  moral	  distress	  (See	  for	  example	  Vitz	  &	  Meade,	  2011;	  Braithwaite	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Worthington	  et	  al,	  2007)	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go	   of	   the	   sense	   of	   blame	   and	   regret	   that	   can	   also	   be	   burdensome.	   That	  forgiveness	   can	   be	   a	   freeing	   feature	   of	   her	   experience	   requires	   the	   doctor	   to	  acknowledge	   the	   difficulties	   she	   has	   faced	   in	   responding	   to	   his	   orders.	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   care,	   it	   is	   perhaps	   important	   for	   the	   doctor	   to	   say	   sorry	   for	   the	  suffering	   and	   distress	   that	   both	   patient	   and	   nurse	   have	   experienced	   in	   the	  delivery	  of	  medicine.	  This	   is	  not	   so	  much	  an	  admission	  of	  blameworthy	  action,	  but	   is	  rather	  an	  admission	  that	  medicine	  often	  fails	  and	  that	  harm	  is	   intimately	  entwined	   with	   its	   ability	   to	   benefit.	   This	   again	   is	   a	   term	   and	   activity	   more	  commonly	  placed	  under	  the	  subject	  of	  spirituality.	  	  As	  was	  shown	  in	  chapter	  two,	  Solomon	  examined	  emotions	  and	  morality	   in	  his	  early	  career	  and	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   see	  how	  his	  work	  developed	   to	   include	   the	  importance	  of	  spirituality	  in	  ethics,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  atheist	  (Solomon,	  2002).	  In	   my	   own	   analysis	   of	   moral	   distress	   the	   questions	   that	   are	   inherent	   to	  spirituality	   also	   seemed	   to	  be	   central	   to	   its	   resolution.	  Authors	  have	  discussed	  the	   importance	   of	   finding	   meaning	   in	   moral	   distress	   in	   the	   face	   of	   suffering	  (Meiers	  &	  Brauer,	  1998;	  Gustafsson,	  2008)	  and	  although	  most	  of	  the	  attention	  in	  the	   work	   on	   spirituality	   and	   meaning	   has	   been	   directed	   towards	   the	   nurse	  helping	   the	  patient	   to	   find	  meaning	   (Balboni	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Edwards	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Deal,	  2011;	  McSherry,	  &	  Jamieson,	  2011).	  	  Solomon	  argues	  that	  spirituality	  is	  ‘coming	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  big	  picture	  and	  with	  it	  a	  larger	  sense	  of	  our	  lives’	  (p5)	  Again,	  this	  broader	  picture	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  nurse	   who	   is	   proximate	   to	   suffering.	   Rather	   than	   Dickenson’s	   rather	   cold	  assertion	   that	   responsibility	   can	   be	   limited	   by	   an	   acknowledgement	   of	   luck,	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Solomon	  asserts	  that	  instead,	  one	  ought	  to	  face	  the	  uncertainty	  with	  trust	  and	  to	  accept	   that	  whatever	   happens,	   is	   not	  wholly	   in	   one’s	   own	   hands.	   Although	   he	  doesn’t	  associate	  this	  with	  a	  belief	   in	  God,	   it	   is	  perhaps	  helpful	  to	  consider	  that	  religious	   teachings	  also	  encourage	  an	  acceptance	  of	   lack	  of	   control	  as	  a	  central	  act	  of	  faith.	  Whether	  its	  luck	  or	  God,	  no	  nurse	  or	  doctor	  has	  full	  control	  of	  what	  will	   happen	   to	   their	   patients.	   Perhaps	   this	   could	   be	   described	   as	   a	   caring	   and	  spiritually	   influenced	  consequentialism.	  With	  such	  a	  stance	   it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  competent	  and	  caring	  nurse	  who	  can	  accept	  this,	  can	  then	  accept	  that	  in	  the	  face	   of	   regrets	   and	   unwanted	   outcomes,	   that	   she	   did	   her	   best	   under	   the	  circumstances,	   or	   as	   Solomon	   states	   ‘A	   sense	   of	   powerlessness	   combined	  with	  resoluteness	  and	  responsibility.’	  (p47.)	  	  	  It	   is	   difficult	   to	   conclude	   how	   a	   sense	   of	   spirituality	   can	   be	   incorporated	   into	  nursing.	   Chan	   (2010)	   found	   that	   nurses	   who	   practiced	   a	   religion	   were	   more	  likely	   to	   provide	   for	   the	   spiritual	   needs	   of	   patients.	   It	  must	   be	   asked	  how	   in	   a	  secular	  society,	  can	  nurses	  gain	  a	  spiritual	  understanding	  of	  what	  they	  do?	  The	  potential	   answers	   to	   this	   question	   are	   varied	   and	   in	   this	   thesis	   there	   is	   only	  space	   available	   to	   give	   brief	   consideration	   to	   them.	   One	   approach	   could	   be	   to	  make	  practical	  consideration	  to	  nurses’	  work.	  For	  example,	  Maeve	  (1998)	  found	  that	   nurses	   coped	   with	   suffering	   by	   having	   time	   to	   clean	   the	   patient	   and	  surroundings	  after	  death.	  Sometimes	  service	  demands	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  spend	  an	   appropriate	   length	   of	   time	   in	   laying	   a	   person	   out	   and	   giving	   them	   time	   to	  ‘rest’.	   Inclusion	  of	   ritual	  around	   this	  kind	  of	  activity	   could	  help	  nurses.	   In	  busy	  environments	  where	  a	  death	  is	  quickly	  replaced	  by	  the	  next	  critically	  ill	  patient	  and	  where	  there	  is	  no	  time	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  coping,	  then	  perhaps	  a	  book	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of	   condolences	  or	  observation	  of	   a	  minute’s	   silence	   could	  be	   incorporated	   into	  the	  ward’s	   routine.	  An	   activity	   such	   as	   a	  minute’s	   silence	   could	  be	  particularly	  beneficial	   because	   for	   a	   short	   time	   it	   joins	   all	   the	   members	   of	   the	  multidisciplinary	  team	  together	  in	  acknowledgement	  of	  what	  they	  do.	  	  	  Another	  approach	  that	  might	  help	  with	   the	  spiritual	  aspect	  of	  moral	  distress	   is	  for	  further	  work	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  on	  how	  expectations	  impact	  on	  the	  experience.	  Gustaffson	   (2009)	   found	   that	   expectations	   had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   moral	  distress	  and	  burnout.	  It	  might	  be	  that	  nurses	  have	  unrealistic	  expectations	  about	  what	   they	   can	   achieve	   in	   their	   care.	   For	   example,	   the	   fact	   that	   nurses	   take	  doctors’	  orders	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  nurse	  education,	  nor	  is	  it	  found	  in	  the	  nursing	  literature,	   other	   than	   as	   a	   point	   of	   advocacy	   or	   else	   as	   a	   wrongful	   power	  imbalance.	  104	  	  Without	  this	  acknowledgment	  nurses	  lose	  the	  basis	  from	  which	  to	  demand	  proper	  management	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  ought	  always	  to	  feel	  justified	  in	  the	  orders	   they	   follow.105	   The	   frustration	   that	   comes	   from	  not	   being	   able	   to	  make	  final	  decisions	  is	  worse	  if	  the	  nurse	  has	  been	  educated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  believe	  that	   she	   carries	   responsibility	   for	   these	   decisions.	   However,	   unrealistic	  expectations	  can	  also	  run	  into	  an	  overestimation	  of	  what	  nursing	  and	  medicine	  can	  achieve	  in	  the	  face	  of	  suffering.	  As	  Solomon	  argues,	  tragedy	  and	  suffering	  are	  insurmountable	   features	   of	   human	   life,	   and	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   overestimate	   the	  impact	  of	  medicine	  and	  nursing	  on	  the	  alleviation	  of	  suffering,	  especially	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  life.	  For	  example	  Gielen	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  found	  that	  around	  forty	  percent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  104	  The	  empirical	  and	  scholarly	  work	  that	  this	  is	  based	  on	  has	  been	  cited	  in	  previous	  chapters.	  105	  Kane	  (2009)	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  discussion	  that	  leads	  to	  this	  sense	  of	  justification	  in	  HCPs	  who	  are	  involved	  with	  abortion	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of	   interviewed	  nurses	   in	  Finland	  working	   in	  palliative	  care,	  were	  supporters	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  terminal	  sedation.	  Although	  this	  might	  reflect	  a	  respect	  for	  patient	  autonomy	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life,	  it	  might	  also	  reflect	  the	  fact	   that	   palliative	   care	   eases	   suffering	   for	   many	   patients,	   but	   not	   for	   all.	  Supporting	   this	   position	   Verpoort	   et	   al.	   (2004)	   found	   that	   some	   of	   the	   nurses	  interviewed	  were	  supportive	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  where	  suffering	  could	  not	  be	   alleviated	   and	  was	   intolerable	   to	   the	   patient.	   In	   accepting	   that	   nursing	   and	  medicine	  is	  not	  a	  cure	  all	  for	  suffering,	  the	  nurse	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  burden	  herself	  or	  the	  doctor	  with	  blame	  when	  things	  do	  not	  turn	  out	  in	  the	  way	  she	  would	  want.	  	  	  Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  opposed	   the	  objection	   that	   to	  exclude	  conscientious	  objection	  from	  the	  UK	  code	  of	  conduct	  could	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  responsibility	  that	  leads	  to	  nurses	  allowing	  or	  participating	  in	  atrocious	  acts.	  It	  has	  broadened	  the	  basis	   from	   which	   solutions	   to	   moral	   distress	   might	   be	   found	   to	   include	   an	  acknowledgment	   of	   medical	   authority	   over	   nursing	   actions	   and	   the	   spiritual	  aspect	  of	  the	  complex	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress.	  In	  the	  epilogue	  the	  narrative	  that	   formed	   the	   initial	   ideas	   in	   this	   thesis	  will	  be	  returned	   to	  and	  a	  concluding	  analysis	  of	  moral	  distress	  in	  ‘futile’	  medical	  care	  be	  made.	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Epilogue	  	  This	   thesis	   has	   sought	   to	   understand	   the	   nature	   of	   harm	   that	   occurs	   in	  moral	  distress	  when	  nurses	  feel	  complicit	  in	  ‘futile’	  care	  and	  to	  examine	  whether	  or	  not	  professionally	   sanctioned	   conscientious	   objection	   to	   ‘futile’	   orders	   ought	   to	   be	  included	  in	  the	  UK	  (and	  other)	  nursing	  codes	  of	  conduct.	  	  The	   nebulous	   nature	   of	   harm	   in	   moral	   distress	   was	   categorised	   as	   a	   primary	  harm	  done	  to	  the	  patient	  and	  a	  secondary	  harm	  done	  to	  the	  nurse,	  and	  indirectly	  to	  the	  patient.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  moral	  distress	  does	  not	  identify	  primary	  harm	  to	  the	  patient.	  Illegal	  orders	  would	  be	  a	  primary	  harm,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  what	  occurs	  in	  moral	  distress.	  Moral	  outrage	  that	  requires	  a	  response	  of	  disobedience	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  nurse,	  would	  be	   the	  correct	   term	   to	  apply	   to	   this	   circumstance	  and	  choice	   of	   action.	   Indeed	   the	   choice	   in	   this	   instance	   is	   one	   of	   professional	  obligation,	  and	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  self-­‐protection.	  	  The	   nurse	   is	   a	   professional	   who	   necessarily	  works	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  doctor,	  and	  to	  avoid	  a	  concession	  to	  this	  fact	  is	  a	  disservice	  to	  nurses.	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  societal	  consensus	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  law,	   and	   philosophically	   is	   supportable.	   Professional	   codes	   differ	   in	   their	  response	  to	   this	   fact,	  but	  once	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  nursing	   is	  examined,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   see	  how	   the	  nurse	  ought	   to	  be	  encouraged	  away	   from	  her	  patient’s	  bedside	   under	   any	   but	   the	   most	   extreme	   circumstances.	   Should	   professional	  codes	  confer	  a	  sense	  of	  authority	  to	  the	  nurse	  with	  regard	  to	  medical	  decision-­‐	  making,	  then	  the	  nurse	  is	  necessarily	  going	  to	  be	  frustrated.	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  The	  intention	  was	  to	  keep	  grounded	  in	  the	  practical	  reality	  of	  clinical	  nursing.	  In	  meeting	  this	  end	  I	  will	  consider	  how	  the	  narrative	  that	  was	  the	  initial	  analysis	  of	  moral	  distress,	  might	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  completed	  analysis.	  	  First	   of	   all,	   the	   events	   of	   the	   narrative	  would	   not	   be	   changed.	  Mrs	  Bird	  would	  most	   likely	   still	   be	   treated,	   unless	   perhaps	   if	   the	   nurse	   decided	   to	   advocate	  further	  for	  her,	  by	  directly	  calling	  the	  consultant	  in	  charge.	  However,	   if	  she	  had	  taken	   into	   account	   the	   importance	   of	   consensus,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   her	   nursing	  and	  medical	  colleagues,	  other	  than	  the	  registrar,	  did	  not	  see	  medicating	  Mrs	  Bird	  as	  a	  misjudgment,	  then	  maybe	  speaking	  with	  the	  registrar	  was	  enough.	  	  The	  nurse	  was	  correct	   in	  her	  prediction	  of	  consequences	   for	  Mrs	  Bird,	  but	   this	  prediction	   had	   been	   based	   on	   caring	   for	   one	   other	   end	   stage	   COPD	   patient	   a	  matter	   of	   a	   few	  days	   before.	   The	   events	   that	   this	   patient	   had	   experienced	  had	  been	  traumatic	  to	  observe,	  and	  although	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  this	  coloured	  the	  nurse’s	  prediction,	  she	  applied	  sound	  reasoning	  to	  the	  concerns	  she	  expressed	  to	  the	   registrar.	   The	   emotional	   distress	   that	   she	   had	   experienced	  with	   this	   other	  patient	  acted	  to	   increase	   the	  emotionally	  distressing	  element	  of	  moral	  distress.	  The	   last	   time	   she	   had	   seen	   this	   patient	   she	   had	   avoided	   going	   into	   his	   room	  because	  she	  knew	  she	  could	  not	  ease	  his	  suffering.	  There	  had	  been	  no	  spiritual	  resolution	  of	   this	   failing	   and	   this	   added	   to	   the	   emotional	   distress.	   Some	  of	   the	  anger	   she	   felt	  must	  have	  been	  a	  projection	  of	   the	  anger	   she	   felt	   for	   this	   failing	  that	  was	  her	  own.	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The	  narrative	   now	   appears	   to	   be	   flawed	  when	   it	   argues	   that	   the	   adherence	   to	  duty	  ought	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  limitation	  of	  sense	  of	  responsibility.	  This	  phrase	  carried	  with	   it	   the	   implication	   that	   the	  nurse	  could	  perform	  acts	   for	  which	  she	  was	   not	   responsible.	   This	   is	   an	   error	   because	   it	   psychologically	   detaches	   the	  nurse	   from	   physical	   actions	   and	  would	   lead	   to	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	   sense	   of	  good	  conscience	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  integrity,	  autonomy	  and	  responsibility	  that	  are	  essential	  to	  nursing	  care.	  	  Instead,	   the	   distinction	   between	   authority	   and	   responsibility	   needed	   to	   be	  defined.	   The	   nurse	  was	   responsible	   for	   all	   of	   her	   actions,	   but	   the	   authority	   to	  decide	   on	   Mrs	   Bird’s	   care	   was	   the	   registrar’s.	   Rather	   than	   accepting	   the	  registrar’s	  conclusion	  that	  the	  consultant	  had	  made	  the	  decision	  and	  therefore	  it	  would	  be	   followed,	   the	  nurse	  ought	   to	  have	   required	  a	   reasonable	   justification	  for	  the	  prescribed	  medical	  treatment.	  The	  registrar	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  educated	  and	  worked	  under	   institutional	  directives	  that	  he	  was	  under	  obligation	  to	  offer	  this	  justification.	  The	  empirical	  data	  that	  the	  nurse	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  would	  have	  been	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  this	  justification.	  The	  registrar	  ought	  to	  have	  broadened	   the	   nurse’s	   perspective	   beyond	   the	   two	   patients	   that	   crowded	   her	  physical	   space	   and	  mind.	  Thereafter,	   the	  nurse	   could	  have	  proceeded	  with	   the	  treatment	  and	  care	  with	  an	  eased	  burden.	  Although	  the	  traumatic	  aspect	  of	  care	  would	   remain,	   this	   justification	   would	   have	   removed	   the	   ‘moral’	   from	   moral	  distress.	  The	  freedom	  to	  be	  physically	  and	  emotionally	  proximate	  to	  a	  patient	  is	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  nursing,	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  wrong-­‐doing	  may	  have	  allowed	  the	  nurse	  to	  remain	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  patient.	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Although	  the	  narrative	  was	  correct	  to	  question	  the	  adherence	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  duty	  and	   the	   code	  of	   conduct,	   perhaps	   it	   failed	   to	   recognise	   that	  blindly	   following	  a	  code	  or	  any	  other	  directive	  is	  a	  form	  of	  overlain	  conscience.	  The	  lack	  of	  flexibility	  that	   this	   results	   in	   fails	   to	   recognise	   the	   complexity	   of	   moral	   and	   emotional	  responses	  to	  caring	  for	  sick	  and	  dying	  people.	  The	  nurse	  would	  have	  benefitted	  more	   from	   the	   partialistic	   and	   relational	   paradigm	   of	   the	   ethics	   of	   care	   in	  relation	  to	  her	  ‘moral	  dilemma’.	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  dialogue	  between	  her	  colleagues	  and	  particularly	  the	  registrar	  might	  have	  continued	  for	  longer.	  But	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  she	  would	  have	  accepted	  the	  offer	  of	  the	  charge	  nurse	  to	  put	  up	  the	  infusion	  for	  her.	  This	  was	  an	  example	  of	  care	  and	  compassion	  from	  a	  colleague,	  and	  the	  duty	  bound	  moralistic	  stance	  of	  the	  nurse	  failed	  to	  be	  open	  to	  receiving	  this	   care	   and	   compassion.	   The	   care	   that	   was	   offered	   touched	   the	   nurse,	   but	  perhaps	   had	   she	   have	   taken	   some	  help,	   particularly	   in	   putting	   up	   the	   infusion	  that	   had	   such	   unpleasant	   side	   effects	   associated	   with	   it,	   she	  might	   have	   been	  more	  able	  to	  remain	  proximate	  to	  her	  patient	  and	  would	  most	  likely	  not	  have	  felt	  the	   need	   to	   withdraw	   from	   her.	   An	   understanding	   that	   proximity	   colours	   the	  moral	  reality	   that	  one	   faces	  would	  have	  also	  helped	  her.	  She	  might	  have	  better	  understood	  that	   the	  emotions	  she	  experienced	  were	  part	  of	   that	  proximity	  and	  that	   as	   distressing	   as	   they	  were,	   they	  were	   also	   the	   source	   of	   compassion	   and	  good	  nursing.	  	  In	   this	   instance	   and	   in	   all	   instances	   of	   ‘futile’	   orders	   it	   is	   right	   that	   the	   nurse	  ought	  not	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  a	  doctor’s	  orders.	  It	  blurs	  the	  boundaries	  of	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  and	  burdens	  the	  nurse	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  authority	  that	  she	  is	  not	  by	  consensus	  deemed	  to	  have.	  If	  she	  does	  not	  concede	  to	  this	  lack	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of	   authority,	   or	   else	   train	   as	   a	   doctor,	   she	   will	   always	   be	   frustrated.	   	   Such	  frustration	   will	   burden	   the	   nurse	   with	   a	   sense	   of	   doing	   wrong,	   and	   will	  necessarily	   take	   time	  and	  energy	  away	   from	  what	  ought	   to	  be	   the	   focus	  of	  her	  work:	  the	  nursing	  care	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  Of	   course	   the	   response	  of	   the	  nurse	   to	   ‘futile’	   orders,	  where	   the	  doctor	   orders	  care	   that	   is	   certainly	   harmful,	   or	   other	   instances	   of	   objective	   harm	   is	   another	  matter.	  This	  thesis	  has	  only	  examined	  the	  case	  that	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  an	  area	  of	  ethical	  uncertainty,	  where	  the	  nurse	  is	  always	  right	  to	  concede	  to	  medical	  orders,	  preferably	   under	   the	   ethical	   conditions	   I	   have	   proposed	   as	   antecedent	   to	   this.	  How	  she	  ought	   to	  prevent	   serious	  harm	   to	  patients	   is	  another	   subject,	  but	  one	  that	  this	  thesis	  certainly	  leads	  onto.	  	  The	  recent	  cases	  of	  patient	  neglect	  that	  have	  highlighted	  serious	  misconduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  nursing	  profession	  only	  serve	  to	  further	  reiterate	  how	  important	  nursing	  care	  is.	  (QCC,	  2011)	  Whatever	  the	  causes	  for	  these	  misdemeanors,	  they	  demonstrate	   the	  necessity	   for	  nurses	   to	   remain	  proximate	   to	   the	  patient	   –	  not	  only	  to	  deliver	  care,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  close	  enough	  to	  experience	  the	  empathy	  that	  is	  a	  source	  for	  ethical	  practice.	  It	  might	  be	  that	  the	  movement	  in	  nursing	  history	  to	  gain	  autonomy	  and	  to	  take	  on	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  and	  authority	  for	  doctors’	  orders	  has	  contributed	  to	  this.	  If	  so,	  then	  a	  professional	  acceptance	  of	  the	  power	  difference	  between	  nursing	  and	  medicine	  might	  be	  an	  important	  step	  in	  nursing,	  because	   it	  means	  that	  nurses	  make	  themselves	  more	   free	  to	  nurse.	   In	  a	  society	  that	  will	  always	  prefer	  cure	  to	  care	  when	  that	  choice	  is	  available,	  this	  is	  perhaps	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the	  best	   that	  nurses	  can	  do.	  Whatever	   the	  case,	   the	  patient	  must	  always	  be	  the	  object	  of	  first	  concern.	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